Roger Moorhouse - The Devils' Alliance - Hitler's Pact with Stalin, 1939-1941

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History remembers the Soviets and the Nazis as bitter enemies and ideological rivals, the two mammoth and opposing totalitarian regimes of World War II whose conflict would be the defining and deciding clash of the war. Yet for nearly a third of the conflict’s entire timespan, Hitler and Stalin stood side by side as allies. In
, acclaimed historian Roger Moorhouse explores the causes and implications of the tenuous Nazi-Soviet pact, an unholy covenant whose creation and dissolution were crucial turning points in World War II. Indeed, this riveting chapter of World War II is the key to understanding why the conflict evolved—and ended—the way it did.
Nazism and Bolshevism made unlikely bedfellows, but the brutally efficient joint Nazi-Soviet invasion of Poland in 1939 illustrated the powerful incentives that existed for both sides to set aside their differences. Forged by vain and pompous German foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop and his Russian counterpart, the inscrutable and stubborn Vyacheslav Molotov, the Nazi-Soviet pact in August of 1939 briefly unified the two powers. Together, the Germans and Soviets quickly conquered and divvied up central and eastern Europe—Poland, the Baltic States, Finland, and Bessarabia—aiding one another through exchanges of information, blueprints, and prisoners. The human cost was staggering: in Poland alone, the Soviets deported 1.5 million people in 1940, 400,000 of whom would never return. Tens of thousands were also deported from the Baltic States, including almost all of the members of the Estonian parliament. Of the 100,000 civilians deported to Siberia from Bessarabia, barely a third survived.
Nazi and Soviet leaders hoped that a similar quid-pro-quo agreement would also characterize their economic relationship. The Soviet Union would export much-needed raw materials to Germany, while the Germans would provide weapons and technological innovations to their communist counterparts. In reality, however, economic negotiations were fraught from the start, not least because the Soviets, mindful that the Germans were in dire need of raw materials to offset a British blockade, made impossible demands of their ally. Although German-Soviet trade still grew impressively through 1940, it was not enough to convince Hitler that he could rely on the partnership with Moscow, which on the whole was increasingly turbulent and unpredictable.
Fortunately for the Allies, the pact—which seemed to negate any chances of an Allied victory in Europe—was short-lived. Delving into the motivations and forces at work, Moorhouse explores how the partnership soured, ultimately resulting in the surprise June 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union. With the final dissolution of the pact, the Soviets sided with the Western democracies, a development that changed the course of the war—and which, upon Germany’s defeat, allowed the Soviets to solidify the inroads they had made into Eastern Europe during their ill-starred alliance. Reviled by contemporaries, the Nazi-Soviet Pact would have a similarly baleful afterlife. Though it was torn up by the Nazis and denied or excused as a strategic necessity by the Soviets, its effects and political ramifications proved remarkably persistent. The boundaries of modern eastern and central Europe adhere closely to the hasty divisions made by Ribbentrop and Molotov. Even more importantly, the pact laid the groundwork for Soviet control of Eastern Europe, a power grab that would define the post-war order.
Drawing on memoirs, diaries, and official records from newly opened Soviet archives,
is the authoritative work on one of the seminal episodes of World War II. In his characteristically rich and detailed prose, Moorhouse paints a vivid picture of the pact’s origins and its enduring influence as a crucial turning point, in both the war and in modern history.

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204 “Our association with Moscow must be governed”: Fröhlich, op. cit., 8:418.

204 stationing German troops in Finland: The troops in question were predominantly located in supply bases along the route leading to the northern tip of German-occupied Norway.

204 “not a word in the agreements”: DGFP, Series D, Vol. XI, 550–553.

205 “no power on earth which could oppose”: Ibid., 554.

205 in her dealings with the Baltic states: Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, ed., The Halder War Diary, 1939–1945 (London: Greenhill, 1988), 282.

205 “a strain on German-Russian relations”: DGFP, Series D, Vol. XI, 556.

205 “solution of these problems”: Ibid., 558–559.

205 “Let’s divide the whole world”: Chuev and Resis, op. cit., 18.

206 Bulgaria had requested any such guarantee: DGFP, Series D, Vol. XI, 559–560.

206 “she would not need the Straits for that”: Ibid., 561.

206 “the main event”: Schmidt, Statist, op. cit., 523.

206 “I persisted. I wore him down”: Chuev and Resis, op. cit., 16.

206 “the main issues”: DGFP, Series D, Vol. XI, 562.

207 said his good-byes, and left: Berezhkov, History, op. cit., 42. A similar version of this exchange is related in the record of postwar interviews with Molotov; Chuev and Resis, op. cit.

207 “Under Lenin’s gaze”: Schmidt, Statist, op. cit., 524.

208 respect one another’s spheres of influence: DGFP, Series D, Vol. XI, 564–565.

208 in line with Soviet interests: Ibid., 565.

208 “to find a way out of the difficulties”: Quoted in Ribbentrop, op. cit., 319.

209 coming back to his “decisive question”: DGFP, Series D, Vol. XI, 566–569.

209 “Though not invited to join in the discussion”: Winston S. Churchill, Their Finest Hour (New York: Bantam Books, 1949), 516.

209 center of the city was targeted: Berlin Air Raid records, reproduced in Wieland Giebel and Sven Felix Kellerhof, eds., Als die Tage zu Nächten wurden (Berlin: Giebel Verlag, 2003), 217.

