Christopher Andrew - The Sword and the Shield

42. Mitrokhin’s notes do not give the date of foundation of the Sixteenth Directorate, but indicate that it was in existence not later than 1968; k-22,232.

43. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 529. vol. 6, ch. 9.

44. vol. 6, ch. 3, part 3.

45. vol. 6, ch. 9. Mitrokhin’s notes do not record ANTON’s real name.

46. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 1179.

47. vol. 6, ch. 9.

48. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 1192.

49. Kalugin, Spymaster, p. 92.

50. For illustrations of some of the complex antennae on the roofs of Soviet missions in the United States and elsewhere, see Ball, Soviet Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), pp. 49-68.

51. vol. 6, ch. 9.

52. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, p. 359.

53. Dobrynin, In Confidence, pp. 357-8.

54. vol. 6, ch. 9.

55. vol. 6, ch. 3, part 2.

56. vol. 6, ch. 9.

57. vol. 6, ch. 2, part 1.

58. vol. 6, ch. 9. On the crisis over the Soviet “combat brigade” in Cuba, see Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 444-7. Mitrokhin’s notes on POCHIN files also record that “during the crisis in Lebanon the [Washington] residency was able to make a correct evaluation of the unfolding situation and inform the Centre on a timely basis that the United States had no plans for military intervention” (vol. 6, ch. 9). It is unclear which Lebanese crisis is referred to. Since the other material in this section of Mitrokhin’s notes deals with the mid-1970s, however, the reference is probably to 1974, when Israel made a series of air attacks against villages in southern Lebanon, which it suspected of harboring terrorists.

59. vol. 6, ch. 9.

60. The FBI shortwave radio communications channels monitored continuously by the RAKETA post during the 1970s were:

• the radio link between surveillance vehicles and the six FBI posts responsible for observing the movements of Soviet personnel (167.4625 megahertz);

• the channel used by surveillance vehicles and observation posts monitoring the movements of members of Middle Eastern and some Western missions to the UN (167.2125 megahertz);

• the channel used for communications between the FBI department investigating bank robberies and surveillance vehicles (167.6887 megahertz);

• the channel used by those investigating other federal crimes (167.3756 megahertz);

• the channel used for communications between the FBI despatch centers in New York and New Jersey (frequency in the 167 megahertz band not recorded);

• the channel used for other communications between the New York dispatch center and FBI vehicles (167.7760 megahertz)

vol. 6, ch. 9).

61. vol. 6, ch. 9.

62. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 4, n. 1.

63. The running costs for the main intercept posts in KGB residencies around the world in 1979 were as follows (figures in thousands of hard currency roubles):

Washington (POCHIN): 26.0

New York (PROBA): 29.4

San Francisco (VESNA): 6.7

Ottawa (codename not recorded): figures unavailable (5.8 in 1977)

Montreal (VENERA): 3.3 (plus 3.5 for purchase of motorcar)

Cuba (TERMIT-S): 18.8

Brazil (KLEN): 4.8 (increased to 8.2 in 1980; 13.3 in 1981)

Mexico (RADAR): 3.5 (increased to 4.6 in 1980)

Reykjavik (OSTROV): 2.3

London (MERCURY): 7.1

Oslo (SEVER): 7.2

Paris (JUPITER): 10.1

Bonn (TSENTAVR-1): 11.3

Cologne (TSENTAVR-2): figures unavailable

Salzburg (TYROL-1): 1.3

Vienna (TYROL-2): 3.3

Berne (ELBRUS): 2.8

Geneva (KAVKAZ): 2.3

Rome (START): 15.0

Athens (RADUGA): 4.2

Ankara (RADUGA-T): 9.5 (plus supplementary 2.2)

Istanbul (SIRIUS): 5.3

Teheran (MARS): 5.0

Beijing (KRAB): 4.5

Tokyo (ZARYA): 10.4 vol. 6, ch. 9; 1977 figures for Ottawa from vol. 8, ch. 5)

Because of the KGB’s curious accounting methods, these figures doubtless do not represent the full running costs of the intercept posts. They do, however, give an approximate indication of the relative level of activity at each post. Other significant intercept posts, probably less important than those listed above, included Lisbon (ALTAY), Nairobi (KRYM), Cairo (ORION),The Hague (TULIP), Brussels (VEGA), Belgrade (PARUS), Hanoi (AMUR), Jakarta (DELFIN) and Damascus (SIGMA). Mitrokhin’s notes do not give the budgets for these posts.

