Günter Bischof - The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968

Folder 5 “Memos Czechoslovakia, 1/68–8/68,” Box 179, Country File Europe, USSR, Czechoslovakia, National Security File, LBJ Library.

Subject: U.S. Reaction to Soviet Move Against Czechoslovakia

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

1. We should, I believe, denounce in the clearest possible terms the action of the Soviets and certain of their Warsaw Pact allies against Czechoslovakia as being an unprovoked and unjustified act of aggression—both publicly at the highest level, in the Security Council and in the NATO, because:

a. We must make it clear that we do not accept the Soviet interpretation of the move as being a purely internal Communist affair. Otherwise, both the Soviets and the peoples of Eastern Europe will assume that we have given the Soviets a free hand within the Communist sphere.

b. We must disprove that we, as is often alleged in Europe, accept the status quo in Europe because of a desire to achieve a détente with the Soviets or a settlement in Vietnam.

c. Since the UN was formed largely to prevent aggression, we have no choice but to raise a case of aggression against one of its members, even in the face of a certain veto in the Security Council.

d. NATO, having been founded to defend against Communist encroachment against the Atlantic Nations, cannot ignore the drastic change in the European power balance caused by the Soviet move.

2. We should, at the same time, not give any impression that we intend to take unilateral action. It is not necessary to enunciate or explain this since the world fully understands it. We should not, on the other hand, give as explanation the fact that the Czech leaders did not ask for assistance. Everyone understands that this was not practical in the circumstances.

3. The Soviet move demonstrates once more, as clearly as in Hungary in 1956 and in East Germany in 1953, their continuing intent to use whatever means are required to keep control over the Communist nations, even in the face of overwhelming world—and even other Communist opinion. This sets severe practical limits on our détente effort, which must be taken into account in our future negotiations with the Soviet Union. This is particularly true in the case of the FRG, whose goals in this regard have become increasingly unrealistic.

4. Although we should not, I believe backtrack on any bilateral agreements already negotiated, i.e. Civil Air and Consular, we should not in deference to reality and world opinion proceed with discussion of any new détente efforts for the time being. Our engagement in disarmament discussions would appear to many as being as cynical on our part—as on the part of the Soviets. The NPT, which is a largely fait accompli and stands on its own merits, should not be affected.

5. The Soviet action opens up excellent possibilities for exploitation to our and the free world advantage.

a. Without any effort on our part, the implications of the present move are such that the world should now fully understand the nature of the Soviet regime and the lengths to which it will go to maintain its control over other countries. Although we should not stand back, we should let others carry the burden of explaining this wherever possible. In showing their hand so clearly, the Soviets move should have a particular effect on the attitude of the world youth. It should, if the young people involved are sincere in the goals they profess, bring the Soviets into their direct line of criticism and attack. Efforts should be made discreetly to encourage this.

b. A new opportunity should be provided to obtain many of our objectives within NATO which we have not been able to accomplish on account of a general apathy on the part of other states. We should be able at least to stabilize present force goals.

c. There is possibility that the Soviet action might precipitate a fundamental review of French policy, possibly leading to the French being willing to establish closer relations with the NATO organization and closer cooperation with U.S. and other NATO countries in their relations with the Soviet Union.

d. The Soviet move will, it is believed, take the steam out of the efforts of those in Congress who have sought a drastic unilateral reduction in U.S. forces in Europe. The opportunity should be taken to try to get public statements recognizing the changed situation by some of the Congressional leaders involved, particularly Senators Russell, Mansfield and Symington.

6. The move against Czechoslovakia clearly demonstrates the renewed strong influence of Ulbricht on the Soviets (after what appeared to be a temporary eclipse), even though this influence largely stems from his personal weakness and that of his regime. Since this may presage Ulbricht’s desire for renewed attacks against the FRG and threats to Berlin access, it might be advisable to warn the Soviets in advance of the serious consequences of such action.

Folder 1, Box 1, Czech Crisis Files, Lot 70 D 19, Office of the Executive Secretariat, RG 59, NARA.

Stenographic notes of the conversation between the Soviet leadership and the president of the ČSSR, L. Svoboda, and M. Klusák

23 August 1968 1

[7:00 p.m.]

Top Secret 2

Svoboda : In Prague parliament held a session and so did the government; there has also been a CC meeting. I was asked yesterday to form a new government but I think this would be unconstitutional.

Brezhnev : Sorry, I don’t quite understand.

Svoboda : The situation has now changed for the better… In the Czechoslovak army 265 have been wounded and twenty-three killed, who are being buried now.

Podgornyi : And how many casualties among the Soviet comrades?

Svoboda : I can’t say for sure but there are some. We have taken all measures so that there are as few casualties as possible.

(Comrade Svoboda proposes that Comrade Dubček go to Prague, openly confess his guilt and resign his powers. If some other course was adopted instead, it was likely to result in popular discontent.)

Brezhnev : Ludvík Ivanović [Svoboda], if Comrade Dubček resigns his powers, who would then become First Secretary?

Svoboda : It is obvious you have not understood me quite correctly. Where is Dubček now?

Brezhnev : He is alright.

Svoboda : If he were to resign from his post, it would be better for all of us. If he remains where he is, that is alright as well. In any case it is necessary for Comrade Dubček to step forward.

Brezhnev : Where, here?

Svoboda : No, in Prague. All the members of the government have said that they will keep their posts only if Černík becomes the head of the government. People say about Bil’ak that he is a traitor. Bil’ak cannot be the head of the government, he has no authority with most members of our party.

Brezhnev : That’s all very well, Ludvík Ivanovič [Svoboda], but right now we should not be looking back, we should be looking ahead how we are going to avoid great bloodshed. Let’s be frank: the whole country is in a psychosis. Even before the trip to Čierná nad Tisou an atmosphere of utmost nationalist tension was created. No other slogans were shouted there apart from Dubček, Dubček, save Dubček. A great tension was in evidence even then. I do believe there must be reason why this situation was brought about. Moreover it now transpires that various underground radio transmitters and arms caches have been discovered. Today for instance submachine guns and other arms were found in a cellar of the Ministry of Agriculture. The whole thing looks as if there was some group, let’s cautiously call them rightists, counterrevolutionaries, that had been expecting things to take this turn. That they conducted the party conference in the way they did is further proof.