Christopher Davidson - After the Sheikhs - The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies

By autumn 2011 the situation in Oman appeared to have stabilised, following scheduled elections in October for its Consultative Council and promises from the ruler that the Council would be granted more legislative power and that 50,000 new jobs would be created, mostly in the public sector. On this latter promise it became clear that Oman had sought assistance from Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf monarchies, as a GCC rescue package of about $10 billion — to be spread out over ten years — had earlier been allocated to Oman, [888] 92. The National , 11 March 2011. in much the same way as Bahrain’s abovementioned financial assistance. But over the course of 2012 there have been several further arrests, with a round-up of several bloggers and internet activists in May 2012. Including a well-known Omani photographer and a female student who writes under the pen name ‘Rose of Dhofar’, they were accused of defaming the ruler and given prison sentences of between twelve and eighteen months. [889] 93. Gulf News , 17 July 2012.

Having intervened militarily in Bahrain and having now positioned itself as the de facto bank-roller of the Bahraini and Omani ruling families in order to help them stave off riots and revolution, any political instability in Saudi Arabia itself will have major ramifications for all of the Gulf monarchies. Indeed, while it can be argued that a revolution or civil war within one of the smaller Gulf monarchies could be contained by its neighbours, any significant strife in Saudi Arabia would quickly spread across its borders. Although still in command of substantial resources, the kingdom is nevertheless under increasing strain, with several of the mounting pressures discussed in this book — including high youth unemployment, poverty, and a growing sectarian divide between its Sunni and Shia populations — reducing its ruling family’s room for manoeuvre. As with Bahrain and Oman there have been protests and numerous killings in the wake of the Arab Spring, but given the kingdom’s much more repressive police apparatus, its even stronger controls over the media, and its generally inhospitable atmosphere for foreign journalists and international non-government organisations, these have not yet received the attention they deserve.

Described as ‘Arabia’s silent protests’ and later as ‘the Middle East’s most under-reported conflict’, [890] 94. The Guardian , 23 January 2012. the Saudi protests began at about the same time as those in Bahrain and not long after crowds began congregating in Cairo’s Tahrir Square. In a direct rebuttal of the Grand Mufti’s position on the Arab Spring, in early February 2011 several senior Saudi scholars and religious leaders openly called on Mubarak to step down in order to ‘prevent further bloodshed’ and to respect ‘the thousands protesting for social and political reforms’. [891] 95. Al-Basheer News , 6 February 2011. The same week a Facebook group was set up by Saudi activists focusing on their own country’s plight. Entitled ‘The People Want to Reform the Regime’ the group soon attracted several thousand followers, most of whom seemed to be Saudi nationals. In addition to demanding ‘the equal distribution of wealth’ and ‘seriously addressing the problem of unemployment’, the group also called for an independent judicial system, anti-corruption measures, and ‘respect for human and women’s rights’. More formally, after Mubarak’s ousting several petitions began circulating in Saudi Arabia. Signed by thousands of prominent Islamists and liberal figures ‘from across the political spectrum’, [892] 96. Washington Post , 20 April 2012. Quoting Waleed Abu Alkhair. the documents included a ‘Declaration of National Reform’ and one entitled ‘Towards the State of Rights and Institutions’. As with the Facebook group the documents focused on the need for further political and social liberties and improved management of the economy. [893] 97. Nolan, May 2011. In mid-February a political party was even launched by opposition figures, despite such organisations remaining illegal in the kingdom. Described as ‘an act of protest’, the new ‘Islamic Umma Party’ was made up of not only Islamists, but also many secular academics, human rights activists, and lawyers. In a letter sent to the king and posted on their website, the party wrote to the king that ‘You know well what big political developments and improvements of freedom and human rights are currently happening in the Islamic world’ and bluntly stated that ‘… it’s time to bring this development to the kingdom’. Meanwhile in an unprecedented public attack on the monarchy a party member and prominent Saudi lawyer [894] 98. Abdul-Aziz Al-Wahhabi. told Reuters that ‘You cannot just have the royal party governing the country. We want to raise this issue with government officials and persuade them’. [895] 99. Reuters, 10 February 2011.

In parallel to these gestures of defiance a number of street protests have also taken place. Although these initially suffered from low turnouts, seemingly due to fear of reprisals by security forces, by April 2011 they had gathered pace and increasingly resembled those in Bahrain and Oman. Unsurprisingly, the largest protests were taking place in the kingdom’s Eastern Province. In some instances several hundred protestors were convening, especially in the Shia-dominated town of Qatif, with most calling for improved human rights and greater political reforms. A protest of more than 200 Saudi nationals also took place in the town of Awwamiya, despite a fatwa having been announced the day before by the government-backed Council of Senior Religious Scholars which stated that demonstrations were against Sharia law. Significantly, the Awwamiya protestors turned out to condemn the Saudi military’s role in Bahrain and in particular the alleged Saudi involvement in the destruction of Shia mosques there. [896] 100. Reuters, 22 April 2011.

The regime’s response to these challenges has thus far been multipronged, much like the responses in Bahrain and Oman, with a mixture of threats, violence, appeasement, and increased government largesse. Having had to imprison some 160 political prisoners in the first two months of the protests, [897] 101. Reuters, 22 April 2011. the king moved quickly to announce the establishment of a new anti-corruption commission while at the same time promising thousands of new public sector jobs. However, the majority of these jobs were viewed as strengthening the kingdom’s security sector as 60,000 were earmarked for the Ministry for Interior — already one of Saudi Arabia’s biggest employers. [898] 102. Nolan, May 2011. In a massive ramping up of the wealth distribution strategy, a raft of new subsidies and public sector salary increases was also announced. Estimated to have cost over $130 billion, which included some $14 billion worth of bonuses paid out to civil servants and a new $530 per month unemployment benefit, the package was clearly intended to provide the majority of Saudi nationals with a temporary panacea in order to insulate them from any further impact from the Arab Spring. To some extent this seemed to work, as by May 2011 a 58 per cent year-on-year increase in consumer spending was reported, as many Saudis began to enjoy their windfalls. [899] 103. Arabian Business , 25 May 2011.

As 2011 progressed and protests continued unabated, especially in Eastern Province, it became evident that these measures would be insufficient to quell all unrest in the kingdom. As with Bahrain, there were reports that the Saudi authorities were seeking foreign mercenaries to join their security forces. In June 2011 a noted Saudi scholar claimed that ‘the Saudis are doing the same [as Bahrain], trying to invite Indonesia and Malaysia to send military troops to protect the monarchy, and we see that from Jordan as well’. [900] 104. Jakarta Globe , 19 June 2011. Quoting Ali Al-Ahmad. Similarly it was reported by Al-Jazeera that the chairman of the Saudi National Security Council [901] 105. Bandar bin Sultan Al-Saud. had made ‘two quiet trips to Pakistan to seek their support in case protests erupted at home’. With the Pakistani media claiming that the Pakistani prime minister [902] 106. Yousaf Raza Gillani. had told the Saudi visitor that ‘…his country supported the Saudi stance in the Gulf and the Middle East and would stand by Riyadh for regional peace’, one observer remarked that ‘the potential need for foreign troops in case protests spiral out of control has forced the Saudis to work with the current Pakistani civilian government for whom they have nothing but utter contempt’. [903] 107. Al-Jazeera English , 30 July 2011.