64. Ball, Soviet Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), pp. 27-9; Rosenau, “A Deafening Silence,” pp. 723-5.

65. vol. 6, ch. 9.

66. Ball, Soviet Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), pp. 27-9.

67. vol. 2, app. 3.

68. k-22,136. Shorter reports were submitted by each intercept post at least once a month.

69. vol. 6, ch. 3, part 2.

70. vol. 6, ch. 6.

71. vol. 6, ch. 2, part 3; vol. 6, ch. 6; vol. 6, app. 2, parts 4, 5.

72. On the origins of the UKUSA agreement, see Andrew, “The Making of the Anglo-American SIGINT Alliance”; on its subsequent development, see Ball and Richelson, The Ties That Bind and Hager, Secret Power.

73. t-7,131.

74. t-7,130.

75. k-19,435.

76. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 5.

77. See above, chapter 6.

78. vol. 2, app. 3. The names of the head and deputy heads of the Sixteenth Department are given in k-22,134.

79. Interview by Christopher Andrew with Viktor Makarov, 1993. When Oleg Gordievsky became resident-designate at the London residency early in 1985, the Sixteenth Department officer told him that there was currently no British source providing high-grade cipher material (Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 610).

80. Interview by Christopher Andrew with Viktor Makarov, 1993; Kahn, “Soviet Comint in the Cold War,” pp. 20-3.

81. Interview with Gurgenev (identified only by his first name and patronymic), Izvestia (September 24, 1991).

82. On March 25, 1985, for example, the London residency received an urgent telegram asking for British reactions to Gorbachev’s meeting with the executive committee of the Socialist International. Sooner than report that the event had failed to excite great interest in Britain, the residency simply concocted a favorable reply without contacting any of its limited range of sources. (Recollection of Oleg Gordievsky, then resident-designate.)

83. See above, chapter 21.

84. Interview by Christopher Andrew with Viktor Makarov, 1993; Viktor Makarov, “The West Had No Aggressive Plans against the USSR,” Express Chronicle (February 19, 1992), p. 5.

85. Urban, UK Eyes Alpha, ch. 19.

86. Ball, Soviet Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). Ball and Windren, “Soviet Signals Intelligence (Sigint).”

87. Rosenau, “A Deafening Silence,” p. 726.

88. Andrew, “The Nature of Military Intelligence,” p. 5.

89. Rosenau, “A Deafening Silence,” pp. 727, 732 n. 6.

1. Djilas, Tito, p. 29; Djilas, Rise and Fall, pp. 106-7; Radzinsky, Stalin, p. 399.

2. k-20,272; Ranković’s codename is in k-20,287.

3. Djilas, Rise and Fall, pp. 82-3, 105-6.

4. k-20,281.

5. k-20,276.

6. k-20,290,292. Tishkov’s cover name (Timofeyev) is given in Djilas, Rise and Fall, pp. 82-3, 105-6.

7. k-20,279.

8. k-20,289,290.

9. Djilas, Rise and Fall, pp. 84-5, 92, 95, 98-9, 105-6; Dedijer, Tito Speaks, p. 268.

10. k-20,292.

11. k-5,707.

12. Djilas, Rise and Fall, chs. 14, 15; Djilas, Tito, pp. 84-7; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 371-2. VAL is identified by Sudoplatovs, Special Tasks, p. 338.

13. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 415-17.