Roger Moorhouse - The Devils' Alliance - Hitler's Pact with Stalin, 1939-1941

150 “unadulterated twaddle based on ignorance”: Quoted in Dallek, op. cit., 212.

150 Roosevelt was beginning to prepare the ground: Glantz, op. cit., 53.

150 “Mr. President,” he wrote, “with great respect”: Stephen Ambrose, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938 (New York: Penguin Books, 1991), 5, 7.

151 Although he declared himself “deeply moved”: Quoted in Churchill, op. cit., 303.

152 the two were duly found guilty and sentenced: Nigel West, MI5: British Security Service Operations, 1909–1945 (London: Bodley Head, 1981), 126.

152 “sympathies with the system of government”: Text cited in Aaron Goldman, “Defence Regulation 18B: Emergency Internment of Aliens and Political Dissenters in Great Britain During World War II,” Journal of British Studies 12, no. 2 (May 1973): 122.

152 representing almost the entire active party membership: Goldman, op. cit., 129.

152 allegedly attempting to undermine industrial production: Gardiner, op. cit., 295.

152 Labour Party’s entry into government: Goldman, op. cit., 129.

153 not to employ British Communist Party supporters: Gardiner, op. cit., 300.

153 keen for some rapprochement with Britain: TNA, War Cabinet, CAB 65/11/25, February 7, 1940, 222.

154 “I am sorry for Sir S. Cripps”: TNA, FO 371/24844 5853, June 23, 1940, quoted in Hanak, op. cit., 59.

154 “We did not at that time realize”: Churchill, op. cit., 280.

154 “We did not at that time realize”: Hanak, op. cit., 57.

155 seismic impact that Hitler’s aggression had wrought: Quoted in Gabriel Gorodetsky, Stafford Cripps’ Mission to Moscow, 1940–42 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 52.

155 driving Stalin into Hitler’s arms: Ibid., 76, 78.

155 Allied plan to bomb the Soviet oilfields: Stephen Dorril, MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty’s Intelligence Service (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 194.

156 London and Moscow would sign a pact of nonaggression: TNA, FO 371/29464 1604, October 22, 1940, quoted in Hanak, op. cit., 66.

156 highlighting Moscow’s ongoing discussions with the British: Ibid., 67n3.

156 “Does the British Government imagine itself”: Ivan Maisky, Memoirs of a Soviet Ambassador: The War, 1939–1943 (London: Hutchinson, 1967), 142.

157 “Believe me we are tired”: Ibid., 143.

157 “it was up to the Russians”: Laurence Collier, head of the Northern Department of the Foreign Office, quoted in Gorodetsky, op. cit., 129.

157 temptation for Great Britain to come to some arrangement: Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War (London: HMSO, 1970), 1:607.

157 lacking the delicacy required for the task: Gorodetsky, op. cit., 131.

157 “nothing to do no chance of influencing events”: Ibid., 147.

158 “Neither dictator,” one memorandum noted: Ibid., 55.

159 “It was all so mad”: Ibid., 76.

162 Prinz Eugen would be the only one: The Prinz Eugen would meet her end in 1946, when she was used as a test vessel for the US atomic test at Bikini Atoll, before being towed to Kwajalein Atoll, where she capsized.

162 German engineers had originally devised the Admiral Hipper class: Erich Raeder, My Life (New York: Arno Press, 1980), 199.

164 “comradeship in misfortune”: Quoted in Walter Laqueur, Russia and Germany: A Century of Conflict (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1965), 123.

164 72 percent of her machinery imports from German firms: Statistics from ibid., 132, and Paul N. Hehn, A Low Dishonest Decade (New York: Continuum, 2002), 246.

164 10 percent of German exports went in the other direction: Statistics quoted in Hehn, op. cit., 245–246.

165 unsuccessfully floated the idea of a general normalization of relations: For details of the Kandelaki mission, see Lew Besymenski, “Geheimmission in Stalins Auftrag?” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 40, no. 3 (1992): 339–357.

165 build bridges between Moscow and Berlin: This is suggested by KGB defector Walter Krivitsky, In Stalin’s Secret Service (New York, 2000), 196, and is reported in the more reliable study by Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1990), 187.

166 third largest source of crude oil and iron ore: Manfred Zeidler, “German-Soviet Economic Relations During the Hitler-Stalin Pact,” in From Peace to War: Germany, Soviet Russia and the World, 1939–1941 , edited by Bernd Wegner (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1997), 100–101.

166 prelude to the program unveiled in October 1938: Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction (London: Allen Lane, 2006), 659.

166 It was, Göring concluded, “a gigantic programme”: Quoted in ibid., 288.

166 perceived advantage in men and materiel still held good: William Carr, Arms, Autarky and Aggression (New York: Norton, 1972), 106.

167 amount of money in circulation was 40 percent higher: “Reich Is Accelerating Inflation of Currency,” New York Times , September 27, 1939, 1.

167 cash flow deficit of 2 billion RM: Tooze, op. cit., 296.

167 Germany was compelled “by dire necessity”: Max Domarus, Hitler: Speeches and Proclamations, 1932–1945 (London: Tauris, 1997), 3:1444.

167 highlighted the urgent need for imports: Edward E. Ericson III, “Karl Schnurre and the Evolution of Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1936–1941,” German Studies Review 21, no. 2 (May 1998): 265.

168 already clear in their essentials by the end of 1938: Ericson, “Schnurre,” op. cit., 268.

168 cost many thousands of civilian lives: Richard Bessel, Germany After the First World War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 41.

168 wider political pact with Hitler’s Germany: Zeidler in Wegner, op. cit., 98.

169 repaid in raw material shipments from 1946: Ibid., 99.

169 treaty as better than “all previous agreements”: Quoted in Jane Degras, ed., Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy (New York: Octagon Books, 1978), 3:367.

170 named in Soviet press reports as “Ambassador Baron von Schnurre”: Edward E. Ericson III, Feeding the German Eagle: Soviet Economic Aid to Nazi Germany, 1933–1941 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 71, 79.

170 “they smiled at us, shook our hands”: Alexander Yakovlev, quoted in Seweryn Bialer, ed., Stalin and His Generals: Soviet Military Memoirs of World War II (London: Souvenir Press, 1970), 117.

170 “In strict order, as though on parade”: Ibid., 117.

171 “Everything was impeccably organised”: Ibid., 118.

171 “I give you my word as an officer”: Ibid., 118.

171 prevented from even seeing the remainder of the workshop: Valentin Berezhkov, At Stalin’s Side (New York: Carol, 1994), 81–82.

172 not even been accepted for operational use by the Luftwaffe: See William Green and Gordon Swanborough, “Heinkel’s High Speed Hoaxer: The Annals of the He 100,” Air Enthusiast (January–April 1989).

172 Moscow was not accorded reciprocal privileges: Tobias R. Philbin III, The Lure of Neptune: German-Soviet Naval Collaboration and Ambitions, 1919–1941 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1994), 68–70.

172 merely a cover for a concerted campaign: Ericson, Feeding the German Eagle , op. cit., 125.

172 including everything from cruisers to fighter aircraft: Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945 (hereafter “DGFP”), Series D, Vol. VIII (Washington, DC, 1954), 472–475.

172 “fully approved by Stalin”: DGFP, Series D, Vol. VIII, op. cit., Doc. 442, 516–517, Ritter telegram to Schulenburg, December 11, 1939, .