Christopher Davidson - After the Sheikhs - The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies

Since then the government has hastily tried to create more public sector jobs and raise salaries — following a $10 billion emergency package from the GCC — and has sought to convene a ‘National Consensus Dialogue’ with the various opposition groups and political parties in order to ‘re-launch the political reform processes’ and ‘write a new chapter in the country’s history’. [865] 69. BBC News, 2 July 2011. But the leading Shia political society — Al-Wefaq National Islamic Society — boycotted the discussions and in many ways the other societies involved in the dialogue now no longer really represent the substantial popular protests on Bahrain’s streets. The king also initiated the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry to investigate and report on the crackdown. By appointing several world renowned human rights lawyers above reproach, including former UN lawyer Cherif Bassiouni, the king’s intention was likely to buy some breathing space when dealing with the international community. Indeed, the commission was described by some Bahraini opposition members as being the ‘king’s perfect defence shield’ as it allowed him to continue suppressing protests for several months while appeasing concerned western diplomats and other observers by convincing them that something was being done.

Although the commission’s findings, published in November 2011 and broadcast to the nation, were suitably damning, describing how prisoners were tortured to death, threatened with rape, and often hooded, whipped, beaten, and subjected to electric-shock treatment, [866] 70. The Economist , 26 November 2011. little significant action has since been taken by the authorities. Most individuals and departments blamed by the commission have not been punished, with only ten junior police officers having stood trial, [867] 71. Kinninmont (2012), p. 11. and only a few of the hundreds of political prisoners have been released. Moreover, crackdowns on protests have continued and appear to be no less brutal than before with reports of deaths and torture remaining frequent. These accelerated after the lengthy hunger strike of a key opposition figure [868] 72. Abdulhadi Al-Khawaja. and the reinstatement of the Bahrain Formula One Grand Prix in March 2012—deemed by The Independent newspaper to be the ‘most controversial race’ in F1 history. [869] 73. The Independent , 21 April 2012. With F1’s governing body seemingly oblivious to the situation, over 100,000 protestors reportedly took to the streets, with security forces firing teargas and stun grenades into the crowds. [870] 74. BBC News, 20 April 2012. One demonstrator was even found ‘peppered with birdshot… after having been beaten and partially burned’. [871] 75. Kinninmont (2012), p. 12. Opposition sources now claim that over eighty Bahrainis have died since the uprisings began, [872] 76. Reuters, 31 July 2012. with nearly 5000 Shia having been fired from their jobs, [873] 77. Kinninmont (2012), p. 3. with hundreds of homes having recently been raided, and with over $10 million having been looted by security personnel from Shia communities. [874] 78. Al-Wefaq Society press release, 30 July 2012. Quoting the ‘Gangs of Darkness’ awareness campaign.

As another relatively poor Gulf monarchy, Oman also faced serious protests and riots in 2011. Much like in Bahrain, the protestors were not initially calling for the overthrow of the regime, but were rather expressing their grievances over poor economic opportunities, the lack of political reform, and widespread corruption in the government. Unsurprisingly the most serious protests occurred in Oman’s more indigent areas, notably the northern city of Sohar where a number of protestors — most of whom had congregated around the Globe Roundabout as part of the ‘Green March’—died in clashes with the police in February 2011. But several hundred protestors were also reported to have rallied in the capital city of Muscat where they had translated their banner slogans into English and French for the benefit of the international media. Following swift promises of increased subsidies, pay rises for the public sector, social security benefits for the unemployed, and other benefits estimated to have cost the government $2.6 billion, [875] 79. Reuters, 29 June 2011. Oman’s ruler [876] 80. Qaboos bin Said Al-Said. went on to dismiss twelve ministers in a further effort to appease the opposition. [877] 81. BBC News, 27 February 2011; Reuters, 9 April 2011. But in early April 2011 Omani newspapers ran headlines that makeshift weapons had been discovered in the houses of protestors, including members of a group called ‘Gang of the Dragon’. Photographs were displayed indicating that knives and swords were being manufactured. [878] 82. Gulf News , 9 April 2011; Oman Daily , 8 April 2011. And by the end of the month fresh protests had erupted elsewhere in the country, with hundreds spilling onto the streets of Oman’s southern city of Salalah and with smaller protests taking place in Haima, a key oil-producing region, and in Ibri. The demands again focused on economic concerns and greater government accountability, but this time the authorities found it harder to disperse the protestors, many of whom remained encamped in Salalah’s central square for weeks. [879] 83. Voice of America , 22 April 2011.

