Karsten Kunibert Krüger-Kopiske - Die deutsche Kühlschifffahrt - German Reefer Shipping

It was not until 1950 that the QUADRIGA, a relatively modern two-handed ship (built in 1936) was put into service for the banana importer Willy Bruns. But now the reconstruction was much faster than after 1919. In 1956 the refrigeration capacity of 4 million cubic feet was already reached — more than at the beginning of the Second World War — the fleet consisted of 18 ships, one less than in 1940. Besides traditional reefer shipping companies like Laeisz, Rob. Sloman, Union and H. Schuldt, W. Bruns and the Horn Line also left the scene.

20 years after the end of the war in 1965, the fleet consisted of 72 ships with almost 14 million cubic feet of cargo capacity. The previous shipping companies had continued to expand their fleet and with Hamburg Süd and Reederei Heinrich C. Horn two new competitors had joined the fleet. The attentive reader may notice that this figure does not correspond with an article quoted here from the magazine “Hansa” from the same year (there: 52 ships with 12.6 million cbf). This is because “Hansa” only uses banana vessels, but the refrigerated fleet is larger — more in number, less in capacity.

In 1972, the German reefer fleet reached its peak with 83 vessels in terms of number — but not in terms of capacity. At that time, as many as 16 ships were being managed by the new shipping company “Frigomaris”, which managed a large part of the fleet of the Israeli “Maritime Fruit Carriers” and was under German flag.

When the book “Die deutschen Kühlschiffe” by Kludas/Witthohn was published in 1981, a farewell to the German reefer fleet was sung by the authors in the introduction. This was consistent in that the ship, which was not owned by German shipowners, no longer bore the German flag at the stern — and at this time many authors were still emphasising the connection between flag and ownership. We don’t do this, because shipping is an international trade and shipowners let their ships sail under many flags — a trend that can be observed in other countries even before the Second World War and that has also prevailed in Germany since the early 1970s. In 1981, for example, we have 53 ships with 16.5 million cubic feet. Here we also include the fleet of the GDR with 13 ships, the “Belgian” ships of F. Laeisz (seven ships), the out-flagged “Frigomaris” (14 ships) and many other smaller shipping companies, including the Harmstorf ships. In fact, with the HELENE JACOB and the WALTER JACOB in 1983 two more newbuildings came under the (West) German flag. The units chartered by the Bremen Union were developed according to the findings of the “Ship of the Future” project, a project which at that time was intended to keep the German flag internationally competitive.

Under the German or another flag — in 1989 the German merchant fleet reached its low point with 1,410 ships and a total of 7.517 million gross register tons. For refrigerated shipping, 47 ships with 15 million cbf could still be counted at that time — slightly less than in 1981.

In the 1990s the number of refrigerated vessels remained stable, but capacity grew quite prominently during this decade — from 12.8 (1990) to 19.3 (2000) million cbf, i. e. by 25 %. With Thien + Heyenga, Triton and Ost-West, three new shipping companies are entering the market.

In 2006 and 2007 the German reefer fleet then experiences another enormous upswing — it increases from 45 to 75 units and capacity almost doubles from 18.3 to 34.9 — the reefer fleet has never been so large (in terms of capacity). This boost is mainly due to the cooperation between the issuing house MPC Capital and the relatively young East Frisian shipping company Triton and it’s parent company Seatrade. The idea brough forward by MPC was to acquire relatively modern and large reefer vessels within the framework of an investor model (so-called “closed” ship funds) and to employ them at Seatrade Pool. The aim was to offer investors an alternative to the container ship investments otherwise common in Germany in the shipping sector — and the investors took up the offer.

What many investors are always told in such financial projects, but are sometimes forgotten by them, is that shipping is a hgh risk investment — offering a capital-intensive service in international markets offers enormous opportunities but also risks — and shipping — including reefer shipping — has been in troubled waters since the financial and economic crisis of 2007/08 — expected earnings did not materialise and many ships left the German fleet — shipping companies withdrew. The German merchant fleet as a whole shrank from 3,781 ships in 2011 to 1,982 units (mid-2020).

