Günter Bischof - The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968

Mr. Clifford asked Mr. Warnke for his comments. Mr. Warnke said it is difficult to sort out the various impacts. He would hope that the worst impact would be on the Soviet Union. Militarily it was a fine operation but politically a debacle that has stirred up adverse opinion around the world. In spite of our efforts at a détente the Soviets have made this move. The impact in Europe appears extreme. There will be a loss of influence of various communist parties. He feels that the French and Italian communist parties will be negligible factors. As a result, the Rumanians and Yugoslavs are restless. The Soviet efforts have increased their diplomatic deficit. Both the Yugoslavs, the arch-heretics, and Communist China, the true believers, have criticized the Soviets.

Mr. Warnke said these events show the need for a significant American presence in Europe. The Soviets have not been transformed. It shows that we still cannot forecast whether the Soviets might take action against NATO. The invasion should put an end to the Symington amendment. We should maintain a strong defensive posture rather than credit the Soviets with becoming magnanimous.

Mr. Clifford said he feels these events point up the basic soundness of the DoD position taken on the Hill. It is better to negotiate with the Soviets from a position of strength. The Soviet actions have added to the efficacy of this argument. He recalled the effort required to sustain our position on the Hill on the SENTINEL ABM program. Opponents argued that the Soviets and communism had changed. We successfully debated this move. The opposition group should have substantially less support in the future. As General Wheeler said the whole area of support for NATO had a serious problem on hand. In Senator Mansfield’s report to the President upon his recent return from Europe he was sanguine and optimistic about US/USSR relations. The ink had hardly dried on this report when the Soviets invaded. Unfortunately, however, the Soviet invasion will have an adverse effect on various important efforts we were making. The non-proliferation treaty is still hanging in the balance. The West Germans have not yet signed, the Israelis have not yet chosen to sign it, and many other nations haven’t signed. The Soviet actions may have an adverse effect. Further, steps were fast approaching a climax to start the talks with the Soviets on the limitation of strategic weapons. He hoped as time moves on that we can select the right time and get started on these talks. In some respects the climate might even be better for these talks as a result of their moves. There will be more realistic feeling about the Soviet Union’s attitudes.

4. Civil Disturbances

[…]

5. French Hydrogen Bomb

[…]

6. Project 693 and FY 1970 Budget

[…]

7. Legislative Matters

[…]

8. F-111

[…]

9. South Vietnamese Navy

[…]

10. Czechoslovakia Postscript

General Chapman said that the Soviet’s [ sic ] invaded Czechoslovakia because Mother Russia was directly threatened. We would expect the Soviets to take additional preemptive actions under similar circumstances.

The meeting adjourned at 1053

R. Eugene Livesay, Staff Secretary

“Top Secret” Secretary of Defense Staff Meeting, 3 September 1968

Mr. Clifford, Mr. Nitze, Mr. Resor, General Palmer (for Westmoreland), Mr. Ignatius, Admiral Clarey (for Admiral Moorer), Dr. Brown, General McConnell, General Wheeler et al.

1. Secretary Clifford’s First Six Months

Mr. Clifford began meeting 0935 stating that it was thoroughly fitting and proper to state that on 1 September he marked his first six months of service as the present Secretary of Defense.

[….]

3. Eastern Europe

At one stage during the past week there were a number of reports that Soviet military forces were engaged in large scale maneuvers. Troops and arms appeared to be moving toward Rumania. There were also activities in Bulgaria and Hungary. Only Yugoslavia was not involved. These reports came in with such consistency as to create the greatest concern here. Mr. Clifford noted that the President’s statements of the threat to world peace if the Soviets moved into Rumania. The Soviets have assured the President that they have no intentions toward Rumania and no desire to create trouble. They state that the Czechoslovakia situation is a family problem which is no concern to or of interest to the United States or otherwise. We should leave their personal problems to them and they will leave ours to us. All this is said in an amicable and conciliatory manner. They have stated that they hoped that the events of the last few weeks will not effect U.S./USSR talks on strategic weapons. Mr. Clifford said our posture should be one of careful, guarded, watchful waiting. He asked General Wheeler to report on the military situation in Eastern Europe.

General Wheeler said there are from fourteen to seventeen Soviet divisions, four Polish divisions, and elements of East German, Bulgarian and Hungarian forces of less than division size in Czechoslovakia. The Soviets have moved some aircraft back to their home stations. These moves appear to be consolidating their hold on Czechoslovakia and do so with lower visibility. Western military attaches have seen no evidence of troop activity in Hungary. There have been field training exercises in Bulgaria. To date there have been primarily communications exercises, with no movement of ground troops. Yugoslavia is in a high state of alert. Rumania is on alert but has been dampening their polemics. We should keep an attitude of watchful waiting. General Wheeler is not convinced at all that we have seen the end of this.

Mr. Clifford said NATO is faced with a situation of considerable concern. NATO has noted with alarm the considerable number of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia which has a common border with West Germany. NATO has demonstrated deep concern at the movement of Warsaw Pact forces which are in position to effect the interest of one of the NATO countries, Germany. There will be more discussion this week and he will report on these at next Monday’s staff meeting.

[…]

The meeting adjourned at 1052

R. Eugene Livesay, Staff Secretary

“Top Secret” Secretary of Defense Staff Meeting, 9 September 1968

Mr. Clifford, Mr. Nitze, Mr. Resor, General Palmer (for General Westmoreland), Mr. Ignatius, Admiral Moorer, Dr. Brown, Dr. Enthoven, Mr. Warnke et al.

1. Eastern Europe and NATO

Mr. Clifford began meeting at 0935. […]

Mr. Clifford said that each Monday he says this has been quite a week. The fact is that each week has been quite a week. There were a number of meetings at the White House. The Tuesday luncheon meeting was held on Wednesday with a long list of agenda items. The NSC meeting on Wednesday was devoted to Czechoslovakia and problems in Central Europe. The Cabinet meeting Thursday was devoted to Vietnam and reports on Czechoslovakia and Central Europe. A great deal of effort last week was devoted to these problems.

At this point the existing situation in Czechoslovakia is fluid. It is difficult to say which way it will turn. The Czechs are taking it as you would suppose they would. This has been an extraordinarily bitter pill for them to swallow. It will take a long time to get over the Soviet invasion. A disturbing factor in the whole situation is the erratic manner in which the Soviets went about their move. Militarily it went well, politically very bad. He would have expected the Soviets to have a good plan for the takeover. He would have expected that they would have had a group set up to invite them in, however, they couldn’t find anyone who would step forward and say it was they who invited the Soviets in. This made the Soviets look foolish. Further they produced no evidence of either internal or external aggression. Mr. Clifford takes some comfort from the fact they did it so badly. However, if they can make mistakes in Czechoslovakia they could make them elsewhere. Apparently it is a dichotomy in the Kremlin. Apparently the hardliners have prevailed over the softliners. Since the hardliners took over they moved immediately without laying the diplomatic and political basis for their moves. We have to watch the Soviets with the greatest care.