Christopher Davidson - After the Sheikhs - The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies

Most notably, after Qatar’s Al-Jazeera news network seemed to have played a pivotal role in galvanising support for the Tunisian and Egyptian protestors in early 2011 by relentlessly broadcasting the events that led to their dictators’ respective downfalls, Qatar then took a leading role in efforts to solve the Libyan crisis, ultimately backing the Benghazi-based rebel government in its campaign to oust Muammar Gaddafi’s regime. In April 2011 Qatar became the first country in the world to offer diplomatic recognition to the Libyan National Transitional Council, and Doha hosted a meeting of the Libya Contact Group — a collection of entities committed to finding a ‘new political direction’ for the war-torn country. [962] 166. Foreign Policy , 12 April 2011. Remarkably, Qatar then despatched six of its fighter jets to contribute to the NATO-led no fly zone over Libya, [963] 167. New York Times , 4 April 2011. and in the latter days of the conflict was believed to have provided weapons and even small detachments of special forces to facilitate the rebels’ storming of Tripoli. Since then Qatar has been similarly supportive of the Syrian opposition, having formally recognised the Free Syrian Army and the coalition of rebel movements working towards Bashar Al-Assad’s ouster. Most dramatically, in January 2012 the Qatari ruler made a public call for Arab troops to intervene in Syria, stating in a high profile interview on CBS News that the rest of the Arab world had a duty to ‘stop the killing’. [964] 168. Voice of America , 14 January 2012. Since then, there have been very frequent reports that Qatar is among a handful of countries actively arming the Syrian rebels. [965] 169. Most reports highlight assistance from Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. Turkish assistance can be viewed through the lens of border security while Saudi assistance can be viewed through the lens of countering Iran’s presence in the region. Qatar’s assistance, however, is best viewed through a moral lens. For a full discussion see Stephens, Michael, ‘What Does Qatar Want in Syria?’ Open-Democracy , 6 August 2012.

Qatar’s Arab Spring policy has not been without its obstacles, however. Despite the official line, as summed up by a prominent member of the ruling family, being that ‘we believe in democracy, freedom, dialogue, and we believe in that for the entire region’ and despite the aim seeming to be ‘[hoping] that the people of the Middle East will see us as a model, and they can follow us if they think it is useful’, [966] 170. New York Times , 4 April 2011. Quoting Jabar bin Yusef bin Jassim Al-Thani. the Qatari ruling family is still treated with suspicion by revolutionary forces in the region. A number of Gulf nationals and even Qatari nationals have voiced their suspicions, seemingly believing that the emirate’s maverick foreign policy and public support for democratic movements is simply another aspect of the monarchy’s wily survival strategy. The most obvious discrepancy has been the Qatari position on the Bahraini revolution, as although Qatari forces did not contribute to the Saudi-led military intervention, and although Al-Jazeera did eventually broadcast the ‘Shouting in the Dark’ documentary, this seemed to be an inconsistent response when compared with Qatar’s vociferous and high profile support for Tunisian, Egyptian, Libyan, and Syrian protestors. Notably, Qatar did not publicly condemn the brutal crackdowns in Bahrain, and the Arabic version of Al-Jazeera has been heavily criticised for shying away from covering the events in Manama. Moreover, when a live discussion programme on Al-Jazeera English was scheduled following a repeat broadcast of ‘Shouting in the Dark’, the producers removed a prominent Bahraini human rights activist from the three person line-up at the last minute, permitting only a member of the Bahraini government and the author to put forward their views. [967] 171. Al-Jazeera English , 12 August 2011. The show was entitled Inside Story: Bahrain . The Bahraini government representative was Jamal Fakhro and the Bahraini human rights activist was Maryam Al-Khawaja, head of the Foreign Relations Office for the Bahrain Center for Human Rights.

Following senior resignations at Al-Jazeera Arabic in 2011, seemingly as a result of the network’s inability to offer fair coverage of the Arab Spring, suspicions over Qatar’s intentions continued to mount. These were further exacerbated following the widespread dissemination in 2011 of a leaked US cable, originally dating from 2009, which described the Qatari regime’s apparent manipulation of the network to suit its policy objectives. Referring to several memoranda, the cables claimed that Al-Jazeera was being built up by the Qatari ruling family as a ‘bargaining tool to repair relationships with other countries’, and cited the example of Qatar’s improved relations with Saudi Arabia being based on the network’s ‘toning down of criticism of the Saudi royal family’. Before concluding that Al-Jazeera was ‘proving itself a useful tool for the station’s political masters’, the cable also damningly claimed that the Qatari prime minister [968] 172. Hamad bin Jassim Al-Thani. had told a prominent US senator [969] 173. John Kerry. that Qatar had proposed a bargain with Hosni Mubarak which involved ‘stopping [Al-Jazeera] broadcasts in Egypt for one year in exchange for a change in Cairo’s position on Israel-Palestinian negotiations’. [970] 174. The Guardian , 6 December 2010.

Meanwhile, on a domestic level there continues to be criticism that the Qatari authorities promote self-censorship of the media, with local newspapers and television stations being unable to cover a number of delicate issues in the emirate. Indeed, further to the difficulties faced by the Doha Centre for Media Freedom, the leaked cable also commented that the US embassy had ‘assessed a steady lack of overall media freedom in Qatar’ and believed that ‘although overt and official censorship is not present, self and discreet official censorship continues to render Qatar’s domestic media tame and ineffective’. [971] 175. The Guardian , 6 December 2010. There has also been criticism that the Qatari authorities — in much the same way as the other Gulf monarchies — are quite prepared to repress their own citizens, if necessary. In March 2011, for example, Amnesty International reported that a Qatari blogger and human rights activist [972] 176. Sultan Al-Khalaifi. —the founder of an organisation that monitors cases of arbitrary detention in the emirate — was himself seized. He was reportedly arrested by eight members of Qatar’s security services and his home, car, and computer were searched without warrant. [973] 177. Amnesty International press release, 3 March 2011.

The state formation processes of the smaller Gulf monarchies, and in particular their historic relationships with Britain and other foreign powers, are crucial to understanding the political institutions that developed — especially those that fit with the neo-patriarchy and liberalised autocracy arguments. Equally, in Saudi Arabia knowledge of the state that formed around the long-running alliance between the ruling family and the religious establishment remains central to any contemporary analysis. Important too have been the various components of the ruling bargains or social contracts that have been constructed by these polities. As per the rentier state model, the distribution of wealth along with the creation of a national identity and the formation of an indigenous rentier elite class that sits above all expatriates have been paramount. But other, non-economic legitimacy resources also clearly matter. As expected by revised modernisation theory approaches, Michael Hudson’s mosaic model, and observers of these regimes’ re-orientalisation strategies, these bargains have included cults of personality, the co-option of religion, tribal heritage, and other traditional sources of power and authority.