Roger Moorhouse - The Devils' Alliance - Hitler's Pact with Stalin, 1939-1941

185 resell much of it at a healthy profit: See Ericson, Feeding the German Eagle , op. cit., 116, 120n80.

185 risen by 75 percent to 5.5 million RM: Statistics quoted in ibid., Tables 2.1 and 2.2, 195.

185 Soviet supplies for the month dropped: Ibid., 135–136.

185 unpredictable economic partnership with Moscow: Zeidler in Wegner, op. cit., 108.

186 Prinz Eugen had been completed: Berezhkov, op. cit., 90–91.

186 “raised a rumpus”: Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers (London: André Deutsch, 1971), 114.

186 export trade in foodstuffs and fuel: Ericson, Feeding the German Eagle , op. cit., 125, 130n24.

187 would be reduced by two-thirds: Ibid., 126.

187 become “Germany’s tail”: Gabriel Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), 24.

187 “moral embargo” on trade: Zeidler in Wegner, op. cit., 103.

187 German military success had been a “great surprise”: Quoted in Gorodetsky, op. cit., 16.

188 poisoning already fraught relations as it went: See Bronis J. Kaslas, “The Lithuanian Strip in Soviet-German Secret Diplomacy, 1939–1941,” Journal of Baltic Studies 4, no. 3 (1973): 211–225.

188 “compensation” for historic Soviet losses at Romanian hands: Geoffrey Roberts, Stalin’s Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 55.

188 Black Sea was potentially little more than a Soviet lake: This aspect is well covered in Gorodetsky, op. cit., 23–47.

188 “we would have been helpless”: A transcript of the Hitler-Mannerheim discussion is in Ahti Jäntti and Marion Holtkamp, eds., Schicksalschwere Zeiten: Marschall Mannerheim und die deutsch-finnischen Beziehung 1939–1945 (Berlin, 1997), 76–87. Translated from the German by the author.

189 memorandum was something like a warning shot: DGFP, Series D, Vol. X (London, 1957), Doc. 13, 12–13.

190 “Intoxicated by victory, the German Government”: Quoted in Gorodetsky, op. cit., 56.

190 Red Navy training detail should be permitted to serve: Philbin, op. cit., 122–125.

191 vessel’s German origins were not mentioned: “Istoriya boevich korablei,” Izvestia, October 13, 1940, 1.

191 “delimitation of mutual spheres of influence”: DGFP, Series D, Vol. IX, 291–297.

191 relations between the two would thereby be improved: Ibid, 353–354.

191 “The main topic of the negotiations”: Quoted in Gorodetsky, op. cit., 58.

193 a special “European-designed” train: Gustav Hilger and Alfred G. Meyer, The Incompatible Allies: A Memoir-History of German-Soviet Relations, 1918–1941 (New York: Macmillan, 1953), 322.

193 “excessive secrecy and stupid subordination”: Ibid., 322.

194 “it was not concern for our comfort”: Valentin Berezhkov, History in the Making: Memoirs of World War Two Diplomac y (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1983), 19.

195 induce some sympathetic Berliners to join in: Paul Schmidt, Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne (Wiesbaden, DE: Aula, 1986), 514. This is disputed by eyewitnesses and consequently misreported by historians. Hitler’s interpreter Paul Schmidt recalls that only the “Presentation March” was played and that the “Internationale” was avoided, for fear that communist Berliners might be tempted to join in. Soviet interpreter Valentin Berezhkov, meanwhile, claims that the Soviet anthem was played. See Berezhkov, History , op. cit., 20. Newsreel footage available online shows the “Presentation March” clearly being played, so on that basis I consider Schmidt’s account to be more reliable.

195 uncharacteristic terseness in his diary as “cool”: Elke Fröhlich, ed., Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, Part 1 (Munich: K. G. Saur, 1998), 8:416.

195 party functionaries organized cheering and flag waving: Schmidt, Statist , op. cit., 515. It is also referenced in the edited English edition of the memoir; Paul Schmidt, Hitler’s Interpreter (New York: Heinemann, 1951), 209.

195 “could not have known the weather in advance”: Henry W. Flannery, Assignment to Berlin (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1942), 37.

196 to greet the Soviet minister: Karl-Heinz Janßen, “Wir müssen Freunde bleiben,” Die Zeit, June 14, 1991.

196 French cinema audiences learned more: The contemporary French newsreel of Molotov’s arrival is 2'47", whereas the German version is only 2'13". See http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=endscreen&v=2dPLEOC-uUo&NR=1and http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LzanQARfV2Q.

196 no recollection of his arrival in Berlin: Felix Chuev and Albert Resis, ed., Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics (Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993), 16–17.

196 After riding through the “half-empty streets”: Berezhkov, History , op. cit., 21.

196 former diplomat Willibald von Dirksen: Ernst A. Busche, Bellevue (Leipzig, DE, 2011), 105–134.

196 “A long avenue of limes”: Berezhkov, History , op. cit., 21.

197 some dared to wave: Ibid., 21–22.

197 “on a broader basis” through a “demarcation”: Ribbentrop letter quoted in Rudolf von Ribbentrop, Mein Vater: Joachim von Ribbentrop, Erlebnisse und Erinnerungen (Graz, AT: Ares, 2013), 318.

197 “go about its business” undisturbed: Albert Seaton, Stalin as Warlord (London: Batsford, 1976), 94.

198 The first meeting was held: Not, as is sometimes maintained, in the Reich Chancellery or the Bellevue Palace. See Schmidt, Interpreter , op. cit., 210.

198 rarely allowed his poker face to slip: Schmidt, Statist, op. cit., 516.

198 Germany, he said, was “extraordinarily strong”: Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945 (hereafter “DGFP”), Series D, Vol. XI (London, 1961), 533, Ribbentrop-Molotov meeting, November 12, 1940.

199 “in the long run the most advantageous access”: Ibid., 533–537.

199 “the ideas which the Führer”: Ibid., 539.

200 break for a late luncheon: Ibid., 541.

200 “keeping his powder dry”: Schmidt, Interpreter , op. cit., 213.

200 “Two tall blond SS men”: Berezhkov, History , op. cit., 23.

200 “still without a word”: Ibid., 23.

201 a test of mettle: Richard Overy, The Dictators (London: Allen Lane, 2004), 20.

201 Hitler’s “surprisingly gracious and friendly manner”: Quoted in Gabriel Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), 74.

201 Hitler outlined Germany’s viewpoints: DGFP, Series D, Vol. XI, 544.

201 “intolerable and unjust” situation: Chuev and Resis, op. cit., 15.

201 “he wanted the i’s dotted”: Schmidt, Statist, op. cit., 519.

202 boundaries of the so-called Greater East Asian sphere: DGFP, Series D, Vol. XI, 548.

202 “The questions hailed down on Hitler”: Schmidt, Interpreter , op. cit., 520.

202 Hitler was “meekness and politeness itself”: Berezhkov, History , op. cit., 25; Schmidt, Statist, op. cit., 520.

202 “in view of a possible air raid alarm”: DGFP, Series D, Vol. XI, 548–549.

203 People had been shot for less: Valentin Berezhkov, At Stalin’s Side (New York: Carol, 1994), 157–158.

203 “tripping up” Hitler’s deputy: Chuev and Resis, op. cit., 20.

203 “It goes without saying”: Ibid., 16.

203 fundamental basis of Soviet-German relations: “Perepiska V. M. Molotova so I. V. Stalinym. Noiabr 1940g,” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, no. 9 (1992): 18, quoted in Aleksandr M. Nekrich, Pariahs, Partners, Predators: German-Soviet Relations , 1922–1941 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 199.