Christopher Davidson - After the Sheikhs - The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies

Still viewed as a necessity by the governments of the Gulf monarchies — most of which remain fearful of foreign aggression or in some cases even each other — the Western security guarantees they have sought and maintained are nevertheless becoming increasingly problematic, not least because of the significant expansion of the physical Western military footprint in their territories, often described as ‘boots on the ground’. Despite receiving encouragement from the ruling families that serve as their hosts, the existence of substantial non-Arab, non-Muslim bases on the Arabian Peninsula has always been controversial and potentially delegitimising for the Gulf monarchies. And as more details emerge of their size and scope it is likely the bases will draw further criticism, perhaps serving as another flashpoint for opposition movements while of course undermining the ability of these states to keep positioning themselves as peaceful neutrals.

Among the most entrenched Western bases in the Gulf monarchies is Qatar’s Al-Udeid Airbase. In 1999 Qatar’s ruler told the US that he would like to see ‘up to 10,000 American servicemen permanently based in the emirate’ and over the next few years the US duly began shifting personnel from a camp at Saudi Arabia’s Prince Sultan Airbase. [679] 22. Globalsecurity.org Special report on Al-Udeid Air Base, Qatar. Although Al-Udeid has only ever housed a few thousand American servicemen at a time, it has nevertheless been used as a forward headquarters of the US Central Command — CENTCOM — along with housing a US Air Force expeditionary air wing, a CIA base, and an array of US Special Forces living in compounds. Similarly, nearby Bahrain continues to host a US Naval Support Activity Base that houses the US Naval Forces Central Command and the entire US Fifth Fleet. Although the American role in Kuwait has recently been downsized, there still exist at least four infantry bases, including Camp Patriot, which is believed to house about 3000 American soldiers, and two air bases: Camp Ali Salem and Camp Al-Jabar.

Although there are no US infantry bases in the UAE, the country’s ports are heavily used by the US. Dubai’s Jebel Ali is now the US Navy’s most highly visited ‘liberty port’, with warships such as the USS John Kennedy regularly being refuelled or serviced in Dubai’s dry docks, [680] 23. Davidson, Christopher M., The Persian Gulf and Pacific Asia: From Indifference to Interdependence (London: Hurst, 2010), chapter 7. which remains one of only two ship repair yards in the Persian Gulf. [681] 24. The other dry docks being in Bahrain. It was recently estimated that around 4,000 American sailors come ashore at Jebel Ali each year, with many claiming in anonymous US Navy surveys that Dubai is their favourite stop-off location due to the availability of alcohol and nightclubs. [682] 25. Davidson (2010), chapter 7. Moreover, Jebel Ali together with Port Rashid also serve as major transit hubs for US military goods, with most such freight being delivered by three inconspicuous European shipping companies. [683] 26. One company being British, one Danish, and the other Norwegian. Meanwhile Abu Dhabi’s Port Zayed is the US Navy’s second most used port in the Persian Gulf [684] 27. Workers World , 17 May 2007. and, on a lesser but still significant scale, Fujairah’s deep water port is also used by the US Navy, with the emirate’s major hotels having a longstanding arrangement to bloclet many of their rooms for Navy personnel. Similarly, following the 2003 invasion of Iraq some of Abu Dhabi’s hotels began to billet US soldiers on leave from Iraq. In mid-2006 the US president stated that ‘…the UAE is a key partner for our navy in a critical region, and outside of our own country Dubai services more of our own ships than any other country in the world’. Moreover, commenting on the aforementioned Dubai Ports scandal in the US, a US rear admiral declared that ‘…in a sense Dubai Ports has already been responsible for American security because we dock here in Dubai, and from personal experience I can confirm they are wonderfully efficient’. [685] 28. Davidson (2008), chapter 8.

