[926]Ibid., p. 151; Victor D. Cha, ‘Engaging China: The View from Korea ’, in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds, Engaging China: the Management of an Emerging Power (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 32–56.
[927]Shambaugh, ‘Return to the Middle Kingdom?’, pp. 33- 4.
[928]South Korea sends more than 13,000 students a year to China, a figure equal to the total number of Koreans who studied in the US at the height of US- South Korean relations between 1953 and 1975; Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive , p. 117.
[929]Shambaugh, ‘ China Engages Asia ’, p. 79.
[930]Chung, ‘ China ’s Ascendancy and the Korean Peninsula ’, pp. 156, 160-61.
[931]Ibid., p. 160.
[932]Ibid., pp. 161-2.
[933]Jonathan D. Pollack, ‘The Transformation of the Asian Security Order: Assessing China’s Impact’, in Shambaugh, Power Shift , pp. 338- 9, 342.
[934]South Korea, however, is fiercely protective of its independence and identity, and took considerable offence over an interpretation by Chinese historians in 2003 that the ancient kingdom of Koguryo (37 BC-AD 668) had been part of China. Intense diplomatic activity in 2004 saw the dispute shelved; Shambaugh, ‘China Engages Asia’, p. 80.
[935]Peter Smith and Richard McGregor, ‘Good Days: Australia Prospers from China ’s Resource Needs’, Financial Times , 2 April 2008. Also ‘A Ravenous Dragon’, a special report on China ’s quest for resources, The Economist , 15 March 2008, pp. 8–9.
[936]‘Australia Shifts Course, Away from US’, posted on www.bbc.co.uk/news. Greg Barnes, ‘Australia Finds a New Role as Sino-US Matchmaker’, South China Morning Post , 26 February 2008, and ‘Rudd Hitches Australia’s Future to Rising China’, South China Morning Post , 14 August 2008.
[937]Fairbank, The Chinese World Order , p. 61.
[938]For an interesting discussion of these issues, see Wang Gungwu, ‘Early Ming Relations with Southeast Asia: A Background Essay’, in Fairbank, The Chinese World Order , pp. 60–62. Also Park, ‘ Small States and the Search for Sovereignty in Sinocentric Asia’, p. 3.
[939]Callahan, Contingent States , pp. 77, 81.
[940]It should be noted that the Chinese continue to insist that negotiations over the sovereignty of the islands must be conducted on a bilateral rather than a multilateral basis, another echo of the tributary system; Callahan, Contingent States , pp. 97- 8.
[941]Ibid., p. 62.
[942]Ibid., p. 94.
[943]Ibid., pp. 33, 66- 7, 78, 83. The Chinese claim the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea on the same basis; Erica Strecker Downs and Phillip C. Sanders, ‘Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism: China and the Diaoyu Islands’, in Michael Brown et al., eds, The Rise of China (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000), p. 51; also Callahan, Contingent States , p. 72.
[944]Willy Lam, ‘ China Flexes Its New Muscle’, International Herald Tribune , 21 December 2007.
[945]Chen Hurng-yu and Pan Shiying, cited in Callahan, Contingent States , p. 96.
[946]Ibid., p. 63.
[947]Reinhard Drifte, Japan’s Security Relations with China since 1989: From Balancing to Bandwagoning (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p. 53.
[948]Callahan, Contingent States , pp. 179- 80.
[949]Ibid., pp. 158- 61, 166, 174.
[950]Ibid., p. 141.
[951]Cited in ibid., pp. 158- 9; also p. 143.
[952]Michael D. Swaine, ‘ China ’s Regional Military Posture’, in Shambaugh, Power Shift , p. 277.
[953]Quoted in Amitav Acharya, ‘Containment, Engagement, or Counter-dominace? Malaysia’s Response to the Rise of China’, in Johnston and Ross, Engaging China , p. 131; also Kim, ‘The Political Economy of Mahathir’s China Policy’, p. 11.
[954]Christopher R. Hughes, Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 154- 5.
