Roger Moorhouse - The Devils' Alliance - Hitler's Pact with Stalin, 1939-1941

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History remembers the Soviets and the Nazis as bitter enemies and ideological rivals, the two mammoth and opposing totalitarian regimes of World War II whose conflict would be the defining and deciding clash of the war. Yet for nearly a third of the conflict’s entire timespan, Hitler and Stalin stood side by side as allies. In
, acclaimed historian Roger Moorhouse explores the causes and implications of the tenuous Nazi-Soviet pact, an unholy covenant whose creation and dissolution were crucial turning points in World War II. Indeed, this riveting chapter of World War II is the key to understanding why the conflict evolved—and ended—the way it did.
Nazism and Bolshevism made unlikely bedfellows, but the brutally efficient joint Nazi-Soviet invasion of Poland in 1939 illustrated the powerful incentives that existed for both sides to set aside their differences. Forged by vain and pompous German foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop and his Russian counterpart, the inscrutable and stubborn Vyacheslav Molotov, the Nazi-Soviet pact in August of 1939 briefly unified the two powers. Together, the Germans and Soviets quickly conquered and divvied up central and eastern Europe—Poland, the Baltic States, Finland, and Bessarabia—aiding one another through exchanges of information, blueprints, and prisoners. The human cost was staggering: in Poland alone, the Soviets deported 1.5 million people in 1940, 400,000 of whom would never return. Tens of thousands were also deported from the Baltic States, including almost all of the members of the Estonian parliament. Of the 100,000 civilians deported to Siberia from Bessarabia, barely a third survived.
Nazi and Soviet leaders hoped that a similar quid-pro-quo agreement would also characterize their economic relationship. The Soviet Union would export much-needed raw materials to Germany, while the Germans would provide weapons and technological innovations to their communist counterparts. In reality, however, economic negotiations were fraught from the start, not least because the Soviets, mindful that the Germans were in dire need of raw materials to offset a British blockade, made impossible demands of their ally. Although German-Soviet trade still grew impressively through 1940, it was not enough to convince Hitler that he could rely on the partnership with Moscow, which on the whole was increasingly turbulent and unpredictable.
Fortunately for the Allies, the pact—which seemed to negate any chances of an Allied victory in Europe—was short-lived. Delving into the motivations and forces at work, Moorhouse explores how the partnership soured, ultimately resulting in the surprise June 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union. With the final dissolution of the pact, the Soviets sided with the Western democracies, a development that changed the course of the war—and which, upon Germany’s defeat, allowed the Soviets to solidify the inroads they had made into Eastern Europe during their ill-starred alliance. Reviled by contemporaries, the Nazi-Soviet Pact would have a similarly baleful afterlife. Though it was torn up by the Nazis and denied or excused as a strategic necessity by the Soviets, its effects and political ramifications proved remarkably persistent. The boundaries of modern eastern and central Europe adhere closely to the hasty divisions made by Ribbentrop and Molotov. Even more importantly, the pact laid the groundwork for Soviet control of Eastern Europe, a power grab that would define the post-war order.
Drawing on memoirs, diaries, and official records from newly opened Soviet archives,
is the authoritative work on one of the seminal episodes of World War II. In his characteristically rich and detailed prose, Moorhouse paints a vivid picture of the pact’s origins and its enduring influence as a crucial turning point, in both the war and in modern history.

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173 “Negotiations are not proceeding favourably”: DGFP, Series D, Vol. VIII, op. cit., addendum to Doc. 487, 575, Ritter telegram to Berlin, December 27, 1939.

173 “Germany is at war”: DGFP, Series D, Vol. VIII, op. cit., Doc. 438, 513, Ribbentrop Memorandum, December 11, 1939.

173 objections and refusals from their own side: Ericson, Feeding the German Eagle , op. cit., 92.

173 “less sanguine” about the relationship: Quoted in Ericson, ibid., 98.

173 “Made in Russia”: William Shirer, Berlin Diary: The Journal of a Foreign Correspondent, 1934–1941 , ill. ed. (New York: Galahad Books, 1997), 131.

174 assuming a full quota of Soviet deliveries: Ericson, Feeding the German Eagle , op. cit., 205.

174 promise “given during the September negotiations”: DGFP, Series D, Vol. VIII, op. cit., Doc. 594, 739, Ribbentrop telegram to Schulenburg, February 3, 1940.

174 800 million RM of business in the first two years: DGFP, Series D, Vol. VIII, op. cit., Doc. 607, 763–769, text of the German-Soviet Commercial Agreement, February 11, 1940.

174 “great economic and political significance”: Izvestia, February 16, 1940, 1.

174 “The Soviet Union sees this not merely”: Quoted in Zeidler in Wegner, op. cit., 96.

174 “more than a battle won”: The National-Zeitung, quoted in Bogdan Musial, Stalins Beutezug (Berlin: Propyläen, 2010), 27.

174 “first great step towards the economic programme”: DGFP, Series D, Vol. VIII, op. cit., Doc. 636, 814–815, Schnurre Memorandum, February 26, 1940.

175 “a door to the East opened wide”: Gustav Hilger and Alfred G. Meyer, The Incompatible Allies: A Memoir-History of German-Soviet Relations, 1918–1941 (New York: Macmillan, 1953), 317.

175 Soviets also ordered ten single-seat Heinkel He-100 aircraft: DGFP, Series D, Vol. VIII, op. cit., Doc. 607, 763–764, “Economic Agreement,” February 11 1940.

175 various types of bombs and ammunition: D. A. Sobolev and D. B. Khazanov, “Heinkel He-100 for the USSR,” Aviation of World War II , www.airpages.ru/eng/ru/he100_2.shtml.

