Günter Bischof - The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968

If we proceed in the manner that you suggest, if Dubček were to go to Prague, openly confess his guilt and resign his powers—let’s call this an option—what would happen? So he accepts the role of scapegoat and explains why he resigns his powers. And who is going to succeed him as First Secretary? To elect a First Secretary you first need to make sure there is agreement in the presidium of the CC in its old form. As it is, neither Piller nor Kolder nor Bil’ak nor Indra are included. Who is supposed to be elected? Will Dubček’s influence be sufficient for the purpose?

It is necessary for Comrades Dubček, Smrkovský and Černík as well as for your whole delegation to declare in advance that the present party conference has been convened illegally and has no function. This declaration has to be made first of all. Then the presidium becomes active in the old form which is considered legitimate. If you’re going to consider the party conference as legally convened and neither Bil’ak nor Indra nor Švestka nor Kolder are there, if there are, to put it quite frankly, no healthy forces present, who is then supposed to be elected? This is a course we simply cannot give our consent to because it is for this very reason that we have sent our troops into Czechoslovakia: to prevent the country from going down the wrong road. […]

We will evacuate our troops only when we have a binding commitment from you. We are under obligation to our allies, the other Socialist countries, and are unable to evacuate troops on our own.

Klusák : Were there German soldiers on Czechoslovak territory?

Podgornyi : No, not a single German set foot on Czechoslovak territory.

Klusák : Is it maybe necessary to put this point to the Minister of Defense?

Brezhnev : It is absolutely certain that there were no German soldiers on Czechoslovak territory. We kept them back.

Klusák : In Prague people are absolutely convinced that they’re there even now.

Brezhnev : This is an act of provocation. Between you and me: the German comrades were offended because they felt that they were not being trusted somehow.

Podgornyi : We did this at your request. We took the whole situation into account even though they were to have marched with the others initially. 3

1. Added by hand in the original.

2. “Strictly classified” added by hand.

3. This is the final proof that the decision to refrain from deploying the NVA was made in Moscow at the request of the Czechoslovaks. See Rüdiger Wenzke, “Die Nationale Volksarmee der DDR: Kein Einsatz in Prag,” in Karner et al., Beiträge , 673–86.

RGANI, F. 89, op. 38, d. 57, pp. 1–19. Translated from the German translation of the original Russian document (original Russian and German translation in Karner et al., Dokumente , #107).

“Secret” Secretary of Defense Staff Meeting, 1 July 1968

Mr. Clifford, Mr. Nitze, Mr. Resor, General Johnson, Mr. Ignatius, Admiral Moorer, Dr. Brown, General McConnell, General Wheeler, General Chapman, Dr. Enthoven, Mr. Warnke, et al.

1. Personnel Matters

Mr. Clifford began the meeting at 0937.

[…]

7. Troop Reductions in Europe

Mr. Clifford said that we are having an exceedingly difficult problem regarding our troops in Europe. He has talked with Senator Russell on this matter. Senator Symington has offered an amendment to the Appropriations Bill, which might pass in the current Congressional climate. He proposes to cut U.S. troops in Europe to 50,000. Senator Russell has indicated that he is prepared to vote for the proposal. Senator Mansfield has stated that he has sought Department of Defense cooperation to cut our troops in Europe. Unless Defense comes up with an alternative proposal, the Senate plans to go ahead with the Symington amendment. Mr. Clifford said he had taken up the matter with the President and he has expressed deep concern. He does not wish in the closing days of his Administration to have the dismantling of NATO take place. The Senate has the bit in its teeth and they plan to take action. Mr. Clifford said he believed that the House was with us. Senator Russell feels we have to have a substitute plan because we can’t beat something with nothing. We will want to give our preferred attention to this matter. We need to have a plan in addition to the 34,000 that are now scheduled to be out by 30 August 1968. When these troops return, our European forces will total around 300,000. This latter figure is the one being used on the Hill and which they is excessive and should be brought down. We need to come up with a plan and take it up with our NATO allies. We may be able to work out something reasonable and intelligent.

Mr. Nitze stated that there would be the problem of coordinating any proposed reductions with State. Mr. Clifford said that the State Department feels that any reductions is all wrong. They have said that they can’t agree with any kind of reduction. They want to stand firm. We feel we must “bend” with the wind. He will discuss the matter with Secretary Rusk.

[…]

The meeting adjourned at 1023

R. Eugene Livesay, Staff Secretary

“Top Secret” Secretary of Defense Staff Meeting, 15 July 1968

Mr. Nitze, Mr. Resor, General Westmoreland, General Walt (for General Chapman, Dr. Brown, General McConnell, Admiral Johnson (for General Wheeler), Mr. Earle (for Mr. Warnke), Mr. McGiffert, Mr. Stempler et al. Staff meeting convened at 0937 under Mr. Nitze’s chairmanship.

Symington Amendment

Mr. Nitze summarized Mr. Clifford’s and his meeting of last Thursday (11 July) with Senators Russell, Stennis, and Jackson. He reported that Mr. Clifford emphasized to the Senators:

1. The importance of NATO to our strategic defense;

2. The relationship and sensitivity of our European force deployments to:

a. the political situation in France,

b. the current commercial and travel problems involving Berlin,

c. the Soviet deployments to the Mediterranean, and

d. the political and economic changes in eastern Europe;

3. The relationships of U.S. force reductions to the general proposition of NATO and Warsaw pact force reductions and to the forthcoming discussions with the Soviet union on arms limitations; and

4. The troops withdrawals which have already been made (e.g., REFORGER).

Senator Russell replied that while he recognized the eloquence of Mr. Clifford’s arguments, he had heard eloquent pleas before. The Senator remarked that the only new developments were the recent political changes in Czechoslovakia. Senator Russell said that while we had been maintaining sizable forces in Europe for twenty-three years, he wondered how much longer the U.S. planned to keep them there. He felt that our allies were not contributing their proportional share and that Mr. McNamara has not made the reductions in U.S. European force levels the Congress thought he was going to make. Senator Russell also said while he had not realized previously that the Symington proposal would reduce U.S. forces to 50,000, he thought [the] Symington Amendment would carry—in some form or another—unless an adequate substitute amendment could be presented. The Senator mentioned the possibility of developing a five-year reductionin-strength program, or, alternatively, the withdrawal of some 50,000 men over an eighteen-month period.

Senator Stennis generally supported current U.S./NATO policies but was disturbed by the lack of adequate force contributions to the common NATO defense by our European allies. He noted that serious balance of payments problems still persist and that the various bilateral offset agreements hadn’t been very satisfactory. Senator Stennis also said that a substitute amendment was desirable.