Christopher Davidson - After the Sheikhs - The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies

By this time a number of hastily introduced new laws had also come into effect, most of which aimed to limit the kingdom’s increasingly vocal opponents’ use of the media and especially the internet. A decree was issued in late April 2011 that amended the kingdom’s existing press and publications law so as to prohibit all expression, including online comments, that ‘contradicted the rulings of Sharia law’ along with ‘anything that called for disturbing the country’s security, or its public order, or serves foreign interests that contradict national interests’. Moreover, seemingly fearing a backlash against the controversial fatwa, the new law also consolidated the position of the religious establishment by announcing a prohibition on ‘violating the reputation, dignity, or the slander of the Grand Mufti… and members of the Council of Senior Religious Scholars’. By also prohibiting the defamation of ‘any other government official or government institution’, and preventing the ‘publishing without consent of proceedings from any investigations or court trials’, the law effectively elevated senior members of the ruling family above criticism and legitimised the already rampant practice of secret court proceedings. Described by Human Rights Watch as ‘eviscerating any gains in freedom of expression under [the king’s] reign’, the law was accused of ‘effectively throwing the kingdom back to a time when dissent of any sort resulted in arrest’. [904] 108. Human Rights Watch, 3 May 2011.

Although the financial penalties for infringing the law are very high — now approximately $130,000 [905] 109. Al-Watan , 5 June 2011. —a number of bloggers and journalists covering the ‘red line’ topics have also been imprisoned since its introduction. These include a writer [906] 110. Fadhil Makki Al-Manasif. who documented the various arrests that had taken place in the Eastern Province and the peaceful nature of a candle-lit march by female protestors in Qatif; and two young men [907] 111. Mustafa Al-Badr Al-Mubarak and Husain Kazhim Al-Hashim. who were seized after they blogged about the early protests in February and March 2011. Considered by Human Rights Watch as ‘having brought the climate for reform in Saudi Arabia to freezing point’ the arrests have also been viewed as clear evidence that ‘the Saudi ruling family shows no signs that it might ease its iron grip on the right to express political opinions’. [908] 112. Human Rights Watch, 3 May 2011. Most dramatically, in early 2012 it became apparent that a young Saudi journalist [909] 113. Hamza Kashgari. who had been arrested in Malaysia, to where he had fled, was likely to face the death penalty upon his extradition to the kingdom. Having posted tweets that were deemed blasphemous by the Council of Senior Religious Scholars on the grounds that they revealed his uncertainties about the Prophet Muhammad’s teachings, he had also posted controversial tweets in defence of women’s rights in the country, including one that stated ‘No Saudi women will go to hell, because it’s impossible to go there twice’. [910] 114. The Independent , 13 February 2012.

Moves have also been made to strengthen Saudi Arabia’s anti-terror legislation even further in an effort to legitimise the arrests of opposition figures and other activists. Indeed, in July 2011 Amnesty International claimed that a secret new anti-terror decree was being drawn up by the Saudi authorities in order to ‘strangle peaceful protest’ and ‘pave the way for even the smallest acts of peaceful dissent to be branded terrorism’. Having seen a classified copy of the draft law, the BBC confirmed that the proposed changes would allow for even more lengthy detention of suspects without trial (for over 120 days at a time), would further restrict their legal access, and would likely increase the use of the death penalty. Moreover, any questioning of the integrity of Saudi Arabia’s ruling family would become an offence automatically punishable by a minimum of ten years in prison. This has led Muhammad Fahad Al-Qahtani, [911] 115. Not to be confused with Muhammad Al-Qahtani, the alleged twentieth 9/11 hijacker, who is currently in detention in Guantanamo Bay. the co-founder of Saudi Arabia’s Civil and Political Rights Association to claim that ‘[the law] will give an open hand for the minister of the interior to do whatever he wants to do. Basically he will be controlling the judiciary, controlling the public prosecutor, he’s in charge already of the prison system, and there is no way to get a fair trial’. [912] 116. BBC News, 22 July 2011.

As a wealthier Gulf monarchy with a relatively small population and a government that can continue distributing wealth to most of its citizens, Kuwait has mostly avoided violent demonstrations in the wake of the Arab Spring and, thus far, there have been few calls for outright regime change. Moreover, with a slightly more robust parliament than its neighbours the emirate has enjoyed something of a safety valve, as some degree of free expression has been tolerated. Nonetheless there were still intense periods of street protests in 2011 along with strong and very public opposition of the government and the ruling family — most especially the unelected prime minister, Nasser bin Muhammad Al-Sabah. And, as with the other Gulf monarchies, there has been a noticeable crackdown on dissenting intellectuals, journalists, and other activists. Most of the criticism has been centred on government corruption, the squandering of national resources, and the lack of meaningful political and economic reforms, which many Kuwaitis believe are long overdue.

In December 2010, only a week before the beginning of the Tunisian revolution, an outdoor rally was staged in a suburb of Kuwait City by a group of opposition members, including MPs and academics. Accusing the government of trying to amend the emirate’s 1962 constitution and thus limit the powers of Kuwait’s parliament, and protesting that fifteen of the Kuwaiti cabinet’s sixteen ministers remained unelected, the men were only dispersed following a baton charge by Kuwaiti special forces. Dozens of participants were reportedly beaten, with five Kuwaiti nationals being taken to hospital for treatment of their wounds and fractures. [913] 117. Agence France Press, 8 December 2010. A month later, in January 2011, the opposition began making further claims, namely that the government was buying off MPs to ensure their loyalty in parliamentary votes. Calling themselves the ‘Anything but the Constitution’ bloc, the fairly broad-based group then met to discuss and plan their agenda to ‘protect the constitution, basic freedoms, and national unity’ while also condemning the government for ‘putting pressure on media outlets that comment negatively on the government’. In particular, the government’s closures of Al-Mustaqbal daily newspaper and of the Mubasher satellite television channel earlier that month were strongly criticised. Warning the government that it was violating freedoms by suppressing the constitution, one member argued that the authorities ‘…should investigate the sources that fund corrupt media instead of targeting the brave youth of Twitter, who are honest and loyal to Kuwait’. Meanwhile several other members called for the outright removal of the prime minister on the basis that attempts by opposition MPs to pass non-co-operation motions against him should have pushed him to resign his post. [914] 118. Arab Times , 5 January 2011. In early February 2011, with the Egyptian revolution in full flow, the formal opposition’s demands were bolstered by the emergence of an informal coalition of younger Kuwaiti activists, most of whom were made up of students, young professionals, and other social media users. Calling themselves the ‘Fifth Fence’, the group began using Twitter to urge Kuwaiti nationals to stage a mass rally outside the parliamentary buildings in order to protest the government’s ‘undemocratic practices’ and ‘to press for the legitimate right of holding sessions and to declare our rejection of the continuity of this government’. [915] 119. Agence France Presse, 6 February 2011.