Christopher Davidson - After the Sheikhs - The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies

With the UAE Five in prison and with www.uaehewar.net eventually going offline after the website’s owners were unable to renew its subscription from their prison cells, the government shifted its focus to top-down reforms and distributing largesse to the national population. In addition to an expansion of the electorate for the September 2011 Federal National Council elections, massive salary increases were also announced for public sector employees, in some cases of up to 100 per cent, while welfare benefits were increased by up to 20 per cent and a $2.7 billion package to assist poorer nationals with outstanding loans was set up. Interviewed by a state-backed newspaper, ministerial employees benefiting from the salary increases stated ‘this is not the first time the President has surprised us with his generosity… it is not about the financial benefit, but about how the people of the country are taken care of’ and ‘it was a big surprise that makes everyone happy, it is like a prize for all’. Similarly, other interviewees stated they planned to use the increases to buy new cars, indulge their wives and children, and upgrade rooms in their houses. [944] 148. The National , 1 December 2011. A seemingly minor perk, highly symbolic free parking permits for UAE nationals in Dubai, was also announced. [945] 149. Arabian Business , 17 April 2011.

In parallel to this spending programme, it was exposed in May 2011 that the UAE had been hiring a private army of foreign soldiers. Much like the focus on mercenaries in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, it seemed that the UAE authorities were similarly unwilling to take any chances on uncontrollable street protests in the wake of the Arab Spring. Revealed by the New York Times in an extensive report, the crown prince of Abu Dhabi had been employing the founder of Blackwater, a private military company, to create a secret 800-strong force made up of Columbian and South African fighters. At a cost of over $500 million, a base had been constructed in Abu Dhabi’s interior and the men brought into the UAE posing as construction workers. According to documents associated with the project, the force’s raison d’être was to conduct special operations missions inside and outside the country, defend oil pipelines and skyscrapers from terrorist attacks, and — crucially—‘put down internal revolts’. Further to this latter objective, the report also stated that the Blackwater founder was under strict instructions to hire no Muslim mercenaries as ‘Muslim soldiers… could not be counted on to kill fellow Muslims’, while another document associated with the project described ‘crowdcontrol operations where the crowd is not armed with firearms but does pose a risk using improvised weapons such as clubs and stones’. [946] 150. New York Times , 14 May 2011.

Within days of a November 2011 report by the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, which concluded that the imprisonment of the UAE Five was arbitrary and that the UAE government should release the men and pay them reparations, [947] 151. The Arabic Human Rights Network press release, 14 February 2012. they were freed in time for the UAE’s national day celebrations on 2 December. Although the men were convicted of ‘publicly insulting the UAE’s leaders’, sentenced to three years imprisonment, and then pardoned within 24 hours — seemingly in an effort to portray Abu Dhabi’s ruler as being magnanimous — their names were not cleared of the supposed crime. Nonetheless, soon after their release UAE Five immediately resumed their online activities, appearing stronger than before. They renewed most of their demands and were quickly followed by thousands of UAE nationals on various social media platforms. By the end of the year the opposition seemed to have broadened, with the government facing further criticism for stripping seven Islamist critics, including a judge, of their citizenship. Referred to as the ‘UAE Seven’, they claimed they were ‘unjustly targeted for their political views’ after having earlier signed a petition on behalf of an indigenous Islamist organisation entitled the Reform and Social Guidance Association [948] 152. The UAE reform movement — sometimes referred to as ‘Al-Islah’—is indigenous, founded in 1974, and is not affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood. which was calling for an end to ‘all oppressive measures against advocates of reform in the country’. [949] 153. Associated Press , 22 December 2011.

Over the course of 2012 the situation has greatly deteriorated. In March a young UAE national [950] 154. Salah Al-Dhafairi. was arrested for tweeting about the Arab Spring. He was accused of ‘damaging national security and social peace’ and handed over to a state security court, [951] 155. Associated Press , 12 March 2012. before being re-arrested at a mosque in April. In May a prominent stateless person [952] 156. Ahmed Abd Al-Khaleq. —one of the original UAE Five and well known for running a website detailing the plight of the UAE’s bidoon — was arrested, stripped of his residency papers, and deported to Thailand — a country he had never visited before. [953] 157. Al-Jazeera News , 16 July 2012. By the end of July dozens more activists had been arrested, bringing the total number of political prisoners to fifty-four. These included academics, human rights activists, Islamists, and even a ruling family member. [954] 158. Sultan bin Kayed Al-Qasimi, a member of the Ra’s al-Khaimah ruling family. He was held under house arrest at the ruler’s palace. The former of director of Abu Dhabi’s educational zone [955] 159. Issa Khalifa Al-Suwaidi. and former president of the Jurists’ Association [956] 160. Muhammad Al-Mansoori. were arrested along with a number of lawyers, [957] 161. Most notably Salim Hamdoon Al-Shehhi, Abdulsalam Darwish, and Muhammad Al-Roken. some of whom were detained when they tried to represent arrested activists. [958] 162. Human Rights Watch, 1 August 2012; Emirates Centre for Human Rights, 31 July 2012. In some cases the sons of these have men were imprisoned [959] 163. For example Rashid bin Muhammad Al-Roken. and lawyers from Kuwait and Qatar trying to travel to the UAE to defend the detainees were denied entry. Interestingly, the fifty-four prisoners represent all seven emirates, almost all had active Twitter accounts prior to their arrests, and they represent more or less the full spectrum of opposition in the country. Most are being held without charge and several have reported incidents of torture, with some having been beaten or followed by plain clothes security prior to their detainments. One prisoner, originally detained for being a member of a terrorist organisation, was then accused of Muslim Brotherhood membership, before finally being officially accused of embezzlement at his workplace. [960] 164. Muhammad Rashid Al-Kalbani, an Omani passport holder.

As the smallest of the Gulf monarchies, with a tiny national population and one of the world’s highest GDP per capita, the Qatari ruling family and its government have largely escaped the past year unscathed, with few serious opponents emerging and with no significant calls for political reform. Indeed, the November 2011 announcement that elections would be held in 2013 for Qatar’s Advisory Council was less a concession to popular demands and more a case of being a top-down, pre-emptive strike by a forward-thinking ruler. Moreover, with 2011 and 2012 witnessing Qatar’s public and diplomatic support for various Arab Spring movements elsewhere in the region — as an extension of its described role as peace-broker and mediator — the emirate has been careful to distance itself from its neighbouring Gulf monarchies and their predominantly anti-Arab Spring, counter-revolutionary stances. This strategy, although high risk, has allowed Qatar’s ruler [961] 165. Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani. to avoid losing legitimacy in the manner of his peers, and in many respects has allowed him to capitalise on the Arab Spring despite being one of the region’s most autocratic rulers.