Günter Bischof - The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968

Senator Jackson was generally more sympathetic to the views expressed by Messrs. Clifford and Nitze and concurred in the view that the most practical alternative to the Symington Amendment was an acceptable substitute amendment.

Mr. Nitze expressed the view that the Executive branch should not be asked to develop “for-the-record” a substitute amendment because of the subsequent problems it would create with our NATO allies. The Senators accepted Mr. Nitze’s suggestion but asked if State and Defense could work informally with them in developing an acceptable substitute.

At a White House meeting last Friday evening, (which General Wheeler and Mr. Clifford attended) Mr. Nitze had been told that while the President was pleased that Messrs. Clifford and Nitze had met with the Senators, he didn’t want anyone in the Executive Branch taking positions which would endorse a withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe. The net result of the President’s instruction is that work should continue on the REDCOSTE proposals but that we should characterize this effort as an “investigation of possibilities and not as a “decision document.”

Mr. Nitze said that notwithstanding the President’s instructions of Friday evening, serious balance of payments problems persist. Dr. Brown remarked that the RECOSTE effort had been characterized as a series of proposals to reduce “people,” not “forces.” Mr. McGiffert asked if we were still obliged to work privately with Senators Jackson and Stennis. Mr. Stempler noted that the ground rule affecting our informal work on an acceptable substitute amendment with the Senators apparently had been changed. Mr. Nitze said that since the Senatorial debate over the Symington Amendment would not take place for about two weeks, there would be an opportunity to review again the Executive Branch’s position with the President. Mr. Nitze then suggested that if anyone had a good idea on how Senatorial support could be mobilized for current NATO deployments he should contact Jack Stempler.

[…]

Staff meeting adjourned at 1035.

Abbott C. Greenleaf, Colonel, USAF, Military Assistant

“Top Secret” Secretary of Defense Staff Meeting, 22 July 1968

Mr. Clifford, Nr. Nitze, Mr. Resor, General Westmoreland, Mr. Baird (for Mr. Ignatius), Admiral Claret (for Admiral Moorer), Dr. Brown, General Wheeler, Dr Enthoven, Mr. Warnke et al.

1. Mr. Clifford’s trip to Southeast Asia

Mr. Clifford began the meeting at 0940.

[…]

5. U.S. Forces in Europe

Mr. Nitze said that with regard to the Symington Amendment to reduce U.S. military forces in Europe we have had two good editorials recently in the New York [T]imes and the Washington Post . We have the problem of how to handle Senator Jackson and work with him on alternative proposals. The President does not want to suggest moving any troops out of Europe. We have talked with Dorothy Fordick of Senator Jackson’s staff. We are suggesting language in the report of the Senate committee covering several kinds of amendments that could be made rather than suggesting an amendment to the bill. Mr. Clifford emphasized that the President feels strongly on this matter and doesn’t want to cut our forces in Europe at all at this time.

[…]

The meeting adjourned at 1042.

R. Eugene Livesay, Staff Secretary

“Secret” Secretary of Defense Staff Meeting, 29 July 1968

Mr. Clifford, Mr. Nitze, Mr. McGiffert (for Mr. Resor), General Palmer (for General Westmoreland), Mr. Ignatius, Admiral Moorer, Mr. Hoopes (for Dr. Brown), Lt. General McKee (for General McConnell), General Wheeler, Dr. Enthoven, Mr. Warnke et al.

1. Negotiations in Paris

Mr. Clifford began the meeting 0938.

[….]

3. Negotiations with the Soviets on Strategic Weapons

Mr. Clifford said there is widespread public interest in the strategic talks with the Soviet Union. There is some indication that these could start within a month or two. He would caution that the press will be wanting to pick up pieces of information from Defense and State. All should be careful in this regard. No information of any kind whatsoever is to be given out. We can remain hopeful on the results of these talks. The talks will have a better chance of success if the lid is kept on comments.

4. USSR/Czechoslovakia Confrontation

Mr. Clifford said we are staying out of this one. We believe the best policy is to permit the Soviets and the Czechs to adjust their differences. We have a number of items going with the Soviet Union and it would be exceedingly unfortunate time to get involved. Here again he cautioned against comments on the situation by Defense personnel.

[…]

The meeting adjourned at 1038

R. Eugene Livesay, Staff Secretary

“Top Secret” Secretary of Defense Staff Meeting, 5 August 1968

Mr. Clifford, Mr. Nitze, Mr. McGiffert (for Mr. Resor), General Westmoreland, Mr. Ignatius, Admiral Moorer, Dr. Brown, General McConnell, General Wheeler, Dr. Enthoven, Mr. Warnke et al.

1. Negotiations in Paris

Mr. Clifford began the meeting at 0940.

[…]

2. USSR/Czechoslovakia

Mr. Clifford said although we do not have the whole story on the discussion by the Czechs, the Soviets and others, the results appear to be a signal accomplishment for Dubcek and the Czechs. The effects will run through the rest of Eastern Europe. The Soviets had a sticky problem. The 1968 Czechoslovakian crisis is a far cry from the 1956 Hungarian crisis. He feels that the Soviets wanted to do everything except march into Czechoslovakia. The manner in which the Soviets and other communist nations deployed troops around Czechoslovakia was interesting. General Wheeler said the Communists had elements of between eleven and eighteen divisions deployed in the southern portion of East Germany. Three Polish divisions plus Soviets were deployed in Poland at the border. Other Soviet divisions were in the Carpathian District of the Soviet Union. In addition, there were two Soviet Divisions inside Czechoslovakia. Our intelligence people are looking into why we were unable to identify earlier some of the divisions deployed. One moved in radio silence and was not known to be in Czechoslovakia until our military attaché saw it while on a trip through the countryside. He noted around 3,000 vehicles. This casts some doubt on assumptions that we have made in the past that if the Communists plan a possible attack against NATO we would receive strategic warning. The Soviets imposed press censorship, security measures, radio silence and concentrated sizeable numbers of troops without our getting early notice. There is no question that they could have overrun Czechoslovakia in a matter of about two days. It would have been an easier task than in Hungary.

[…]

The meeting adjourned at 1048

R. Eugene Livesay, Staff Secretry

“Secret” Secretary of Defense Staff Meeting, 12 August 1968

Mr. Clifford, Mr. Nitze, Mr. Resor, General Westmoreland, Mr. Ignatius, Admiral Clarey (for Admiral Moorer), Mr. Hoopes (for Dr. Brown), General McConnell, Lt. General McPherson (for General Wheeler), Dr. Enthoven, Mr. Warnke et al.

1. Negotiations in Paris

Mr. Clifford began meeting 0936.

[…]

2. MIRVs

Mr. Clifford made reference to the decision to test MINUTEMAN III and POSEIDON. He again cautioned and asked all not to get into any discussions involving the U.S./USSR strategic missiles talks or these tests. We expect that the talks will be coming up within the next month or so. It will be a long, arduous, and sometimes frustrating negotiation. It will add to the burden of the negotiators if unauthorized statements are made. Over the weekend there was an article in the Washington Post by George Wilson entitled “Russians Slow Work on Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Etc.” The information in the article indicates that he got some of it from somebody either in the Pentagon or in the State Department. With problems on the Hill, being in the midst of a political campaign, it will prevent a lot of alarms and excursions if we do not talk about the talks and MIRVs.