By mid 2020, only two reefer shipping companies from Germany are still active — Ost-West Handel und Schiffahrt GmbH in Bremen with 21 ships and MRA Maritime Reefer Agency GmbH from Hamburg. In addition, “IHS SeaWeb” also identifies three “Horn” ships as belonging to a German organisation, with the technical management being carried out by Norbulk Shipping in Great Britain, so the ships no longer belong to Germany.

Auch wenn dieses Buch die deutsche Kühlschifffahrt, ihre Reedereien und deren Schiffe behandelt, ist ein Blick auf die generelle Entwicklung der Kühlschifffahrt notwendig, um die beschriebenen Sachverhalte einordnen zu können. Die deutsche Kühlschifffahrt hat sich – von einigen speziell deutschen Aspekten abgesehen – meist anhand allgemeiner Linien entlang entwickelt. Und darüber hinaus hat sich die internationale Kühlschifffahrt entlang einer Linie entwickelt, die auch die Schiffahrt im Allgemeinen betroffen hat.

Die Kühlschifffahrt, wie wir sie heute kennen, hatte ihren Ursprung in den Jahren nach 1870 und begann im Wesentlichen mit dem Transport von Gefrierfleisch zwischen der Südhalbkugel und Europa/Nordamerika. Insbesondere in Großbritannien, wo die Bevölkerung infolge der Industrialisierung stark gewachsen war, herrschte ein enormer Fleischmangel. In den britischen Kolonien Australien und Neuseeland sowie in Lateinamerika waren die klimatischen Bedingungen zur Schaf- und Rinderzucht exzellent, und es war genug Platz vorhanden, um große Herden zu entsprechend günstigen Kosten zu halten. Die Preisdifferenz rechtfertigte also den Aufwand. „Das Fleisch, das zwischen 1,5d und 2d pro Pfund gekostet hatte, wurde auf dem Smithfield Market verkauft, das Rindfleisch zu 4,5d bis 5,5d pro lb. und das Hammelfleisch zu 5,5d bis 6d pro lb.“ (Kerbrech, 1998, S. 1)

Dass man im Mutterland den bis zu vierfachen Preis erzielen konnte, rechtfertigte Mühen und unternehmerisches Risiko. Doch der Transport war in der Tat sehr risikoreich, denn bis in die 1870er- Jahre gab es an Bord keine Kühlaggregate, und so wurden die Verschiffungen auf Segelschiffen mit Eis und in isolierten Räumen unternommen. Es waren dann Wettläufe gegen die Zeit mit ungünstigen Windverhältnissen und mit der Durchfahrung der heißen Äquatorzone.

Aber der Transport von lebenden Tieren war in vielen Fällen keine Alternative, denn „der Grund für den Verzicht auf den Import von Lebendvieh war überzeugend. Während der Reise würden einige sterben und alle würden an Gewicht verlieren. Das Fleisch der überlebenden Tiere war geschmacklich minderwertiger als das von Tieren, die einige Wochen lang nicht auf die Reise gegangen waren. Es bestand auch die Gefahr der Einschleppung ansteckender Krankheiten, wobei Rinder aus Russland einen besonders schlechten Ruf hatten.“ (Jarvis, 1998, S. 220)

Also konnte der Transport von Fleisch und der von Kühlladung generell nicht über lange Strecken erfolgreich und wirtschaftlich durchgeführt werden, wenn nicht die entsprechenden Kühl- bzw. Gefrieranlagen an Land und auf den Schiffen zur Verfügung standen. Auf die Technik und derer Entwicklung braucht an dieser Stelle nicht weiter eingegangen werden, wir haben dem Thema einen separaten Teil in diesem Buch gewidmet.