Christopher Andrew - The Sword and the Shield

71. Kuzichkin, Inside the KGB, pp. 111-12.

72. Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 238-9.

73. Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 152-3.

74. vol. 2, app. 3.

75. Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 152-9. Cf. Wise, Molehunt, pp. 195-7.

76. vol. 2, app. 3. The Line KR officer Vladimir Nikolayevich Yelchaninov (codenamed VELT), posted to the New York residency in 1978, also spent much of his time trying to track down defectors; vol. 6, app. 2, part 5.

77. Bereanu and Todorov, The Umbrella Murder, pp. 34-7, 70-3.

78. Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 178-83; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 644-5. Bereanu and Todorov, The Umbrella Murder, adds usefully to previous accounts of Markov’s murder but also introduces some implausible speculation. For an illustration of an earlier version of the weapon used to kill Markov, a KGB poison pellet cane of the 1950s, see Melton, The Ultimate Spy Book, p. 152.

79. Interviews with Alpha group veterans, broadcast in Inside Russia’s SAS (BBC2, June 13, 1999).

80. vol. 1, ch. 4.

81. Westad, “Concerning the Situation in ‘A,’” p. 130. Dobbs, Down with Big Brother, pp. 11-12.

82. See above, chapter 15.

83. vol. 1, ch. 4. Mitrokhin’s account contains only a brief allusion to the attempts to poison Amin’s food, which appears to have been the Eighth Department’s preferred method of assassination. According to Vladimir Kuzichkin, who defected from Directorate S a few years later, the first choice of assassin was an Azerbaijani illegal, Mikhail Talybov, who was bilingual in Farsi and had spent several years in Kabul with Afghan identity papers forged by the KGB. Equipped with poisons from the OTU laboratory, Talybov succeeded in gaining a job as a chef in the presidential palace. But, according to Kuzichkin, “Amin was as careful as any of the Borgias. He kept switching his food and drink as if he expected to be poisoned.” Kuzichkin, Inside the KGB, pp. 314-15; Kuzichkin, “Coups and Killings in Kabul,” Time (November 22, 1982); Barron, KGB Today, pp. 15-16. A further, unsuccessful attempt to poison Amin took place at a lunch given by him for his ministers on December 27 (Dobbs, Down with Big Brother, p. 19).

84. Westad, “Concerning the Situation in ‘A,’” p. 130.

85. “The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978-1989,” p. 159.

86. Westad, “Concerning the Situation in ‘A,’” p. 131. The invasion plan was approved by the Politburo on December 12.

87. vol. 1, ch. 4.

88. Dobbs, Down with Big Brother, pp. 18-19.

89. vol. 1, ch. 4.

90. vol. 1, ch. 4.

91. vol. 1, ch. 4.

92. vol. 1, app. 2.

93. vol. 1, ch. 4.

94. On Kikot’s previous career, see k-24,87,89; k-12,376; k-8,590.

95. vol. 1, app. 3.

96. Childs and Popplewell, The Stasi, pp. 138-40, 156-7; Gates, From the Shadows, pp. 206-7; Wolf, Man Without a Face, pp. 271-81. On Carlos’s contacts with the KGB, see volume 2.

97. vol. 7, ch. 15.

98. Gates, From the Shadows, pp. 338-9.

99. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 82-5. 100. Accounts of the August coup include those in Stepankov and Lisov, Kremlevsky Zagovor; Albats, The State within a State; Remnick, Lenin’s Tomb; and Gorbachev, The August Coup. Though Kryuchkov and other leading plotters were arrested after the coup, their trial was repeatedly postponed. By early 1993 all had been released. They were given formal amnesties by the Russian parliament elected in December 1993. 101. k-16,408.

1. There is no support in any of the files seen by Mitrokhin that for the implausible theory that a major Soviet agent remained at work in MI5 after the demise of the Magnificent Five. Mitrokhin’s notes contain no reference to Sir Roger Hollis, director-general of MI5, the most senior of the MI5 officers wrongly accused of being a Soviet agent. The Hollis story is now thoroughly discredited (Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 27).

2. On Norwood’s early career, see above chapters 7 and 8.

3. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 17.

4. Hennessy, Never Again, p. 269.

5. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 17. Myakinkov’s name was wrongly transcribed by Mitrokhin as Mekin’kov. (CBEN)

6. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 17.

7. For legal reasons neither HUNT’s real identity nor the government departments for which he worked (included in Mitrokhin’s notes) can be identified. HUNT’s first controller was V. E. Tseyrov (then also Norwood’s controller), followed by B. K. Stolenov and Yu. Kondratenko. After the mass expulsion of KGB and GRU personnel from London in 1971 HUNT was put on ice for several years as a security precaution. Contact was resumed in 1975 by MAIRE, an agent of the Paris residency. Following MAIRE’s death in 1976, the London residency resumed control in 1977. HUNT’s last two case officers were V. V. Yaroshenko and A. N. Chernayev. In 1979, following HUNT’s establishment of a small business, his wife was recruited as a courier. By 1981, however, the Centre was dissatisfied with the quality of HUNT’s intelligence and apparently fearful that he was under MI5 surveillance. Contact with him seems to have been broken at that point. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 16.

8. Blake, No Other Choice, chs. 2-5. Cf. Hyde, George Blake. Though acknowledging his affection and admiration for Curiel, Blake unconvincingly downplays his influence on him. According to Kalugin, Blake “already held far-leftist views at the outbreak of the Korean War” (Kalugin, Spymaster, p. 141.). For examples of other distortions in Blake’s memoirs, see Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 755-6, n. 117); Murphy, Kondrashev and Bailey, Battleground Berlin, pp. 217, 482-3, n. 36.

9. Murphy, Kondrashev and Bailey, Battleground Berlin, pp. 214-15 (an account based on partial access to KGB files and on the recollections of Kondrashev). Rodin was London resident from 1947 to 1952 and from 1956 to 1961; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 663.

10. See below, chapter 26.

11. k-9, 65.

12. Blake, No Other Choice, pp. 207-8. Kalugin, Spymaster, p. 141. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 755-6, n. 117.

13. The best account of the Berlin tunnel operation, based both on material made available by the SVR and on newly declassified CIA files, is Murphy, Kondrashev and Bailey, Battleground Berlin, ch. 11 and appendix 5, which corrects numerous errors in earlier accounts. Mitrokhin’s brief notes on the Berlin tunnel add nothing to Battleground Berlin.

14. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 442. On Goleniewski see Murphy, Kondrashev and Bailey, Battleground Berlin, pp. 342-6.

15. Blake, No Other Choice, chs. 11, 12.

16. Kalugin, Spymaster, p. 142.

17. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 3. Driberg had joined the Communist Party while at public school but was expelled in 1941 when, according to his entry in the Dictionary of National Biography, the Party leadership “discovered that he was an agent of MI5, to which he had been recruited in the late 1930s” ( Dictionary of National Biography, 1971-1980, p. 251). Though Driberg undoubtedly gave information to Maxwell Knight, a leading MI5 officer, much remains obscure about the relationship between them. According to Knight’s personal assistant, Joan Miller, he was a bisexual who, for a time, was “crazy” about Driberg. In her view, Driberg was only “a casual agent” who would “turn in a bit of stuff” when Knight put pressure on him. (Interview with Joan Miller, Sunday Times Magazine (October 18, 1981); Miller, One Girl’s War; Andrew, Secret Service, pp. 521-2.