Christopher Davidson - After the Sheikhs - The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies

The UAE’s ruling families appear to be in a stronger position, as most citizens currently seem content with the state’s ability to keep distributing wealth. But as with the Saudi and Kuwaiti spending programmes, it is questionable how long such generosity can be sustained. Indeed, a decree was circulated in Abu Dhabi government departments in March 2012 stating that a number of the promised big salary increases could not, after all, be delivered. [995] 22. Personal interviews, Beirut, March 2012. Moreover, it is unlikely that the situation in the poorer northern emirates can be contained or remedied in the near future, and street protests or other manifestations of opposition will probably soon emerge, most probably in Ra’s al-Khaimah. Most importantly, the UAE monarchies have faced a serious and likely permanent loss of legitimacy over the past year, largely because of the alacrity with which they resorted to repression. Although the bulk of the population has certainly been scared by the large number of arrests, especially as they have included prominent and educated UAE nationals, the strategy seems to have backfired as total acquiescence has not been achieved and the UAE’s international reputation — which is very important given its described economic model and emphasis on soft power strategies, especially in the West — is undoubtedly going to become tarnished.

Reminiscent of 2011’s collapsing North African regimes, a number of the recent UAE arrests have been accompanied by official government press releases claiming that there is an ‘international plot’ and that the opposition has connections to ‘foreign organisations and outside agendas’. [996] 23. WAM , 15 July 2012. Meanwhile, the ruler of Ra’s al-Khaimah delivered a speech in May 2012, also reported by the official state news agency, warning ‘those who poked their noses into the UAE’s [internal] affairs to mind their own business’. He went on to explain ‘We hear today… that there are some who are trying to tamper with the stability of the UAE. I would like to say to them: the people of the UAE don’t need lessons from anyone. They are confident in themselves and in the solidarity that they share. They don’t change’. Referring to the aforementioned citizenship-stripping practice, he also explained that ‘He who does not like this should leave for another place. Any treachery is a shame for him, and for his country’, before concluding that ‘the UAE is sheltered by the heritage of Sheikh Zayed and by the achievements of the president, His Highness Sheikh Khalifa, and of the rulers and Supreme Council members, and is safeguarded by its people, who are loyal to the nation, the country and its leadership. We don’t care about the raising of trivial things and arguments that have already been defeated’. [997] 24. WAM , 7 May 2012. Most recently, even the ruler of Sharjah — as described, a key benefactor to several Western universities — joined the chorus, explaining that ‘…these people were held at airports, or at border crossings with Oman or Qatar… they were running away to establish an outside organisation’. Most worryingly, in a sort of twisted paternalism he claimed that the arrests were part of a measure to ‘help those who deviated’ and that the state’s measures were ‘to protect its sons’ and to provide ‘treatment, not punishment’. [998] 25. Gulf News , 2 August 2012. These ruling family backlashes — likely to become anti-Western — will most probably intensify, as a London-based, Syrian-style observatory for human rights — the Emirates Centre for Human Rights — has now been established. Detailing the various human rights abuses in the UAE and recording the status of all political prisoners, it has begun to lobby against the UAE regime in the international community. [999] 26. See www.echr.org.uk

As the only outlier, the Qatari ruling family’s future is a little rosier than that of the other Gulf monarchies: the state can actually sustain high spending and wealth distribution to its national population. As one recent study put it, ‘It seems at first glance Qatar has bought itself out of the possible ill effects of modernity’. [1000] 27. Fromherz, Allen J., Qatar: A Modern History (London: IB Tauris, 2012), p. 8. Furthermore, it lacks a poor hinterland, is relatively calm, and has fewer issues of sectarianism or discrimination, and it is generally perceived as having played a positive role in the Arab Spring. The ruler also seems to be more sympathetic than his regional counterparts towards his citizenry’s cultural and religious practices, and it’s possible he may follow a route towards constitutional monarchy in the next few years. Nonetheless there are a number of areas of concern, and if mismanaged these could still derail the ruler’s liberal autocratic ambitions. In particular, if a more organised opposition does emerge, the authorities might still be tempted to resort to heavy handedness, which could delegitimise the ruler and expose his limitations to his own people and the rest of the Arab world. Various websites and Facebook groups have already been set up, including a ‘Revolution in Qatar’ forum which features cartoons of the ruler dressed as an Orthodox Jew or depicted naked, with a US flag draped around his body and horns protruding from his head. It also features photographs of the ruler meeting with Israeli officials. Although these groups are not yet very active — at least compared to similar groups focusing on other Gulf monarchies — and although they still seem to focus mostly on Qatar’s foreign policy, they could be used to discuss future arrests or crackdowns against activists in the emirate itself, or could facilitate discussions about the ruling family, corruption, or other red line issues. Already, for example, the groups contain much criticism of the ruler’s wife’s dress code which is deemed ‘too open and public for the wife of a ruler’, [1001] 28. Ibid., p. 30. along with calls for genuine democracy. Indeed, as reported by the New Statesman , the audience of a recent Doha Debates forum voted overwhelmingly in favour of democratisation over economic liberalisation which — although perhaps not yet representative of the nation — indicated that the increasingly well-educated Qatari youth are likely to push soon for a new environment where legitimate democratic discussion can take place. [1002] 29. New Statesman , 25 February 2011.

The original, British edition of this book went to press in summer 2012. At that time there was little, if any, mainstream discussion outside the region of the prospect of serious political unrest or regime failure in the Gulf monarchies. Academia and the policy community, at least among the monarchies’ Western allies, had for the most part ‘ring-fenced’ these states as exceptional and somehow aloof from the Arab Spring movements sweeping the broader Middle East. With extensive trade and military ties to the West, coupled with the described accumulation of ‘soft power’ influence, this position was both predictable and understandable. With a mixture of carrots and sticks the poorer Gulf monarchies had, after all, managed to contain most of the protests that had spilled onto their streets in the immediate aftermath of the revolutions in North Africa. Meanwhile, the wealthier monarchies seemingly remained in command of largely apolitical, well-heeled societies with little, if anything, in common with those dwelling in the angry tenements of Tunis, Cairo, or Tripoli.

Since then, however, much has changed. By the winter of 2012 most leading Western broadsheets were carrying articles and predictions of either monarchical collapse or at least some serious impending turbulence. Veteran foreign affairs correspondents filing reports on protests, trials, growing poverty, and cyberspace activism in the Gulf states became commonplace, with even leading US think tanks publishing on the prospects of ‘Revolution in Riyadh.’ With a growing awareness of the rising discontent among increasingly large swathes of Gulf nationals, and being better plugged into regional grassroots campaigns and emerging opposition groups, the international commentariat seemed to have finally woken up to the struggle that had already begun to take place between the people of the region and their increasingly authoritarian and reactionary elites.