Christopher Davidson - After the Sheikhs - The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies

Unsurprisingly the new, post-2011 opposition in the Gulf monarchies has manifested itself in different ways depending on the circumstances and pressures in each state. This has ranged from full-blown street riots complete with killings and martyrs in the poorer Gulf monarchies to more subtle intellectual and even internet-led ‘cyber opposition’ in the wealthier Gulf monarchies. But in all cases the regimes have responded with more repression than ever before, thus further exposing the ruling families. In some instances brutal police crackdowns have taken place and foreign mercenaries have been deployed while in others political prisoners have been held, judicial systems manipulated, and civil society further stymied. Thus far only Qatar has avoided such heavy-handedness, mostly due to its more favourable circumstances and its rather different stance on the Arab Spring. Nevertheless even its ruling family is not without critics, and there are already indications that opposition is building and greater repression may follow.

Much of the early opposition in the Gulf monarchies focused on the economic grievances and frustration of merchant or worker communities in the post-pearling industry era, and — especially in the 1960s and early 1970s — the ruling families’ perceived connections to non-Arab, non-Muslim powers and the need to bring these states closer into line with the region’s Arab nationalist republics. Particular hotbeds were in Dubai, Bahrain, and Kuwait, although there were also some protests in Qatar from indigenous oil workers concerned with the excesses of their ruling family. [797] 1. Fromherz, Allen J., Qatar: A Modern History (London: IB Tauris, 2012), p. 7. Several national fronts were established, but only one of these — the Dhofar Liberation Front, later the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf — ever led to an armed insurrection. In many ways the Gulf monarchies were well placed to counter these threats, as Israel’s victories over the main Arab military powers in 1967 and 1973 had taken much of the gloss off Arab nationalism. Moreover, with increasing oil exports and expanding state treasuries this was also the period when many of the region’s wealth distribution practices were inaugurated. Not only were most Gulf nationals enjoying better lifestyles than hitherto, but many were kept busy with the new activities and opportunities resulting from the first major oil booms. In Dubai’s case, many of the families that had been involved in national front activity and opposition to the ruling family in the 1960s became massively enriched in the 1970s, mostly due to being granted exclusive import licenses for the various products demanded by the emirate’s fast growing economy. And today their descendants, now regarded as key allies of the ruling family, are at the helm of some of the region’s biggest trade and retail empires. [798] 2. For a full discussion of the Dubai opposition see Davidson, Christopher M., ‘Arab Nationalism and British Opposition in Dubai, 1920–1966’, Middle Eastern Studies , Vol. 43, No. 6, 2007.

Subsequent opposition movements have been more difficult to contain, as most have focused on the illegitimacy of the Gulf monarchies and in particular their manipulation of Islam. Given that they have often been based on religious platforms, or led by disillusioned or discriminated against sections of the populations, these movements have not been entirely placated with material benefits. In Saudi Arabia, for example, the most serious opposition to the ruling family in the 1990s came from a diffuse movement of young religious dissidents and conservative university students. Critical of the official religious establishment’s seemingly hypocritical support for American bases on Saudi territory following the 1990 invasion of Kuwait, this Sahwa or awakening movement was only dealt with by granting more control over social institutions and the education sector to religious conservatives. Confirming a long held view in the ruling family that their main opposition would eventually come from religious circles rather than liberal reformers, this was deemed a necessary if unpleasant manoeuvre in order to head off further criticism. [799] 3. Nolan, Leigh. ‘Managing Reform? Saudi Arabia and the King’s Dilemma’, Brookings Doha Center Policy Briefing, May 2011. Similarly in the UAE and Kuwait, where Muslim Brotherhood organisations or ‘reform associations’ have existed for many years, there was a tacit understanding in place that these groups would be tolerated and given some influence over the religious and educational establishments. In the UAE this led to the Brotherhood’s de facto control over the Ministries for Education and Social Affairs, with its members presiding over curriculum committees and — for many years — dominating the UAE’s principal university. [800] 4. University of the United Arab Emirates, in Al-Ayn. Up until 2003 senior members of the Abu Dhabi ruling family were even holding meetings with Brotherhood representatives, trying to establish a set of compromises. [801] 5. According to a study of the Muslim Brotherhood in the UAE published by Dar Al-Hayat newspaper in Saudi Arabia. Dar Al-Hayat , 12 September 2010.

Following 9/11, the subsequent US-led War on Terror, the CIA’s capture of a major al-Qaeda figure in the UAE in 2002, [802] 6. Abd Al-Rahim Al-Nashiri was captured in the UAE in November 2002. and a violent campaign launched against the Saudi oil industry and western expatriates in 2003 by ‘Al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula’, the Gulf monarchies have made a volte-face on such Islamist opposition movements. Partly this has been out of fear, with unpublished polls in Saudi Arabia after 2001 indicating that most young Saudi men sympathised with Osama bin Laden and opposed any form of Saudi co-operation with the US over the Iraq War. [803] 7. Nolan, May 2011. But it has also been due to the increasing ease they have experienced in simply branding opponents as ‘terrorists’ or alleging their connections to ill-defined al-Qaeda plots. Indeed, in recent years the Gulf monarchies’ security services have usually been able to arrest activists and repress any Islamist organisations in their territories without fearing any international scrutiny. In many cases these crackdowns won praise from Western powers, being described as part of the Gulf monarchies’ ‘commitment to battling terrorism’. [804] 8. Wall Street Journal , 30 August 2010. With reference to the crackdowns in Saudi Arabia.

In the UAE, for example, the previous concessions granted to the Muslim Brotherhood were soon reversed, with hundreds of teachers, academics, and ministry employees being fired in 2006 from their jobs on the grounds of Islamist affiliations. Some have since been accused of ‘dual loyalties’ or threatening ‘violent acts in the occupied Arab emirates’, [805] 9. Dar Al-Hayat , 12 September 2010. and in 2008 a large number of activists were imprisoned and accused of being part of an ‘underground movement in the UAE trying to promote their own strict view of Islam’. [806] 10. The National , 6 April 2010. Meanwhile in Saudi Arabia new anti-terror legislation has been repeatedly used to imprison men who have been described by international human rights organisations as being political activists. In late 2010 Canada’s Global Post reported on sixteen Saudi nationals — including businessmen, university professors, and a judge — who were charged in a secret court with ‘supporting terrorism and plotting to overthrow the government’. Having been held in custody for more than four years, they were believed to be ‘widely known for peacefully demanding political reforms’. Their case was not reported in the Saudi press, although some Saudi nationals commented on the matter, claiming that the accused were only ‘…seeking reform and to open people’s minds’ and that they were ‘…extremely anti-Al Qaeda’. Moreover, fellow activists complained that such terrorism charges are now widespread in the kingdom as they are ‘…one of the most convenient charges [because] no one will defend you and you will become hopeless’. [807] 11. Global Post , 22 December 2010. There are now countless other such examples in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the region, with a Saudi surgeon having been held in custody and accused of ‘backing and funding terrorism’ since appearing on Al-Jazeera television and criticising the government. [808] 12. Agence France Presse, 30 December 2010. Similarly in Bahrain a trial was held in late 2010 for a group of twenty-five dissidents who were accused of ‘financing terrorism’ and ‘inciting hatred of the ruling family’. Reportedly beaten, tortured, and with the Bahraini media barred from covering their case, the men included prominent bloggers, journalists, and even a member of a human rights group. [809] 13. Los Angeles Times , 23 December 2010.