Christopher Davidson - After the Sheikhs - The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies

Shortly after the summit the Moroccan minister for foreign affairs [846] 50. Al-Tayeb Al-Fassi Fihri. visited Abu Dhabi to convey the ‘…gratitude of King Muhammad to the UAE under the leadership of Sheikh Khalifa for the sincere and fraternal call stated in the final statement of the recent GCC consultative summit for the accession of Morocco to the GCC’. Adding that ‘such a move would further strengthen bilateral ties’, the minister also referred to the ‘…fraternal coordination and co-operation that bind us with these countries since a long time at all levels’, despite Morocco having never had any previous formal engagements with the GCC. [847] 51. WAM , 16 May 2011. Unsurprisingly, within a few months of this and similar meetings between Jordanian officials and GCC representatives, an announcement was made in September 2011 that the GCC would be funding a five year development programme in Jordan and Morocco. Finalised in December 2011 with $2.5 billion being allocated to each state, the deal was viewed by some analysts as being a ‘…consolidation of monarchies that are solidly Sunni’ and with the ‘…attraction [for the Gulf monarchies] being assistance… from [Jordan’s] well-trained military’. [848] 52. The National , 13 September 2011; Reuters, 20 December 2011. Similarly Reuters reported that the deal reflected the Gulf monarchies’ need for ‘…closer ties with Arab kingdoms outside the Gulf as part of efforts to contain the pro-democracy unrest that is buffeting autocratic ruling elites throughout the Arab world’. [849] 53. Reuters, 20 December 2011.

Bahrain, unsurprisingly, has been the biggest flashpoint in the Persian Gulf since the onset of the Arab Spring. As one of the poorest of the monarchies and, beset by a long history of sectarianism, its ruling family has had to contend with almost all of the mounting pressures discussed in this book. On the back of the Egyptian revolution, the Bahraini protests saw an estimated 150,000 nationals streaming onto the streets of Manama following an initial ‘day of rage’, on 14 February 2011. [850] 54. Kinninmont, Jane, Bahrain: Beyond the Impasse (London: Chatham House, 2012), p. 3. Organised by various youth groups, rather than established political societies, the size and strength of this movement took many by surprise. Although the majority of the protestors were Shia — understandable given the long-running discrimination they have faced and their reduced economic opportunities — there were also many Sunni participants, [851] 55. New York Times , 15 February 2011. with slogans of ‘No Sunni, No Shia, Just Bahraini’ being chanted. [852] 56. Kinninmont (2012), p. 9. Calling for the fulfilment of the 2001 National Action Charter, these early demonstrations were not specifically aiming to topple the ruling Al-Khalifa family, but were more modestly focused on getting the government to deliver on earlier promises of political reform and the release of political prisoners. With surprising vigour, however, the Bahraini security services clamped down heavily on the protests, deploying teargas, water cannons, and even live ammunition. The Pearl Roundabout monument — a focal point for the first wave of protests — was even bulldozed in March 2011, despite it representing a key period of Bahrain’s history. Clearly fearing a revolutionary landmark such as Cairo’s Tahrir Square, the rubble around the roundabout was cordoned off, and at least thirty well-established Shia mosques and other religious structures in the kingdom were similarly destroyed — officially on the grounds that they were operating without licences. [853] 57. Ibid. p. 10.

