Günter Bischof - The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968

[No separate item on “USSR/Czechoslovakia in the minutes of this meeting!]

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The meeting adjourned at 1048

R. Eugene Livesay, Staff Secretary

“Top Secret” Secretary of Defense Staff Meeting, 26 August 1968

Mr. Clifford, Mr. McGiffert (for Mr. Resor), General Westmoreland, Mr. Ignatius, Admiral Moorer, Dr. Brown, General McConnell, General Chapman, Dr. Foster, Mr. Warnke et al.

1. Review of Past Week

Mr. Clifford began meeting 0937

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a. Southeast Asia

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b. Czechoslovakia

Mr. Clifford said on Tuesday came the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviets and other Warsaw Pact military forces. The first he heard of this action was in a phone call a little after 9:00 p.m. that evening to advise him to come to the White House for an NSC meeting. Soviet Ambassador Dobroynin [ sic ] had called on the President shortly after 8:00 p.m. to advise him as to why the Soviets were taking this step because of the presence of internal and external aggression against Czechoslovakia. Dobroynin [ sic ] stated that the Soviets had been petitioned to interfere by the government of Czechoslovakia. These statements created great skepticism that night. There is still no indication of who the individuals are that allegedly called on the Soviets to interfere.

Mr. Clifford said it is difficult to understand the manner of the Soviet action. From a military standpoint it was a sophisticated operation but politically it was a bust. He would have expected a prearranged plan for a new government in Czechoslovakia. He would have expected a group to step forward and say they are the individuals who asked the Soviets to interfere, and who were willing to have a new form of government. He personally thinks there was a debate within the Soviet politburo. He knows that they were having extensive meetings. The decision appears to have been made hurriedly. They were ready to move because of the training exercises and practice for invasion which have been conducted over a long period of time. The buttons were pushed and once they moved into Czechoslovakia the whole thing collapsed. Some of the Soviet troops shot at the Czechs and some didn’t. The Russians could have made a contrived case of the external aggression accusing West Germany of infiltrating. The Soviet’s [ sic ] haven’t made a case in any sense of the word. World opinion thinks it is a shocking and appalling case of naked aggression.

Mr. Clifford said at the NSC meeting there was a discussion in great detail as to what we could do about the Soviet moves. From a military standpoint there was no doubt from the beginning that there was nothing we could do about it. Although we deplored the action no one suggested military action on our part. It was decided to proceed in the United Nations, first in the Security Council and then to the General Assembly. Instructions were issued for Ambassador Ball’s presentation. They also discussed the possibility of issuing a presidential statement on the crisis. General Wheeler thought that the president should issue a statement that evening while Mr. Clifford said he voted for a delay until we could see out events were shaping up [ sic ]. In retrospect he believes that General Wheeler was right, although he doubts a twelve hour delay hurt much. When issued, the President’s statement was a good one and forthright.

c. Briefing of Governor Maddox

Mr. Clifford said on Wednesday he participated in an incident which was a signal privilege. Mr. Rusk, Mr. Helms and he briefed Governor Maddox Twice the governor asked questions, but they not sure whether he was referring to Vietnam or Czechoslovakia so they covered both situations. Mr. Clifford said that he read in the paper yesterday that some arsonists had tried to burn down the Governor’s library. It was reported that both books were destroyed, even one which he had not yet had a chance to color. Mr. Clifford said it was less than an inspiring experience.

d. Deployment of Troops to Chicago

On Thursday Mr. Clifford said he began conversations about possible trouble in Chicago [at the National Convention of the Democratic Party]. He and Mr. McGiffert attended a meeting in the White House, first with Mr. Califano and then with the President. As a result, the President decided to preposition troops. If the police first, and then the National Guard can’t handle the situation, we would already have Army troops available on the scene. The president is concerned that if real trouble started it might turn out to be so big that the arrival of troops some 8 hours or so later would be able to do the job. The time to have the troops on hand is right after trouble starts. We have not given out the number of troops moved. The President hopes that their presence in Chicago will act as a deterrent.

e. Congressional Briefing

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2. Military Situation in Southeast Asia

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3. Czechoslovakia

Mr. Clifford asked General Wheeler to take a few minutes and give his observation and reactions on the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and its effect on the European situation. General Wheeler said that over the weekend the Soviets had increased the number of their forces in Prague from about 30,000 to 50,000. The Soviets are starting now to rotate some Soviet units which came from East Germany. The French in a NATO Council meeting called attention to the fact that East German troops deployed into the area of the Sudentenland, 1which the Germans have historically claimed; the Polish forces deployed into the areas claimed historically by Poland; and the Hungarian troops into the areas historically claimed by Hungary. The French raised the question as to whether this presages the partition of Czechoslovakia. Dr. Brown said this deployment could be explained geographically since these areas are adjacent to these countries.

General Wheeler said that there has been more trouble between the population and the occupation troops. There have been several incidents where the Soviets opened fire against demonstrators. Our embassy in Prague reports their people have suffered a series of incidents: their vehicles have been searched; the Soviets fired guns over a military attaché’s car as he drove through Prague. Soviet soldiers broke into the apartment of an American and took a shot gun; and the Soviets intruded on the embassy grounds. Mr. Clifford said he read a cable in which the embassy reported it was surrounded. General Wheeler said yes, this was at the same time two or three Soviet soldiers broke into the grounds.

General Wheeler said that there is no confirmation that the Soviets plan to move into Rumania although they have the capability to do so. The Yugoslavs are getting somewhat upset. A meeting of the Yugoslav Communist party called for an end to the confrontation. They issued a warning that they would maintain Yugoslav sovereignty. They have cancelled military leaves and kept on duty those individuals who were scheduled to return to civilian life shortly.

Mr. Clifford asked how many foreign troops are in Czechoslovakia. General Wheeler said around 200,000. These consist of twelve to fifteen Soviet divisions, elements of four East German and four Polish divisions, and small detachments of Hungarian and Bulgarian forces. The Hungarians are stationed on the outskirts of Czechoslovakia. Tactical aircraft have been deployed to twelve Czechoslovakian airfields from the Western Soviet Union. The invasion forces have grown from 150,000 to 200,000 or more. Mr. Clifford asked how many of the 200,000 there are non-Soviet forces. General Wheeler said he would guess around 30 percent. Mr. Clifford said that this was higher than he would have thought.