The use of UAE air infrastructure has also proved to be a key area of co-operation with the US military, as after 9/11 Dubai International Airport’s Terminal 2 became one of the busiest airports involved in invasion of Afghanistan. For some years since it was one of the few airports in the world that had regular flights to Baghdad and Kabul, with a high proportion of seats being reserved for American military personnel or for employees of big US contractors such as Halliburton. Also important have been the airport’s military freight facilities, with many commercial companies using it to ship US military goods and even armoured vehicles. Shrouded in secrecy for many years Abu Dhabi has also been making available its airbase in Al-Dhafrah to the US Air Force and to the CIA, with RQ-4 Global Hawk unmanned reconnaissance aircraft being stationed there and with KC-10 tanker aircraft having used the base to support operations in Afghanistan. Most embarrassingly for the UAE authorities, in the summer of 2005 it was revealed that US drones and U2 aircraft were also being serviced in Al-Dhafrah, following the crash landing of an unmanned spy plane on its return to Abu Dhabi from a mission in Afghanistan. The incident prompted the US Air Force to confirm that its 380 thAir Expeditionary Wing had been based there since 2002 [686] 29. International Herald Tribune , 22 June 2005. and at the time it was thought that there were over 100 US military personnel stationed in Al-Dhafrah. [687] 30. Jane’s Defence Weekly , 7 February 2007. The UAE has also been secretly making available an airbase in Pakistan to the US military. Following a leaked US diplomatic cable and a Reuters report describing the base as a ‘mystery wrapped in a riddle’, it emerged that the Al-Shamsi base in Baluchistan had been leased by the Pakistani government to the UAE since 1992, but had then been sub-leased more recently by the UAE to the US, presumably to facilitate the latter’s operations in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. According to the cable ‘the UAE government desired to keep details of the UAE co-operation with the US military in Afghanistan and Pakistan confidential, because the government is concerned that public acknowledgement of this assistance could pose risks to the UAE security within the UAE and in Pakistan’. [688] 31. Express Tribune Pakistan , 4 July 2011.

Despite pleas and offers of financial aid from certain Gulf rulers to keep British servicemen based in the region after their independence, [689] 32. For a full discussion see Davidson, Christopher M., The United Arab Emirates: A Study in Survival (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005), chapter 1. Britain’s military role in the Gulf monarchies has been greatly reduced since 1971. Nonetheless the Royal Air Force continues to deploy an expeditionary air wing at Qatar’s Al-Udeid base, and has its own desert air base at Thumrait in Oman. [690] 33. Davidson (2010), chapter 7. Moreover, other Western powers have recently been establishing bases in the region — sometimes openly, and sometimes covertly. Most prominent has been the aforementioned French base in Abu Dhabi, opened at Dhafrah in 2009. Although Abu Dhabi’s former ruler, Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahyan, had long forbidden the overt presence of Western servicemen in Abu Dhabi, sensing the risk it would carry, it seems that his successors have been much less cautious. If anything, the French base — dubbed the ‘Peace Camp’—was inaugurated with considerable fanfare, with even the French president being in attendance. [691] 34. Washington Post , 27 May 2009. It was followed up by announcements that the French Navy would begin using facilities at Abu Dhabi’s Port Zayed, and that UAE diplomats could begin using French embassies in countries where there was no UAE presence. [692] 35. The National , 25 May 2009. Moreover, writing in a high profile opinion editorial for one of the UAE’s state-backed newspapers, the French president openly stated his case, claiming that ‘We have been strategic partners for fifteen years, linked by the defence accord we signed in 1995. With this permanent base, our commitment alongside you becomes even stronger. This base proves that our country is prepared to commit itself fully, together with you, to the security of the region’. Later in his article he also claimed that the base ‘…proves that France is prepared to take every risk for its friends. The message is clear: we will stand by you under all circumstances, even the most difficult’ before concluding that ‘…it is in adversity that one recognises one’s friends. You should know that you can always count on us if the security of the region were ever to be threatened’. [693] 36. The National , 25 May 2009.