John Locke - An Essay Concerning Human Understanding / Ein Versuch über den menschlichen Verstand. Auswahlausgabe

§ 11. That this is so, we have some kind of Evidence in our very Bodies, all whose Particles, whilst vitally united to this same thinking conscious self, so that we feel when they are [332]touch’d, and are affected by, and conscious of good or harm that happens to them, are a part of our selves : i. e. of our thinking conscious self . Thus the Limbs of his Body is to every one a part of himself : He sympathizes and is concerned for them. Cut off an hand, and thereby separate it from that consciousness, we had of its Heat, Cold, and other Affections; and it is then no longer a part of that which is himself , any more than the remotest part of Matter. Thus we see the Substance , whereof personal self consisted at one time, may be varied at another, without the change of personal Identity : There being no Question about the same Person, though the Limbs, which but now were a part of it, be cut off.

§ 12. But the Question is, whether if the same Substance, which thinks, be changed, it can be the same Person, or remaining the same, it can be different Persons. […]

§ 13. […] as to the first part of the Question, Whether if the same thinking Substance (supposing immaterial Substances only to think) be changed, it can be the same Person. I answer, that cannot be resolv’d, but by those, who know what kind of Substances they are, that do think; and whether the consciousness of past Actions can be transferr’d from one thinking Substance to another. […] it must be allowed, That if the same consciousness (which, as has been shewn, is quite a different thing from the same numerical Figure or Motion in Body) can be transferr’d from one thinking Substance to another, it will be possible, that two thinking Substances may make but one [334]person. For the same consciousness being preserv’d, whether in the same or different Substances, the personal Identity is preserv’d.

§ 14. As to the second part of the Question, Whether the same immaterial Substance remaining, there may be two distinct Persons; which Question seems to me to be built on this, Whether the same immaterial Being, being conscious of the Actions of its past Duration, may be wholly stripp’d of all the consciousness of its past Existence, and lose it beyond the power of ever retrieving again: And so as it were beginning a new Account from a new Period, have a consciousness that cannot reach beyond this new State. All those who hold pre-existence, are evidently of this Mind, since they allow the Soul to have no remaining consciousness of what it did in that pre-existent State, either wholly separate from Body, or informing any other Body; and if they should not, ’tis plain Experience would be against them. So that personal Identity reaching no farther than consciousness reaches, a pre-existent Spirit not having continued so many Ages in a state of Silence, must needs make different Persons. […]

§ 15. And thus we may be able without any difficulty to conceive, the same Person at the Resurrection, though in a Body not exactly in make or parts the same which he had here, the same consciousness going along with the Soul that inhabits it. But yet the Soul alone in the change of Bodies, would scarce to any one, but to him that makes the Soul the Man , be enough to make the same Man . For should the Soul of a Prince, carrying with it the consciousness of the Prince’s past Life, enter and [336]inform the Body of a Cobler as soon as deserted by his own Soul, every one sees, he would be the same Person with the Prince, accountable only for the Prince’s Actions: But who would say it was the same Man? The Body too goes to the making the Man, and would, I guess, to every Body determine the Man in this case, wherein the Soul, with all its Princely Thoughts about it, would not make another Man: But he would be the same Cobler to every one besides himself. I know that in the ordinary way of speaking, the same Person, and the same Man, stand for one and the same thing. […] But yet when we will enquire, what makes the same Spirit , Man , or Person , we must fix the Ideas of Spirit , Man , or Person , in our Minds; and having resolved with our selves what we mean by them, it will not be hard to determine, in either of them, or the like, when it is the same , and when not.

§ 16. […] whatever has the consciousness of present and past Actions, is the same Person to whom they both belong. Had I the same consciousness, that I saw the Ark and Noah ’s Flood, as that I saw an overflowing of the Thames last Winter, or as that I write now, I could no more doubt that I, that write this now, that saw the Thames overflow’d last Winter, and that view’d the Flood at the general Deluge, was the same self , place that self in what Substance you please, than that I that write this am the same my self now whilst I write (whether I consist of all the same Substance, material or immaterial, or no) that I [338]was Yesterday. For as to this point of being the same self , it matters not whether this present self be made up of the same or other Substances, I being as much concern’d, and as justly accountable for any Action that was done a thousand Years since, appropriated to me now by this self-consciousness, as I am, for what I did the last moment.

§ 17. Self is that conscious thinking thing, (whatever Substance, made up of whether Spiritual, or Material, Simple, or Compounded, it matters not) which is sensible, or conscious of Pleasure and Pain, capable of Happiness or Misery, and so is concern’d for it self , as far as that consciousness extends. Thus every one finds, that whilst comprehended under that consciousness, the little Finger is as much a part of it self , as what is most so. Upon separation of this little Finger, should this consciousness go along with the little Finger, and leave the rest of the Body, ’tis evident the little Finger would be the Person , the same Person ; and self then would have nothing to do with the rest of the Body. As in this case it is the consciousness that goes along with the Substance, when one part is separate from another, which makes the same Person , and constitutes this inseparable self : so it is in reference to Substances remote in time. That with which the consciousness of this present thinking thing can join it self, makes the same Person , and is one self with it, and with nothing else; and so attributes to it self , and owns all the Actions of that thing, as its own, as far as that consciousness reaches, and no farther; as every one who reflects will perceive.

§ 18. In this personal Identity is founded all the Right and Justice of Reward and Punishment; Happiness and Misery, [340]being that, for which every one is concerned for himself , and not mattering what becomes of any Substance, not joined to, or affected with that consciousness. […]

§ 19. This may shew us wherein personal Identity consists, not in the Identity of Substance, but, as I have said, in the Identity of consciousness , wherein, if Socrates and the present Mayor of Quinborough agree, they are the same Person: If the same Socrates waking and sleeping do not partake of the same consciousness , Socrates waking and sleeping is not the same Person. And to punish Socrates waking, for what sleeping Socrates thought, and waking Socrates was never conscious of, would be no more of Right, than to punish one Twin for what his Brother-Twin did, whereof he knew nothing, because their outsides were so like, that they could not be distinguished; for such Twins have been seen.