209 “why are we in this shelter”: The official DGFP record of the discussion makes no mention of this last exchange, and neither does the memoir of the interpreter present, Gustav Hilger. First mention of it comes, via Stalin, from Churchill, op. cit., 518. It is considered by some to be apocryphal.

209 to see his Soviet counterpart off: Berezhkov, History , op. cit., 42.

209 found it difficult to interrupt Hitler: Sergo Beria, Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin (London: Duckworth, 2001), 63.

210 “swollen-headed and puffed-up”: Gorodetsky, op. cit., 76.

210 ought to have been more accommodating: Beria, op. cit., 63.

210 “some hope of action on the part of Russia”: Quoted in Walter Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1964), 113.

210 “destruction of the power of Russia”: Ibid., 135.

211 “no carefully thought-out plan”: Ibid., 135.

211 “If the plan succeeds”: Jacobsen, op. cit., 260.

211 “It is argued that without liquidating”: Ernst von Weizsäcker, quoted in Gorodetsky, op. cit., 70.

211 “Political discussions for the purpose of clarifying”: H. R. Trevor-Roper, ed., Hitler’s War Directives, 1939–1945 (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1964), 86.

212 “pushed into the background”: Jacobsen, op. cit., 286.

213 “appreciate a statement of the German view”: DGFP, Series D, Vol. XI, 714–715.

213 “We have already achieved a lot together”: Quoted in Ribbentrop, op. cit., 320.

214 Berlin expressing its “astonishment”: Quoted in Gorodetsky, op. cit., 85.

216 with a fistfight breaking out: “Fresh Tension Reported,” New York Times , January 1, 1941, 4.

216 “to crush Soviet Russia”: Trevor-Roper, op. cit., 95.

CHAPTER 8

217 would crown his career: See William Brumfield, Landmarks of Russian Architecture (Australia: Gordon & Breach, 1997), 230

218 British raids on Berlin and the Ruhr: Pravda, December 22, 1940, 5.

218 touring positions on the French coast: Pravda, December 25, 1940, 6; December 28, 1940, 5.

218 expected to attend: The list of participants for the conference is available at http://militera.lib.ru/docs/da/sov-new-1940/90.html.

219 “Results were generally satisfactory”: General M. I. Kazakov, quoted in Seweryn Bialer, ed., Stalin and His Generals: Soviet Military Memoirs of World War II (London: Souvenir Press, 1970), 139.

219 revealed “major shortcomings”: Text of Meretskov’s presentation is at http://militera.lib.ru/docs/da/sov-new-1940/02.htmland Russian State Military Archive (hereafter “RSMA”), f. 4, Op. 18, 55, l. 3–45.

219 “energetic, decisive and bold offensive operations”: RSMA, f. 4. Op. 18, 56, l. 1–52.

220 recognizing the “chief trends”: Georgy Zhukov, Reminiscences and Reflections (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1985), 1:220–221.

220 “exaggerating the success of foreign armies”: RSMA, f. 4. Op. 18, 56, l. 85–92.

220 “like a kennel of mad dogs”: Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers (London: André Deutsch, 1971), 145–146.

220 “The Use of Mechanised Forces in Offensive Operations”: RSMA, f. 4, Op. 18, 59, l. 1–41.

221 “Defence is not the decisive means”: Quoted in Geoffrey Roberts, Stalin’s Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 71.

221 “boundless loyalty to the party of Lenin”: The text of Timoshenko’s speech is at http://militera.lib.ru/docs/da/sov-new-1940/88.html.

221 anonymous tip about the Führer’s aggressive intentions: Gabriel Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), 124.

221 “War will be declared”: Quoted in ibid., 125.

221 “completed its full deployment”: Ibid., 125–126.

221 he had become “unhinged”: Simon Sebag Montefiore, Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2006), 302.

222 described antitank artillery as “rubbish”: Ibid., 295.

222 “For the time being, we should refrain”: Zhukov, op. cit., 224.

222 “victory in war will be won”: Ibid., 224.

222 “The government carries out a program”: Quoted in Bialer, op. cit., 144.

223 possible that this stayed his hand: Sebag Montefiore, ibid., 296.

223 establishment of three front headquarters: Geoffrey Roberts, Stalin’s General: The Life of Georgy Zhukov (London: Icon, 2012), 91–92, 97.

224 outline of the “special tasks”: Quoted in H. R. Trevor-Roper, ed., Hitler’s War Directives, 1939–1945 (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1964), 129, and http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/12–10–45.asp, 339.

224 Hitler would have to be mad: Albert Seaton, Stalin as Warlord (London: Batsford, 1976), 94.

225 drag the politicians in Berlin unwillingly into war: Ibid., 95.

225 “If we show restraint”: Valentin Berezhkov, At Stalin’s Side (New York: Carol, 1994), 53.

225 a potentially provocative gesture: Zhukov, op. cit., 234.

225 twenty-eight mechanized brigades: John Erickson, The Soviet High Command: A Military-Political History, 1918–1941 (London: Macmillan, 1962), 557.

225 a limited call-up of reservists: Zhukov, op. cit., 234.

225 understrength and ill supplied: Roberts, Zhukov, op. cit., 92.

226 requiring the work of around 140,000 laborers: Neil Short, The Stalin and Molotov Lines: Soviet Western Defences, 1928–41 (Oxford, UK: Osprey, 2008), 38.

226 casemates of the new fortifications: David Glantz, The Military Strategy of the Soviet Union: A History (London: F. Cass, 1993), 75.

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