John Locke - An Essay Concerning Human Understanding / Ein Versuch über den menschlichen Verstand. Auswahlausgabe

John Locke

An Essay Concerning Human Understanding

Ein Versuch über den menschlichen Verstand

Englisch / Deutsch

Auswahlausgabe

Übersetzt von Joachim Schulte

Herausgegeben von Katia Saporiti

Reclam

2020 Philipp Reclam jun. Verlag GmbH, Siemensstraße 32, 71254 Ditzingen

Gesamtherstellung: Philipp Reclam jun. Verlag GmbH, Siemensstraße 32, 71254 Ditzingen

Made in Germany 2020

RECLAM ist eine eingetragene Marke der Philipp Reclam jun. GmbH & Co. KG, Stuttgart

ISBN 978-3-15-961550-9

ISBN der Buchausgabe 978-3-15-019501-7

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The Epistle to the Reader

Book I

Book II

Book III

Book IV

An den Leser

Erstes Buch

Zweites Buch

Drittes Buch

Viertes Buch

Zu dieser Ausgabe

Anmerkungen

Literaturhinweise

Nachwort

Register

Reader,

I Here put into thy Hands, what has been the diversion of some of my idle and heavy Hours: If it has the good luck to prove so of any of thine, and thou hast but half so much Pleasure in reading, as I had in writing it, thou wilt as little think thy Money, as I do my Pains, ill bestowed. […]

[…]

[…] Were it fit to trouble thee with the History of this Essay, I should tell thee that five or six Friends meeting at my Chamber, and discoursing on a Subject very remote from this, found themselves quickly at a stand, by the Difficulties that rose on every side. After we had a while puzzled our selves, without coming any nearer a Resolution of those Doubts which perplexed us, it came into my Thoughts, that we took a wrong course; and that, before we set our selves upon Enquiries of that Nature, it was necessary to examine our own Abilities, and see, what Objects our Understandings were, or were not fitted to deal with. This I proposed to the Company, who all readily assented; and thereupon it was agreed, that this should be our first Enquiry. Some hasty and undigested Thoughts, on a Subject I had never before considered, which I set down against our next Meeting, gave the first entrance into this Discourse, which having been thus begun by Chance, was continued by Intreaty; written by incoherent parcels; and, after long intervals of neglect, resum’d again, as my Humour or Occasions permitted; and at last, in a retirement, where an [8]Attendance on my Health gave me leisure, it was brought into that order, thou now seest it.

This discontinued way of writing may have occasioned, besides others, two contrary Faults, viz. that too little, and too much may be said in it. If thou findest any thing wanting, I shall be glad, that what I have writ, gives thee any Desire, that I should have gone farther: If it seems too much to thee, thou must blame the Subject; for when I first put Pen to Paper, I thought all I should have to say on this Matter, would have been contained in one sheet of Paper; but the farther I went, the larger Prospect I had: New Discoveries led me still on, and so it grew insensibly to the bulk it now appears in. I will not deny, but possibly it might be reduced to a narrower compass than it is; and that some Parts of it might be contracted; the way it has been writ in, by catches, and many long intervals of Interruption, being apt to cause some Repetitions. […]

[…]

[…] The Commonwealth of Learning, is not at this time without Master-Builders, whose mighty Designs, in advancing the Sciences, will leave lasting Monuments to the Admiration of Posterity; But every one must not hope to be a Boyle , or a Sydenham ; and in an Age that produces such Masters, as the Great Huygenius , and the incomparable Mr. Newton , with some others of that Strain; ’tis Ambition enough to be employed as an Under-Labourer in clearing the Ground a little, and removing some of the Rubbish, that lies in the way to Knowledge; which certainly had been very much more advanced in the World, if the Endeavours of ingenious and industrious Men had not been much cumbred with the learned [10]but frivolous use of uncouth, affected, or unintelligible Terms, introduced into the Sciences, and there made an Art of, to that Degree, that Philosophy, which is nothing but the true Knowledge of Things, was thought unfit, or uncapable to be brought into well-bred Company, and polite Conversation. Vague and insignificant Forms of Speech, and Abuse of Language, have so long passed for Mysteries of Science; And hard or misapply’d Words, with little or no meaning, have, by Prescription, such a Right to be mistaken for deep Learning, and heighth of Speculation, that it will not be easie to persuade, either those who speak, or those who hear them, that they are but the Covers of Ignorance, and hindrance of true Knowledge. […]

[…]

The Booksellers preparing for the fourth Edition of my Essay, gave me notice of it, that I might, if I had leisure, make any additions or alterations I should think fit. Whereupon I thought it convenient to advertise the Reader, that besides several corrections I had made here and there, there was one alteration which it was necessary to mention, because it ran through the whole Book, and is of consequence to be rightly understood. What I thereupon said, was this:

Clear and distinct Ideas are terms, which though familiar and frequent in Men’s Mouths, I have reason to think every one, who uses, does not perfectly understand. And possibly ’tis but here and there one, who gives himself the trouble to consider them so far as to know what he himself, or others precisely mean by them; I have therefore in most places chose to put determinate or determined , instead of clear and distinct, as more [12]likely to direct Men’s thoughts to my meaning in this matter. By those denominations, I mean some object in the Mind, and consequently determined , i. e. such as it is there seen and perceived to be. This I think may fitly be called a determinate or determin’d Idea, when such as it is at any time objectively in the Mind, and so determined there, it is annex’d, and without variation determined to a name or articulate sound, which is to be steadily the sign of that very same object of the Mind, or determinate Idea.

To explain this a little more particularly. By determinate , when applied to a simple Idea, I mean that simple appearance, which the Mind has in its view, or perceives in it self, when that Idea is said to be in it: By determined , when applied to a complex Idea, I mean such an one as consists of a determinate number of certain simple or less complex Ideas, joyn’d in such a proportion and situation, as the Mind has before its view, and sees in it self when that Idea is present in it, or should be present in it, when a Man gives a name to it. I say should be; because it is not every one, nor perhaps any one, who is so careful of his Language, as to use no Word, till he views in his Mind the precise determined Idea, which he resolves to make it the sign of. The want of this is the cause of no small obscurity and confusion in Men’s thoughts and discourses.

I know there are not Words enough in any Language to answer all the variety of Ideas, that enter into Men’s discourses [14]and reasonings. But this hinders not, but that when any one uses any term, he may have in his Mind a determined Idea, which he makes it the sign of, and to which he should keep it steadily annex’d during that present discourse. Where he does not, or cannot do this, he in vain pretends to clear or distinct Ideas: ’Tis plain his are not so: and therefore there can be expected nothing but obscurity and confusion, where such terms are made use of, which have not such a precise determination.