Christopher Davidson - After the Sheikhs - The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies

Of all the Gulf monarchies, Qatar has had the least to worry about with regard to censorship, given its economic circumstances and the general popularity enjoyed by its ruling family. Moreover, as the home of the Al-Jazeera network — which is widely regarded as enjoying relatively free speech — Qatar’s credentials have been further strengthened. Nevertheless, as with its neighbours, the government has ensured that it has powerful mechanisms to monitor and control most forms of media, including electronic and internet communications. A few activists and bloggers have recently been arrested, which indicates the structural similarities between Qatar and the other Gulf monarchies. The biggest problem so far seems to have been the very public embarrassment over a high profile attempt by the ruling family to brand Qatar as a regional haven of free expression. Launched in 2008 by the ruler’s wife — perhaps to allow the ruler to enjoy a little distance from the project, if need be [654] 193. As Fromherz describes ‘[the ruler] can support initiatives such as press freedom through [his wife] while distancing himself somewhat from the risks associated with such ventures’. See Fromherz, Allen J., Qatar: A Modern History (London: IB Tauris, 2012), p. 27. —the Doha Centre for Media Freedom appointed Robert Ménard, former director of the Paris-based Reporters Without Borders, as its founding director. The Centre then established two safe houses in Doha for journalists fleeing from neighbouring countries and positioned itself to pay the legal fees of such refugees.

But only months after the launch, Ménard sent an open letter to the ruler’s wife claiming that visas to such journalists were being denied by Qatari officials and that ‘…some people close to you and others you have appointed to senior positions at the centre are obstructing its activities’. Furthermore, Ménard had fired a Qatari national at the Centre, allegedly for this reason, and he argued that Qatar’s media was operating ‘under orders’. [655] 194. The Economist , 14 May 2009. Unsurprisingly Ménard resigned from the Centre shortly afterwards, and was quoted in the international media as follows: ‘How can we have any credibility if we keep quiet about problems in the country that is our host?’ [656] 195. Financial Times , 24 June 2009. He also explained that ‘…the Centre has been suffocated. We no longer have either the freedom or the resources to do our work’ and argued that ‘…some Qatari officials never wanted an independent Centre, free to speak out without concern for politics or diplomacy, free to criticise even Qatar’. Finally, he turned attention to Qatar itself, complaining that ‘Qatar has still not ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, despite frequent promises… and the committee that was supposed to discuss a new law on the media — and on which I had been invited to sit — has still not held any meetings’. [657] 196. Doha Centre for Media Freedom press release, 23 June 2009. Since taken offline.

Although the external survival strategies employed by the Gulf monarchies have generally succeeded in securing their position in a volatile environment and boosting their status and influence in more powerful states, they remain prey to pressures and weaknesses that are either byproducts of these relationships or that result from the mismanagement of external forces impacting on the region. Among the latter are efforts to diversify their economic bases away from hydrocarbons that have precipitated the development of new economic sectors geared towards foreign investors, tourists, or simply an increased number of expatriates. In many cases this has led to economy-driven, top-down changes and relaxations in the Gulf monarchies’ societies, especially with regard to cultural and religious practices. Already these are leading to mounting frustration and resentment from some sections of the national populations, especially those who believe that their governments and ruling families are not doing enough to preserve their values and traditions. In turn this is eroding the monarchies’ legitimacy resources, especially relating to traditional authority and Islam.

Also imposed on the broader population with seemingly little consultation have been the Gulf monarchies’ efforts to deepen their security ties with the Western powers. This has led to the establishing of many Western military bases on their soil in recent years, including several discreet installations that most citizens remain unaware of. It has also led to increased spending on Western armaments, with many Gulf monarchies now assigning a huge proportion of their GDP to such expenditure in what now resembles a protection racket, rather than a legitimate attempt to build up indigenous defensive capabilities. Closely related to this expensive militarisation of the region, Gulf nationals are also becoming concerned over the now rampant hawkishness of many of their governments, especially with regards to Iran. Despite shared economic histories and the historic efforts of many ruling families to position themselves as active neutrals, it seems that a new generation of Gulf monarchs are now more willing than ever to publicly antagonise their powerful neighbour.

Notwithstanding the region’s track record of boycotting and limiting contact with Israel in support of the Palestinian question, and despite having national populations which mostly continue to oppose recognition of Israel, many Gulf rulers seem willing, indeed keen, to strengthen economic and political relations with Israel as part of a dangerous, multipronged strategy to appease Western backers and further isolate Iran. The lack of any meaningful collective security or in some cases even basic co-operation between the Gulf monarchies is also a growing concern, not least due to these new, high stakes policies on Iran and Israel. More than thirty years after the founding of the Gulf Co-operation Council the six member states remain at loggerheads over many issues, including border disputes and other long running territorial arguments. In some cases grievances are so strong that diplomatic rifts develop, violence erupts, or one monarchy interferes in the domestic politics of another, sometimes even stirring or sponsoring coups in an attempt to re-arrange power within neighbours.

In some Gulf monarchies, and especially those that have made the greatest efforts to attract foreign direct investment and tourists, or present an inviting visage to expatriates, there have been several noticeable relaxations in recent years, While these measures have certainly been viewed as beneficial or necessary for economic development, it has often prompted strong criticism from more conservative elements of the national populations, many of whom have focused their anger on the apparent indifference of ruling families to their religious and cultural sensibilities. By far the strongest example is Dubai, where, as shown, a considerable attempt has been made to transform the emirate’s economic base by building up free zones, tourism, a real estate industry, and a financial sector. In addition to requiring considerable economic liberalisation such as rulings that allow foreigners to purchase freehold property, the emirate’s government has also striven to ensure that its massive expatriate population and legions of foreign investors and tourists feel as welcome and comfortable as possible. Given that many of Dubai’s newcomers are now either non-Muslim or share very few of the historical and cultural linkages with Dubai that were enjoyed by the earlier immigrants from Persia, India, or other parts of the Arab world, [658] 1. Davidson, Christopher M., Dubai: The Vulnerability of Success (London: Hurst, 2008), chapter 2. the relaxations have usually revolved around Islamic values and traditions. In Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman the same phenomenon can also be observed, although to a lesser extent.