Günter Bischof - The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968

RGANI, F. 2, op. 3, d. 114, pp. 27–54. Unedited stenographic notes. Translated from the German translation of the original Russian document (original Russian and German translation in Karner et al., Dokumente , #38).

Politburo resolution of the CC CPSU.

P 92/82

26 July 1968

82. On the verbal message to the US Ambassador in Moscow concerning events in Czechoslovakia. 1

The draft of the verbal message of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR to the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow on the issue in question is to be countersigned (Attachment).

[Attachment]

On Item 82 of Prot. no. 92

Text of the verbal message of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR to the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow

Information has been received in Moscow about the verbal message Secretary of State Rusk delivered to the ambassador of the USSR in Washington, A. F. Dobrynin, on 22 July of this year in connection with the events in Czechoslovakia. Referring to comments in the Soviet press, notably to a Pravda article of 19 June, the Secretary of State expressed his concern about allegedly unfounded charges leveled at the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] regarding their interference in Czechoslovak affairs.

In this context it is necessary to make it quite clear at the outset that there is no reason why the American side should express their concern to the Soviet side. The Pravda article of 19 July that was cited by the Secretary of State is based on well documented evidence and the American authorities are obviously aware of the authenticity and credibility of the facts in question.

Generally speaking, we would have much more reason to direct the attention of the U.S. administration to the hostile campaign that is at present being waged in the United States against the USSR in connection with the events in Czechoslovakia. On a daily basis the American press, radio and TV spread all kinds of exaggerated reports, with the aim of giving comfort to the anti-Socialist counterrevolutionary forces in Czechoslovakia on one hand and, on the other, of causing bad feelings towards the Soviet Union and the other Socialist countries and use these to stoke tensions in Czechoslovakia.

Many statements of various U.S. officeholders, including members of the U.S. Congress, have been made with the same objectives in mind.

In the above mentioned conversation with the ambassador of the USSR, Secretary of State Rusk declared that events in Czechoslovakia were a matter that concerned solely the Czechs and the other countries of the Warsaw Pact; the U.S. administration did not want to get in any way involved.

If the U.S. administration does not want the situation concerning the events in Czechoslovakia to deteriorate drastically, the US administration should in our view do everything in its power to halt the campaign that is being waged against the Soviet Union in the United States. It goes without saying that this campaign has a very negative influence on public opinion in our country and on Soviet-American relations in general. The Soviet government believes it is essential to avoid anything that might lead to a deterioration in the relationship between our countries and to continue to seek ways and means to improve them. This is also the declared aim of President Johnson.

1. The resolution was put to the vote and passed. Those who voted in favor were L. I. Brezhnev, G. I. Voronov, A. P. Kirilenko, A. N. Kosygin, K. T. Mazurov, A. J. Pel’she, N. V. Podgornyi, D. S. Polyanskii, M. A. Suslov, A. N. Shelepin, and P. E. Shelest.

RGANI, F. 3, op 72, d. 191, pp. 84–85. Translated from the German translation of the original Russian document (original Russian and German translation in Karner et al., Dokumente , #191).

[No date, but from file location end of July/beginning of August 1968]

Tension continues to build, partly because tomorrow is the day the Czechs say the Soviets will start moving out. These are added disquieting signs: (1) [one line redacted] (2) Reportedly, an agreed paragraph in the Warsaw Pact announcement, saying Soviet troops would be leaving, was deleted when the announcement was made; and (3) An unspecified People’s Militia “operation” is due to start at 9:00 tonight.

Possibilities include:

• The beginning of at least token withdrawals, followed by Czech-Soviet bilateral talks early next week and some sort of inconclusive accommodation.

• Soviet unwillingness to remove any troops, continued pressure and continued maneuver.

• Soviet provocation of an incident, perhaps in connection with an ostensible movement to withdraw, followed by a Warsaw Pact call for re-enforcements to protect existing forces.

• Public disorder and violence, in Prague or elsewhere, which would trigger an unraveling of the Czech party and government.

• Militia arrests of liberals, with or without Dubcek acquiescence, or moves toward a coup of some kind.

Alternatives for the United States:

We are obviously not prepared to intervene militarily. Recourse to the UN is probably an “after-the-fact” alternative—certainly not an immediate option. In the very short term, the following seem to be areas where we have alternatives:

1. World public attention. We could find ways to intensify world-wide press, public and government attention and concern. This might have some inhibiting effect on the Soviets. The disadvantage is that it could further destabilize the situation in Czechoslovakia—including the discipline and calm of the Czech public.

2. As a further step, we could make various kinds of official U.S. government statements. We could also stimulate European governments to parallel action. However, we must be careful we do not repeat the mistake of 1956, in creating expectations we are not prepared to follow through on.

3. [A word redacted] may have some capability of stimulating Western European or other Communist Parties and press to call on the Soviets to stop interfering in the internal affairs of a brother Communist Party and nation.

Anything we could do to mobilize independent-minded Communist opinion, before rather than after the fact, would seem worth doing.

4. We might consider what kind of approach to the Romanians and/or Yugoslavs might be useful. Perhaps some discreet comparing of notes would be helpful.

5. We might consider what kind of diplomatic approach to the Russians could be helpful. The difficulty is that we are dealing with a vital interest of the USSR, and it is doubtful they would be responsive to any pressures we could apply or would be willing to bring to bear. Nevertheless, there might be some possibilities.

We have a whole range of things we could do in our Soviet relationship—including cancelling the PanAm inaugural, suspending exchange negotiations, bringing Ambassador Thompson home on consultations, deferring our strategic-arms talks proposals, etc. However, our relationship with the Soviets has historically always been paramount, and our Eastern European interest secondary. This is, no doubt, still true.

6. Conceivably we might have some way through a third party, etc; to signal to the Czech leadership to “cool it,” pull in their horns on reform, curb their press, etc.—if we think this is the best and only way to avert a debacle. There are certainly observers who think we should have done this sort of thing at an earlier stage in Hungary. On the other hand, we are not close enough to Czech developments or their leadership to have much realistic chance of trying to steer them.