[955]Alexander Vuving, ‘Traditional and Modern Sino-Vietnamese Relations’, in Reid and Zheng, Negotiating Asymmetry , p. 9.
[956]Zhao, Chinese Foreign Policy , p. 270.
[957]Li, ‘Security Challenge of an Ascendant China ’, p. 28; Callahan, Contingent States , p. 66.
[958]Shambaugh, ‘ China Engages Asia’, p. 81; Kang, ‘Getting Asia Wrong’, p. 81.
[959]‘Abuse Claims Spark Uproar’, China Daily , 28 November 2005; ‘Malaysia Urged to Probe Women Abuse Cases’, China Daily , 30 November 2005; ‘Police Abuse Images Hurt Tourist Confidence’, editorial, China Daily , 30 November 2005.
[960]‘ Malaysia Urged to Probe Women Abuse Cases’, China Daily , 30 November 2005.
[961]‘Oriental Daily in Danger of Getting Suspended’, Strait Times , 20 January 2006.
[962]Hughes, Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era , p. 81; also Callahan, Contingent States , p. 54.
[963]Quoted in Hughes, Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era , p. 82.
[964]The ethnic Chinese account for the following proportion of the total population: Malaysia 29 %; Brunei 15 %; Cambodia 5 %; Indonesia 3.5 %; Myanmar 20 %; Philippines 2.0 %; Thailand 10 %; Vietnam 3 %. Acharya, ‘Containment, Engagement, or Counter-dominance?’, p. 134; Chua, World on Fire , p. 34.
[965]The Chinese government actively promotes its relations with the overseas Chinese; Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive , p. 77; also pp. 125-7.
[966]Wang Gungwu, China and the Chinese Overseas (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1991), p. 302.
[967]Suisheng Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 280-88.
[968]Zhu Feng, ‘Why Taiwan Really Matters to China ’, 30 November 2004, posted on www.irchina.org
[969]Chu Yun-han, ‘The Political Economy of Taiwan’s Identity Crisis: Implications for Northeast Asia’, paper given at conference on ‘Nationalism and Globalisation in Northeast Asia ’, Asia Research Centre, London School of Economics, 12 May 2007.
[970]Richard Bush, ‘Taiwan Faces China: Attraction and Repulsion’, in Shambaugh, Power Shift , p. 173; Chu Yun-han, ‘The Political Economy of Taiwan’s Identity Crisis’, p. 3.
[971]Chu Yun-han, ‘The Political Economy of Taiwan’s Identity Crisis,’ p. 9.
[972]Chu Yun-han, ‘The Political Economy of Taiwan’s Identity Crisis’, p. 7; Bush, ‘Taiwan Faces China’, pp. 179-80.
[973]Chu Yun-han, ‘The Political Economy of Taiwan’s Identity Crisis’, p. 5.
[974]2005 Taiwan Security Survey, Centre for Election Studies, National Chengchi University, cited in Chu Yun-han, ‘The Political Economy of Taiwan’s Identity Crisis’, p. 8.
[975]Ibid. pp. 12, 14.
[976]Callahan, Contingent States , p. 158.
[977]Ibid., pp. 181-2.
[978]Ibid., p. 193.
[979]Chu Yun-han, ‘The Political Economy of Taiwan’s Identity Crisis’, p. 13.
[980]Chu Yun-han, ‘The Political Economy of Taiwan’s Identity Crisis’, pp. 13–14.
[981]Ibid., p. 13; Swaine, ‘ China ’s Regional Military Posture’, pp. 275-6.
[982]‘Taiwanese Voted for Ma to Fix the Economy Above All Else’, South China Morning Post , 24 March 2008; ‘New Leader in Taiwan Must Strike a Balance’, International Herald Tribune , 24 March 2008.
[983]Callahan, Contingent States , p. 181; Lampton, ‘ China ’s Rise in Asia Need Not Be at America ’s Expense’, p. 321; Robert S. Ross, ‘The Geography of Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-first Century’, in Brown et al., The Rise of China , p. 199.
[984]Callahan, Contingent States , p. 179.
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