Christopher Davidson - After the Sheikhs - The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies

More broadly, the apparent nuclearisation of the UAE and other Gulf monarchies can also be interpreted as part of the strengthening anti-Iran front. This began in late 2009 with Abu Dhabi’s awarding of a $20 billion contract to a South Korea-led consortium [720] 63. The consortium comprising the Korea Electric Power Company (KEPCO), Samsung, Hyundai, Doosan, and Westinghouse. to build four nuclear plants by 2020, [721] 64. The National , 29 December 2010. and has since gathered pace with Kuwait [722] 65. Associated Press , 21 June 2009. and Saudi Arabia [723] 66. Agence France Presse, 30 July 2011. also in discussion with foreign nuclear companies. Although the UAE programme is strictly civilian and rational in terms of diversifying its energy supplies, given declining hydrocarbon reserves and rising domestic energy consumption, the manner in which the programme was initiated was nonetheless also intended to signal a warning to Iran. There was a keenness to seek approval for the programme not only from the International Atomic Energy Agency, but also from the world’s major nuclear powers. The UAE did not move ahead with its contract until it received approval from the US Congress, even though its intention was likely never to award it to the bidding US-Japan consortium. [724] 67. The consortium comprising General Electrics and Hitachi. This is in sharp contrast to Iran’s efforts to press ahead with an indigenous programme that has not sought approval from the US or other nuclear powers.

Qatar, although much more careful with its public statements on Iran since its emergence as the region’s most energetic peace-broker, has also been caught out by leaked cables. Notably, in one from 2009 the Qatari prime minister characterised the emirate’s relationship with Iran as being one in which ‘they lie to us and we lie to them’. [725] 68. The Guardian , 28 November 2010. Nevertheless, Qatar seems to have avoided falling into the front line role now occupied by Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE. This is likely due to its particularly precarious situation: hosting major US military facilities while at the same time having to share its largest gas resource — the offshore North Field — with Iran. Similarly Oman has been more cautious in opposing Iran despite the presence of western bases on its soil and its very high spending on western armaments. Speaking in 2008 in a private conversation with a senior US Navy official, Oman’s Sultan came across as more pragmatic than his neighbouring rulers, while his public statements have been similarly realistic. This is unsurprising given that he is by far the longest serving ruler in the region and has had considerable experience of dealing with pre- and post-revolutionary Iran. Moreover, with Oman’s Musandam Peninsula stretching into the strategic Strait of Hormuz, his is the Gulf monarchy closest to Iran, and — perhaps most importantly — as with Qatar, Oman shares a major offshore gas field with the Islamic Republic. Indeed, 80 per cent of the Henjam field lies in Iranian waters, and the National Iranian Oil Company has earmarked $800 million for the field’s development [726] 69. Arabian Oil and Gas Magazine , 2 January 2012. —an investment Oman is unlikely to be able to match. Tellingly, in his 2008 conversation Qaboos bin Said Al-Said commented to the US official that the ‘Iranians are not fools’ and claimed that ‘Tehran realised there are certain lines it cannot cross [i.e. direct confrontation with the US]’. Most significantly, on the subject of the Gulf monarchies and Iran he stated ‘Iran is a big country with muscles and we must deal with it’ but that ‘as long as the US is on the horizon, we have nothing to fear’. [727] 70. Wikileaks, US Embassy Muscat, 1 March 2008.

Another interesting stance on Iran, although now having little bearing on the region’s security situation, is that of the Sharjah and Dubai ruling families. As one of the Persian Gulf’s most established ports Sharjah has long been home to a substantial Iranian-origin community and, despite having lost one of its outlying islands to Iran in 1971, relations have remained fairly warm. The Sharjah-based Crescent Petroleum has always maintained an office in Tehran and in 2001 the company signed a $1 billion 25 year agreement with the National Iranian Oil Company to pipe some 500 million cubic feet per day of Iranian natural gas to the emirate. [728] 71. Dow Jones Newswire , 14 July 2011. Similarly, as the region’s biggest port, with a long history of laissez-faire policies, Dubai has been home to substantial Iranian-origin communities for over a century, and has a well documented track record of supporting, or at least remaining neutral with regards to Iran. Even when Abu Dhabi and most other Gulf monarchies openly backed Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, Dubai’s ruler remained famously impartial, with the city’s port facilities remaining open to Iranian vessels and its radio station continuing to broadcast the Iranian version of the news. As the relevance of Dubai’s foreign policies have declined following the integration of its armed forces into the Abu Dhabi-led UAE Armed Forces in the 1990s and — as many have speculated — following the bailouts of its economy by Abu Dhabi in recent years, it had been assumed that the emirate’s stance on Iran would eventually fall into line with that of Abu Dhabi. To some extent this has been true, with Dubai’s ruling family having had little choice but to accede to Abu Dhabi’s desire to make the UAE conform to US-led sanctions on Iranian trade. Since about 2008 it has become much harder for Iranian businessmen to transfer money in and out of Dubai, or in some cases even to open bank accounts. Nevertheless such restrictions are viewed as harmful to Dubai’s livelihood, and the emirate’s ruler has publicly stepped out of line on Iran, arguing in a December 2011 CNN interview that Iran is not trying to acquire nuclear weapons ‘despite Western suspicions that it is trying to develop them’ and asking, rhetorically, ‘What can Iran do with a nuclear weapon?’ [729] 72. Reuters, 7 December 2011.

Perhaps even more controversial and risky than hawkishness towards Iran has been the discreet strengthening of political and economic relations between some of the Gulf monarchies and Israel. Seemingly a function of reinforcing relations with their Western security guarantors and hardening the anti-Iran front, but also a consequence of building lucrative trade links with one of the region’s most advanced economies, some Gulf rulers appear willing to co-operate and collaborate secretly with Israel. This is an especially dangerous policy, given the Gulf monarchies’ long history of boycotting Israel, their public alignment with the Arab ‘Refusal Front’, [730] 73. Roy, Olivier, The Politics of Chaos in the Middle East (London: Hurst, 2008), p. 96. and — as discussed — their provision of substantial development aid to Palestine. Moreover, their national populations are for the most part anti-Israeli and pro-Palestinian, with the topics of Israel and Zionism often stirring strong emotions. Certainly, many Gulf nationals grew up watching the Palestinian Intifada on television [731] 74. Filiu, p. 133. and the liberation of Palestine definitely remains a shared ideal among the region’s youth. It is likely too that most of the expatriate populations in the Gulf monarchies share similar views. And there are of course substantial, long-serving communities of Palestinians in every Gulf monarchy. In some cases there are even naturalised Palestinian-origin Gulf nationals who were born in refugee camps serving as senior advisors to rulers’ courts and occupying other powerful positions.