Although several hundred protestors were imprisoned during this period, only a small handful was kept in custody. [880] 84. Gulf News , 8 May 2011. Nevertheless, with fresh demonstrations in May 2011 there were reports of much greater heavy-handedness from the security forces — including armoured vehicles being deployed to evict protestors from their tents and dismantle roadblocks, and with shots being fired into the air. Hundreds more prisoners were taken and two protestors were reported to have been shot. Protestors in Salalah claimed that the government was ‘trying to crush [their] movement’ [881] 85. Al-Arabiya , 14 May 2011. and dozens of activists were given one year prison sentences for ‘damaging public property’ and ‘attacking public employees’. [882] 86. Gulf News , 20 June 2011. Seven were even sentenced to five years’ imprisonment, having been charged with ‘shutting down work at a government organisation’. [883] 87. Reuters, 29 June 2011. In turn the wave of arrests led to further protests in summer 2011 when demonstrators in Sohar called for the release of these prisoners in addition to the meeting of their other, earlier demands. Although the ‘young protesters’ were reported to have decided to end their demonstration and return home so as to ‘avoid confrontation with security forces that could have bad consequences’, security forces were nonetheless described as having been ‘present in big numbers’ and teargas and baton charges were used to disperse the remaining crowds. [884] 88. Gulf News , 22 July 2011.

In parallel to the security clampdown, the Omani authorities also began encouraging loyalist rallies, which often involved motorcades of several hundred cars driving around Muscat. Although the state-backed media claimed these were spontaneous displays of affection for the ruler, opposition activists claim that the state-owned telecommunications company [885] 89. Referring to Omantel. had been sending out multiple SMS messages during the nights preceding the rallies, urging Omani nationals to join in. Since the beginning of the protests the authorities have also sought to limit further the actions of existing civil society organisations, especially those relating to human rights. As with most of the other Gulf monarchies a state-backed human rights organisation was set up, and although it did offer support and advice to protestors and political prisoners, its lack of independence and neutrality has been criticised by many observers. Moreover, in 2011 there was a noticeable rise in media censorship, with journalists and bloggers having been arrested. Most significantly, in August 2011 one of Oman’s few independent newspapers— Al-Zaman —was threatened with closure following the publication of an article alleging corruption in the Ministry for Interior. The newspaper’s editor-in-chief was interrogated while the article’s author [886] 90. Youssef Al-Haj. —a prominent Omani journalist and filmmaker, and a participant in some of the protests — was arrested and brought in for questioning. Without access to a lawyer he was charged with ‘insulting the minister for justice and his deputy’, ‘attempting to create a division in society’, ‘abusing the judiciary in Oman’, ‘violating the publications and publishing law’, and ‘practising a profession without a permit from the Ministry for Information’. Representatives for the Committee to Project Journalists explained the writer’s subsequent trial was due to ‘the Omani authorities engaging in retaliatory tactics against [the accused] for his critical writing’ and that ‘the steps taken by the Omani judiciary suggest that this is a political vendetta rather than an effort to apply justice’. Similarly a group of Omani intellectuals, journalists, and activists issued a statement condemning the closure of Al-Zaman , stating that it would ‘… take us back to a world of repression and restriction of freedoms’. [887] 91. Al-Quds Al-Arabi , 12 August 2011.