Günter Bischof - The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968

Where Yugoslavia is now is also a matter of great concern. The Soviets have long deplored what went on there. If there is continued trouble in Czechoslovakia and the Rumanian comments are disturbing to the Soviets, the hardliners in the Kremlin might decide the time has come to clean up the whole situation. As far as Austria is concerned, if they should move against the Austrians we have a strong involvement there.

What NATO should do has been the subject of discussions and different approaches. Mr. Clifford said that he and General Wheeler had recommended that this is a good time for a NATO meeting. There are substantial Warsaw Pact forces across from a NATO ally, West Germany. Also, should NATO give attention to the Yugoslavia and Eastern Europe situation. Sometimes aggressors are held back by warnings.

Mr. Clifford said that he, Mr. Nitze and Mr. Warnke met with Ambassador Cleveland. He reported that our NATO allies are concerned that our reaction to the Soviet/Czechoslovakian venture continues mild and restrained. Some Europeans have the impression that our desire to have negotiations with the Soviets on Strategic Missiles is so great that there is an implied understanding that the Soviets will look after their sphere and we ours and that we will move towards agreement. An interesting sideline of this is that during the initial days of the Soviet invasion there was an alert in Cuba. The Cubans were concerned that the United States would move in and take them over because they were in our sphere. Mr. Clifford said we could put a stop to this type of talk by having a NATO meeting. It would show that we are deeply concerned over these events.

2. National Press Club Speech

Mr. Clifford said his speech came at a most propitious time. It was a sound and firm speech. The questions that he received after the speech were directed at current problems. He stressed that in order to negotiate in today’s imperfect world one had to negotiate from strength. […] It would be calamitous if the Soviets reached the conclusion that the world is not concerned about their adventures. Once this kind of adventurism begins experience in the past indicates that part of the world can become inflamed.

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The meeting adjourned at 1048

R. Eugene Livesay, Staff Secretary

“Top Secret” Secretary of Defense Staff Meeting, 16 September 1968

Mr. Clifford, Mr. Nitze, Mr. Resor, General Westmoreland, Mr. Ignatius, Admiral Moorer, Dr. Brown, General McConnell, General Wheeler, Dr. Enthoven, Mr. Warnke et al.

1. Return of Marine Corps 27th Regimental Landing Team

Mr. Clifford began meeting 0935.

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2. Central and East European Developments

Mr. Clifford said that we and others are engaged in a study to determine why the Soviets moved and when and how. We are seeking information concerning the size, deployment and equipment, and giving attention to possible next Soviet moves. He noticed an article in the morning paper that the Yugoslavs are deeply concerned. We feel that the Czech invasion is not the end of the story. These developments have led to a great deal of thinking by the NATO countries. There have been discussions of the holding of special meetings and the development of special reactions. He asked Mr. Warnke to report.

Mr. Warnke said the State Department has proposed a series of NATO meetings to make sure that when there is a full NATO ministerial meeting that specific results can be achieved. One alternative is to have sessions of the NATO foreign ministers at the United Nations, followed by a full ministerial meeting in November, advancing the regularly scheduled one in December by thirty days. Replies from NATO countries to these proposed meetings have been mixed. The Germans feel that the Soviets would be tempted to construe a unilateral declaration by the Germans as typical of German aggressiveness. One opposition raised to the meetings included the fact that the first meeting is proposed in connection with the United Nations. West Germany is not a member of the UNO. Also in such circumstances should Mr. Brosio, the Secretary General, be present? Nevertheless it looks like there will be a preliminary meeting later this month involving the permanent representatives plus a few deputy foreign ministers. There will be bilateral talks at the UN and the ministerial meeting will be moved up to November. He doubts that there will be concrete proposals for strengthening NATO until after theses meetings. Mr. Clifford said that the Nuclear Planning Group meeting is scheduled for 10–11 October. So far there is no change in the schedule. This meeting could be significant. General Wheeler said he will attend. The Germans are vitally interested in these developments as they feel the impact of events the most. They have a common border with Czechoslovakia. Dr. Birrenbach, Chancellor Kiesinger’s personal representative, and Herr Schmidt, a party leader in the Bundestag , have been among the German visitors to Washington. He asked Mr. Nitze to comment on his meetings with them.

Mr. Nitze said that Dr. Birrenbach arrived with a paper provided by Chancellor Kiesinger. This paper discussed the origin of the Czechoslovakia crisis. It suggested that the real interest of the USSR is West Germany and the Czechoslovakian crisis was only a phase. The Soviets had previously sent notes to West Germany citing Article 47 and 103 of the UN Charter. These articles give UN Security Council members authority to take certain actions against former enemies without Security Council veto. Mr. Nitze said we in the U.S. feel that the Czechoslovakian crisis originated in developments in Czechoslovakia. The Germans also discussed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Mr. Nitze said he pointed out to both Dr. Birrenbach and Herr Schmidt that prior to the Czech crisis that we were encountering serious questions of maintaining forces in Europe without offset help. The twenty-three years that we have maintained forces in Europe has caused us a balance of payments problem. The key indication we needed on their part was that they are prepared to do something about it. They indicated they would do so but they could not be out in front. It was suggested we organize secret negotiations with the West Germans to get them to increase their Defense budget. If we can get others to bear part of the cost we might do, say, a tenth as much. Mr. Warnke said he had discussed this with State and JCS. Dr. Brown asked how would they offset our costs, by U.S. purchases? Mr. Warnke said yes and in addition take over some of the U.S. functions. Also we would like for them to fill out their own forces. It is important to get going on this.

General Wheeler said there is some consensus developing. Minister Harlan of Belgium feels they need the support of actions by other NATO nations to help them reverse the present Belgium course. We need concerted NATO effort. General Wheeler feels the Soviets seized the Czechoslovakian opportunity to put additional pressures on West Germany although the genesis of the Czech crisis was the situation developing in Czechoslovakia.

Mr. Clifford said he told Dr. Birrenbach that prior to the Czech crisis we had expected restrictions on what we could do. The crisis has been postponed because of the situation. He feels this may be NATO’s last chance to take a new approach. We need to reconstruct, refurbish and reaffirm the Principles with which it was set up.

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The meeting adjourned at 1055

R. Eugene Livesay, Staff Secretary

1. Contrary to the widely held view of American intelligence and contemporary observers, no East German forces were deployed in the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. See Brezhnev’s statement, “It is absolutely certain that there were no German soldiers on Czechoslovak territory. We kept them back […] the German comrades were offended because they felt that they were not being trusted somehow,” in appendix 8.