David Rosenberg - Inside Pine Gap

One segment of the Iraqi military consisted of a large arsenal of Russian-produced Scud missiles, which Iraq had used against Iran during the Iran–Iraq War in the 1980s, [1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chemical_warfare#Iran.E2.80.93Iraq_War and one variable that concerned the intelligence community was that we couldn’t accurately predict where Iraq would place its mobile Scuds. We knew the Scud would not be the ‘game-winner’ for Iraq but if it were used against Israel the Israelis could become drawn into the conflict, possibly alienating some Arab allies. A major objective throughout the intelligence community was to find and locate these mobile Scuds and their associated launch equipment and there was never a moment when the intelligence community was not focused on finding the Scud missiles.

Another more serious concern was Saddam Hussein’s use of chemical weapons, which he had previously used against Iran during the Iran–Iraq War and against the Kurds in the north. [2] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Halabja_poison_gas_attack At Pine Gap, some believed Iraq might become desperate enough to use these unconventional weapons and, if it did, that the United States would retaliate, unconventionally. Fortunately for the coalition soldiers and the Iraqi people, there was no conclusive evidence that Iraq resorted to unconventional warfare during the Gulf War.

When the United States exercised the military option against Iraq it was imperative for the coalition to be prepared with advance intelligence about Iraq’s military posture. The military at Pine Gap had a different perspective from the civilians as they were trained in warfare and knew firsthand the dangers of going into battle against a well-armed enemy.

As Operation Desert Shield evolved and the new year arrived, even those of us with the highest level security clearance at Pine Gap didn’t know the date and time of the first strike against the Iraqi military, and although Desert Shield was announced as a defensive exercise, we knew that a real ground war was fast approaching. The hostile action by Saddam Hussein towards neighbouring Kuwait was denounced by almost every world leader and was condemned by the United Nations. [3] http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/missions/unikom/background.html The disruption to the flow of oil and the uncertain stability of the oil market was a major concern to world leaders and hastened the huge logistical deployment of the military forces arrayed against Iraq. Everyone I worked with hoped that our role of providing intelligence would help to preclude a protracted war that could—given the size of the Iraqi military—cost thousands of coalition lives.

Australia contributed a relatively small but vital contingent of military troops in the Persian Gulf as part of Operation Damask I & II, which provided the bulk of the logistic and administrative support. [4] Stevens, Maritime Power in the Twentieth Century . The Australian Navy also helped enforce economic sanctions against Iraq that were put in place following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. [5] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Australian_contribution_to_the_1991_Gulf_War Although Australian forces did not experience combat during the first Iraq War, ████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████ Pine Gap was an essential part of the ‘silent’ community that was in fact heard loud and clear at the highest echelons in government and by military leaders who were planning the most significant military operation since Vietnam—Operation Desert Storm.

On 29 November 1990, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 678, which set a firm date—15 January 1991—by which Iraq was required to leave Kuwait or the use of force was authorised. [6] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gulf_War#Australia This resolution supported Resolution 660, which stated, ‘1. Condemns the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait; and 2. Demands that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all of its forces to positions in which they were located on August 1, 1990.’ [7] http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/575/10/IMG/NR057510.pdf?OpenElement Iraq chose not to comply with these resolutions; nevertheless by 15 January, Pine Gap still had not received the date and time of the impending first strike against the Iraqi military.

Strategically, 15 January coincided with the favourable offensive military condition of a new moon that would allow a dark sky for the coalition aircraft and military operations. Two nights later, however, I was at work when the mission director told Operations that Tomahawk cruise missiles had just been launched from naval forces against the Iraqi military. The ‘mother of all battles’ had begun!

The mission director was at his desk watching CNN while the operators listened to the news with their headsets as the first missile strikes into Iraq were televised around the world. The coalition kept up the bombing campaign for five weeks, critically damaging defensive systems such as SAMs and neutralising the Iraqi Air Force. My workmates and I were surprised when Saddam Hussein ordered his air force to escape to Iran as we knew that this was a free gift of aircraft to his sworn enemy, most likely never to be seen by him again. We believed Saddam’s ally, Jordan, would have been a wiser choice. (By 2011, not one of the aircraft had been returned. [8] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraqi_wars )

As my colleagues and I found, analysed and relayed information in support of Operation Desert Sabre [9] http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/desert_sabre.htm —the ground phase (soldiers entering Kuwait and Iraq)—the Iraqi military had already been ‘softened’ with constant bombing from coalition aircraft and highly accurate cruise missile strikes. The Iraqi military was left weary and demoralised by the success of the bombing campaign and resultant sleep deprivation from the recurring blasts, loss of Iraqi lives and destruction of the country’s infrastructure.

Utilising intelligence data, the United States Army had penetrated Iraq in advance, performing covert reconnaissance and relaying additional intelligence on the ground prior to 24 February—the day British and American armoured forces crossed the Iraq/Kuwait border and entered Iraq. [10] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gulf_War One day after the start of the ground war, a United States Army workmate said to me, ‘We’ve already lost a thousand soldiers.’ He was expecting the worst and overestimated the will of the average Iraqi soldier to fight on after such a brutal initial assault and against such overwhelming odds. I was pleased to discover that his estimate had been wildly inaccurate, while at the same time saddened to hear that, overall, four Americans had lost their lives. [11] ibid. The mass surrendering of Iraqi soldiers that was shown on television confirmed how effective the coalition strategy had been to break the fighting spirit of the Iraqi military, and the coalition rapidly advanced into Iraq as the intelligence community continued to provide intelligence in support of the coalition military.

During Desert Storm the coalition lost seventy-five aircraft in total. [12] ibid. When an aircraft is shot down over hostile territory, the intelligence community mobilises its resources, including satellite assets, to locate the crew. In these instances, support to rescue and exfiltrate downed pilots and crew becomes the highest priority for the intelligence community. The precedence given to soldiers in this type of immediate danger emphasises the United States Government’s concern for their safety.