At about this time the protests had begun to reach Manama’s financial district and were being predicted to soon reach palaces and government buildings. The Bahrain Formula One Grand Prix — a central pillar in Bahrain’s economic strategy — even had to be called off, [854] 58. BBC Sport, 21 February 2011. much to the consternation of the ruling family. Clearly concerned that the king was due to be ousted in the same manner as the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes, the Bahraini security forces unleashed a massive series of reprisals on the suburbs and villages believed to be home to most of the protestors. Moreover, in order to bolster the defences of their key government and security installations a deployment of about 1500 Saudi soldiers and over 500 UAE security personnel were invited to cross the King Fahd Causeway that links Bahrain to mainland Saudi Arabia. An unprecedented move for these Gulf monarchies, [855] 59. There are, however, many eyewitness reports that Saudi troops entered Bahrain during the various uprisings in the 1990s. See Kinninmont (2012), p. 3. the deployment was justified on the grounds that it was an official response of the GCC’s aforementioned Peninsula Shield Force, despite there being no threat of foreign invasion and despite there being no significant contingents from the other Gulf monarchies. [856] 60. The exception being a reported Kuwaiti naval patrol. Although the Bahraini authorities communicated to their citizens that ‘…the foreign [Saudi and UAE] troops have started arriving to Bahrain in light of the regretful situation the kingdom is currently witnessing’ and called upon ‘…all citizens and residents to co-operate fully with the GCC forces and welcome them warmly’ [857] 61. Los Angeles Times , 15 March 2011. within days there were reports that Saudi and UAE forces had been engaging with protestors and taking part in arrest squads. [858] 62. Global Research special report on Bahrain, 10 April 2011.

Unable to quell the protests, several hundred more political prisoners were taken, including academics, journalists, human rights activists, and even doctors and nurses — the latter groups having witnessed the injuries and deaths sustained by the protestors. Further delegitimising the regime, reports also began to circulate that the Bahraini government was trying to bolster its security services with fresh mercenaries from Pakistan and elsewhere. Having always had a substantial contingent of Pakistani nationals serving in its security sector, along with many Jordanian and Yemeni soldiers, it was believed that the authorities were trying rapidly to increase rapidly the number of non-Arabs in their employment, presumably on the grounds that such foreigners would be more willing to open fire on Bahraini nationals. A Pakistani conglomerate with close links to the Pakistani military was understood to have been recruiting and airlifting thousands of soldiers to Bahrain, while adverts for the ‘Urgent Need of the Bahraini National Guard’ had begun to appear in Pakistani newspapers soon after the first protests in Bahrain. [859] 63. Al-Jazeera English , 30 July 2011; Express Tribune Pakistan , 11 March 2011. Later in 2011 reports also began circulating that Bahrain was trying to recruit from Indonesia and Malaysia, with a noted Saudi scholar claiming that the ‘Bahraini monarchy was at the end of its rope’ and that ‘they [the monarchy] do not trust even the loyalists in Bahrain so they need to seek mercenaries from elsewhere — and these mercenaries will one day be captured and tried in public’. [860] 64. Jakarta Globe , 19 June 2011.

Unsurprisingly, the protestors’ key demands soon evolved from simple demands for political reform to full blown regime change, with chants of ‘Down with Hamad’—referring to the king [861] 65. Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa. —becoming commonplace. Moreover, Bahrain’s aforementioned long-serving prime minister [862] 66. Khalifa bin Salman Al-Khalifa. —a member of the ruling family and an uncle of the king — was being publicly accused of leading the crackdown and inviting the Saudi, UAE, and other foreign troops into the kingdom. Over the summer of 2011 the protests continued unabated with frequent reports of killings, arson, and the seizing of activists. Many of these crackdowns were recorded by onlookers on their smart phones and uploaded onto You-Tube or other video-sharing websites. These have been viewed by thousands of other Gulf nationals and heavily discussed on social media platforms. Facing criticism that Al-Jazeera was not covering the various Arab Spring revolutions in a uniform manner, the Qatar-based network even produced a documentary on the Bahraini protests. Entitled Shouting in the Dark it was watched by more than 200,000 YouTube users in the first week that it was broadcast. Depicting police brutality and various other human rights violations, it led to a diplomatic rift between Qatar and Bahrain, with the latter’s minister for foreign affairs [863] 67. Khalid bin Ahmad Al-Khalifa. tweeting ‘It’s clear that in Qatar there are those who don’t want anything good for Bahrain. And this film on Al-Jazeera English is the best example of this inexplicable hostility’. [864] 68. Al-Jazeera English , 5 August 2011.