Christopher Davidson - After the Sheikhs - The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies

The ongoing disputes between Oman and the UAE have also undermined any sense of GCC collective security. For many years territorial issues were at stake, but over the past decade the situation has become much tenser. In 2003 the UAE began constructing a giant wall stretching across the desert border between the two states. Completed in 2008, it has effectively sealed off the UAE, closing the previously open border between the Abu Dhabi-controlled city of Al-Ayn and the adjoining Omani-controlled city of Buraimi. Greatly resented by residents of both cities and local agricultural businesses, who now have to use checkpoints to cross the border, the wall is seen as damaging centuries-old trade and familial ties between the two communities. [762] 105. The National 20 July 2008. More seriously, especially at an inter-governmental level, was the widely reported cracking of a UAE spy ring in Oman. In late 2010 Omani bloggers began claiming that arrests of ‘UAE agents’ had taken place, and in early 2011 the Omani authorities confirmed these suspicions. Although the UAE authorities initially denied the existence of the spies, stating that ‘The UAE expresses its full willingness to co-operate with… Oman in any investigations that it carries out in full transparency to uncover those who try to mar relations between the two countries’, [763] 106. BBC News, 31 January 2011. the problem was only resolved following Kuwait-brokered personal visits to Oman by the Abu Dhabi crown prince and the ruler of Dubai.

Connected to the Gulf monarchies’ divisions over relations with Iran, it also transpired that the UAE spy ring may have been seeking information on Oman’s possible security links with Iran. As a prominent analyst at a Dubai-based think tank described ‘…one possibility is that the UAE wants to know more about Iran-Oman relations because of Tehran and Muscat’s long ties in security and military co-operation’. [764] 107. Ibid. Indeed, shortly before the Omani authorities’ revelation, it was reported in Iran’s state-backed media that their minister for the interior [765] 108. Mostafa Mohammad-Najjar. had recently visited Muscat. Upon meeting with Oman’s ruler the minister reportedly described Oman as ‘an old friend of Iran which has always been seeking to develop ties with Tehran’ and praised Oman for ‘sending the Zinat Al-Bihar vessel to Iran’s southern waters with a message of peace and friendship’ and releasing 101 Iranian prisoners that had been held in Omani jails. Meanwhile Oman’s ruler had reportedly ‘…called for expansion of bilateral ties, especially in economic areas, and said Iran can serve as a route for transition of goods from Oman to Central Asia’ before concluding that ‘Iran and Oman stand beside each other like two brothers and nothing can make a split between them’. [766] 109. Tehran Times Political Desk , 21 January 2011.

Such spying and bilateral regional security deals with other regional powers — whether real or fictional — understandably attenuate any sense of trust in the GCC and its capabilities. Certainly, there is little doubt that all six of the Gulf monarchies’ governments continue to view separate, international security guarantees as their only effective safety net. Some of the Western powers have seized the opportunities presented by these weaknesses and have now begun to explore the possibility of widening their individual alliances and agreements to form sub-groups of Gulf monarchies. In other words, if two or three Gulf monarchies can be brought together under the umbrella of one Western power, then a sense of collective security can be created for those countries even if it is sponsored by a foreign power and involves bypassing the GCC and its Peninsula Shield Force. Following the founding of the French military base in Abu Dhabi in 2009, the French president’s opinion-editorial in Abu Dhabi’s state-backed English language newspaper hinted at such a possibility. Explaining that ‘…with this first French military base in the Middle East, our country also shows that it intends to be fully engaged in the security and stability of this region’ he then went on to state that ‘France has many allies in the region; our presence in Abu Dhabi will enable us to reinforce our strategic partnership with them’ and that ‘we [France] hope that solid multilateral defence co-operation will develop among our allies in the region’. He concluded that ‘For this reason, we want to fully involve Qatar in the recent French-Emirates “Gulf Shield” military exercise. In a region as troubled as yours, it is essential that the countries defending the same values work together to reinforce their common security’. [767] 110. The National , 25 May 2009.