175 including plants for coal hydrogenation, vulcanization: See DGFP, Series D, Vol. VIII, op. cit., Doc. 607, 762–769, “Economic Agreement,” and Doc. 636, 814–817, Schnurre Memorandum.

176 nearly twice what construction had cost: German offer of 152 million reichsmarks is in Ericson, Feeding the German Eagle , op. cit., 100; construction cost of Lützow is given as 83.59 million Reichmarks in Erich Gröner, German Warships, 1815–1945 (London: Conway Maritime, 1990), 1:65.

176 “to be delivered for completion in the USSR”: DGFP, Series D, Vol. VIII, op. cit., Doc. 607, 763, “Economic Agreement.”

176 “not acceptable from a strictly commercial point of view”: Quote from Ericson, Feeding the German Eagle, op. cit., 115.

177 peaking at 37 million RM in December: Statistics quoted in ibid., Table 1.6, 192.

177 thereby avoiding the problem areas: Philbin, op. cit., 48.

177 peak at nearly ten times that in September: Statistics quoted in Ericson, Feeding the German Eagle , op. cit., Table 1.5, 191.

177 German exports to the USSR of 242 million RM: Statistics quoted in Heinrich Schwendemann, “German-Soviet Economic Relations at the Time of the Hitler-Stalin Pact, 1939–1941,” in Cahiers du Monde Russe 36, nos. 1–2 (January–June 1995): 176.

177 amounted to over 60 percent of monthly totals: See statistics quoted in Ericson, Feeding the German Eagle , op. cit., Table 4.1, 207. The average monthly percentage for July through December 1940 for German exports to the Soviet Union is 67.6 percent of the total.

178 “Guderian’s tanks operated largely on Soviet petrol”: Nikolai Tolstoy, Stalin’s Secret War (London: Cape, 1981), 188, quoted in Andrew and Gordievsky, op. cit., 202.

178 similar figure for grain of 103,000 tons: Statistics quoted in Ericson, Feeding the German Eagle, op. cit., Table 3.2, 202, and Musial, op. cit., 28–29.

178 last prewar orders were being filled: Ericson, Feeding the German Eagle , op. cit., 207.

178 less than 1 percent of German GDP: Statistics quoted in ibid., Table 4.1, 207, and Mark Harrison, ed., The Economics of World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 10.

178 less than import totals from the USSR: Statistics quoted in Ericson, Feeding the German Eagle , op. cit., Table 1.1, 187.

178 nearly 53 percent of the USSR’s total exports: Zeidler in Wegner, op. cit., 110.

179 Soviet exports in the other direction fell short: Statistics quoted in Ericson, Feeding the German Eagle , op. cit., Tables 1.3 and 1.4, 189–190.

179 functioning prototype jet engine by 1938: These were the work of engineering designers Aleksandr Moskalyev and Arkhip Liul’ka, respectively. On the latter, see Mark Harrison, ed., Guns and Rubles: The Defense Industry in the Stalinist State (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 216–217.

179 even overfulfilled by the middle of 1941: Mark Harrison, Soviet Planning in Peace and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 30–31.

180 import from Germany of 117 metal-processing tools: Musial, op. cit., 36–40.

180 nearly 20 million rubles were spent on machinery: Ibid., 53, 54.

181 Total oil supplies from the Soviet Union: Statistics quoted in Ericson, Feeding the German Eagle , op. cit., Tables 3.1 and 3.2, 201–202; and Heinrich Hassmann, Oil in the Soviet Union (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1953), Table 37, 148.

181 confiscated around 1 million tons of French oil stocks: Ericson, Feeding the German Eagle , op. cit., 124, 130n7.

181 Romania supplied over four times that amount: Dietrich Eichholtz, War for Oil: The Nazi Quest for an Oil Empire (Washington, DC: Potomac, 2012), 30.

181 less than 3 percent of Soviet annual production: Statistics quoted in Harrison, Soviet Planning , op. cit., Appendix 2, 253.

181 over thirteen times the total Soviet figure: DGFP, Series D, Vol. VIII, op. cit., Doc. 481, 564.

182 projected at around 9,000 tons per month: Burton Klein, Germany’s Economic Preparedness for War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953), 58.

182 would barely ease the shortage: Statistics quoted in ibid., 45; Ericson, Feeding the German Eagle , op. cit., Table 3.3, 203.

182 target production of 25,000 tons per annum: Bernd C. Wagner, IG Auschwitz: Zwangsarbeit und Vernichtung von Häftlingen des Lagers Monowitz, 1941–1945 (Munich: K. G. Saur, 2000), 39.

182 plant would consume some 600 million RM: Wagner, op. cit., 281–282.

182 “Buna is as large as a city”: Primo Levi, Survival in Auschwitz: The Nazi Assault on Humanity (London: Pocket Books, 1996), 72.

183 bring home from abroad: See Roger Moorhouse, Berlin at War: Life and Death in Hitler’s Germany (London: Bodley Head, 2010), 74–99.

183 reliant on supplies from the Soviet Union: Ericson, Feeding the German Eagle , op. cit., Tables 3.5 and 5.1, 205, 210.

183 German participant described simply as “chicanery”: Ibid., 125.

183 “The negotiations were marked”: Hilger and Meyer, op. cit., 317.

184 “personal intervention of Stalin to prevent”: Andor Hencke, Die deutsch-sowjetischen Beziehungen zwischen 1932 und 1941, unpublished protocol held at the Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Munich, MA 1300/2, 32.

184 ordered that no further difficulties were to be made: Yakovlev in Bialer, op. cit., 119.

184 “The Russians are providing us”: Elke Fröhlich, ed., Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels , Part 1 (Munich: K. G. Saur, 1998), 8:240, entry for July 27, 1940.

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