The bitter quarrels and differences between the Gulf monarchies have sometimes even led to attempts to alter the course of dynastic succession in each other. When opportunities have arisen in one Gulf monarchy — perhaps following the death of a ruler or a petty internal dispute — it is now commonplace for the other Gulf monarchies to interfere, either by discreetly backing a preferred candidate or, in more extreme cases, even sponsoring a coup d’état. Moreover, with the six monarchies failing to present a united front and often being divided over their choice of candidate in these ‘succession contests’, the resulting vacuums have often allowed foreign, non-regional powers to get involved. In some ways this is nothing new, as during Britain’s period of influence in the Persian Gulf there were frequent cases of the political resident stepping in to shape the future of certain monarchies. As described, the colonial representative eased the transfer of power in Abu Dhabi in 1966 from one brother to another, while in 1970 Britain ensured that control of Oman passed from father to son. In most of these situations Britain was playing the role of facilitator rather than meddler, usually consulting members of the ruling family in question and helping the dynasty install its preferred successor at the expense of unpopular or overly cautious incumbents. The squabbles and coups of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century have, however, been quite different, as when neighbouring monarchies or foreign powers have been involved there has rarely been any effort to identify the most suitable or popular candidate, with most of the focus being on installing a ruler that will be the most amenable to their interests.

In the late 1980s, for example, the coup in the UAE’s Sharjah — where one brother [768] 111. Abdul-Aziz bin Muhammad Al-Qasimi. ousted another [769] 112. Sultan bin Muhammad Al-Qasimi. on the grounds of economic mismanagement and squandering — was only reversed following interference by neighbouring Dubai, which had provided accommodation for the ousted ruler and published newspaper stories supporting him. [770] 113. For a full discussion of the 1987 Sharjah coup see Davidson (2008), chapter 7. Similarly in 1995 Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia tried to re-install the ousted ruler of Qatar [771] 114. Khalifa bin Hamad Al-Thani. who, as discussed, was removed from power by his more popular, pro-reform, son. [772] 115. Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani. Although the counter-coup was unsuccessful, fears of a repeat attempt continued to dog Qatar for several more years. Indeed, the following year some 6000 tribesmen were disenfranchised and several ruling family members were arrested after being linked to a Saudibacked coup plot. [773] 116. Kamrava, Mehran. ‘Royal Factionalism and Political Liberalization in Qatar’, Middle East Journal , Vol. 63, No. 3, 2009, p 415. And in 2009 it was reported by Stratfor that a major coup in the emirate had been attempted, involving members of the Qatari military and the ruling family. Most of the subsequent press coverage hinted that the coup had Saudi Arabia’s support. [774] 117. As referred to in Fromherz (2012). Similarly, in February 2011 the Jordan and UAE-based Al-Bawaba news agency reported that another coup had been attempted in Qatar, with thirty military personnel being arrested. This had supposedly coincided with a statement signed by sixty-six opposition figures including sixteen members of the ruling family who were backing the ruler’s exiled brother in France [775] 118. Abdul-Aziz bin Khalifa Al-Thani. and which claimed that the ruler and his wife were involved in ‘cases of corruption and social injustice’. [776] 119. Al-Bawaba , 28 February 2011. Gaining traction, this time the story was even covered in bulletins issued to various UN agencies. Whether true or not, the foreign-sourced report proved damaging for the ruler and has kept the spectre of future coup attempts in the minds of most Qataris and resident expatriates. Indeed, in April 2012 Iran’s Fars News Agency and Saudi Arabia’s Al-Arabiya reported that yet another attempt had taken place, with high-ranking military officers being rounded up and placed under house arrest after clashes between Royal Guard troops and regular military personnel outside one of the ruler’s palaces. Perhaps works of fiction, the reports claimed that the ruler and his wife were transported by American helicopters to a safe location. [777] 120. Fars News Agency , 12 April 2012.