Christopher Andrew - The Sword and the Shield

33. vol. 6, ch. 1, part 1.

34. Sakharov, Memoirs, pp. 510-16.

35. k-21, 80.

36. Gorbachev, Memoirs, p. 296.

37. Bethell, Spies and Other Secrets, pp. 315-16.

38. Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, p. 37. In public, in order not to alienate a majority on the Politburo, Gorbachev stuck to the official line. He declared in an interview with L’Humanité in February 1986: “Now about political prisoners, we don’t have any… It is common knowledge that [Sakharov] committed actions punishable by law… Measures were taken with regard to him according to our legislation. The actual state of affairs is as follows. Sakharov resides in Gorky in normal conditions, is doing scientific work, and remains a member of the USSR Academy of Sciences. He is in normal health as far as I know. His wife has recently left the country for medical treatment abroad. As for Sakharov himself, he is still a bearer of secrets of special importance to the state and for this reason cannot go abroad.” Sakharov, Memoirs, p. 607.

39. Grachev, Kremlevskaya Karonika, pp. 94-104; Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, p. 165.

40. Sakharov, Memoirs, p. 615.

41. Cited in Dobbs, Down with Big Brother, pp. 252-3.

42. Gorbachev, Memoirs, p. 295.

43. Dobbs, Down with Big Brother, pp. 253-64; Remnick, Lenin’s Tomb, ch. 19.

44. Remnick, Lenin’s Tomb, p. 282.

45. Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, pp. 7-10.

46. k-21, 76.

47. k-21, 153.

1. Andrew, “Intelligence and International Relations in the Early Cold War.”

2. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, seeks to assess the varying interest taken by US presidents in SIGINT.

3. Mitrokhin had no direct access to the files of either the Eighth Directorate or the Sixteenth (SIGINT) Directorate, founded in the late 1960s. He did, however, see some documents from both directorates in FCD files.

4. KGB to Khrushchev, “Report for 1960” (February 14, 1961), in the “special dossiers” of the CPSU Central Committee; cited by Zubok, “Spy vs. Spy,” p. 23.

5. Garthoff, “The KGB Reports to Gorbachev,” p. 228.

6. Kahn, “Soviet Comint in the Cold War.”

7. Samouce, “I Do Understand the Russians,” pp. 52-3, Samouce papers, US Army Military Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 237-40.

8. Kennan, Memoirs 1950-1963, pp. 154-7. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 454-6. Kennan was declared persona non grata in October 1952, though chiefly for reasons unconnected with the bugging incident.

9. Bohlen, Witness to History 1919-1969, pp. 345-6. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 456-7.

10. Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 357.

11. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 456. Remarkably, Nosenko’s information was not sufficient to convince his CIA debriefers that he was a genuine defector.

12. vol. 6, ch. 9. For illustrations of some of the espionage equipment supplied by the FCD OT Directorate, see Melton, The Ultimate Spy Book.

13. k-18,342.

14. k-1,160. On KGB penetration of the Orthodox church, see below, chapter 28.

15. vol. 7, ch. 5, para. 44.

16. k-24,299; vol. 7, ch. 5.

17. Philby’s career as an SIS officer had ended after his recall from Washington in 1951. Philby’s later account to Borovik of his years in Beirut contains a number of inaccuracies, due partly to his attempt to discredit Lunn (transcribed by Borovik as “Lan”—an error derived, as in the KGB files noted by Mitrokhin, from the conversion of “Lunn” into Cyrillic). Philby attributes his successful escape in 1963 largely to Lunn’s incompetence and adds that “amazingly, three or four years later [Lunn] received a high honour—the Cross of St. Michael and St. George” (Borovik, The Philby Files, p. 354). In reality, as Philby had correctly informed the KGB after his defection, Lunn was awarded the CMG a decade earlier, in 1957 (vol. 7, ch. 5).

18. Lunn was the author of High-Speed Skiing (1935), A Skiing Primer (1948) and The Guinness Book of Skiing (1983). His father, Sir Arnold Lunn (1888-1974), was one of Europe’s leading ski pioneers, as well as a leading Catholic apologist and a vocal opponent of both Nazism and Communism. His 63 books included 23 on skiing and 16 on Christian apologetics ( Dictionary of National Biography, 1971-1980, pp. 522-3).

19. Lunn’s recent Who’s Who entries give the date of his entry into SIS. Earlier entries make no reference to his intelligence career.

20. Unless otherwise indicated, the account of operation RUBIN is based on k-24,299 and vol. 7, ch. 5.

21. k-26,223.

22. k-26,223.

23. The file noted by Mitrokhin does not reveal what the measures were.

24. On Philby’s depression in the late 1960s and partial recovery during the 1970s, see Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 24-6, 544-5, and Knightley, Philby, pp. 234-7.

25. One of the CIA officers on whom intelligence was gathered during operation RUBIN was selected by Andropov as the target of an attempted abduction.

26. k-18,342.

27. vol. 6, app. 1 (misc.), parts 1, 4; k-27,242. Mitrokhin’s notes give no indication of what intelligence was obtained by bugging the CIA officer’s flat. VERA’s file records that the KGB lost contact with her in 1975 as a result of the Lebanese Civil War.

28. k-27,239.

29. KGB operations in Africa will be covered in volume 2.

30. Details of operation REBUS in k-17,49,59,185; vol. 6, ch. 10. On November 16, 1981 operation PHOENIX succeeded in bugging the residence of the US ambassador in Conakry. The agent responsible was a Guinean (probably a domestic servant) codenamed MURAT (k-17,145; k-8,519). The KGB also succeeded in intercepting the communications of US embassies in a number of other African capitals, among them Bamako and Brazzaville (vol. 6, ch. 10; k-17,168).

31. The last, reforming chairman of the KGB, Vadim Bakatin, appointed after the failed coup of August 1991, outraged his staff by giving the American ambassador blueprints of the highly sophisticated bugging system (Albats, The State within a State, pp. 311-13). There were several security alerts within the existing US embassy in Moscow during the 1980s. In 1984, however, bugs were discovered in electric typewriters in the US embassy in Moscow which had been in use for some years (Lardner, “Unbeatable Bugs”). In 1986 two marine guards admitted giving KGB agents access to the US embassy. Because of improved security procedures, however, the KGB do not seem to have gained access to the cipher room or other sensitive areas (Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 611).

32. k-22,135,232. The GRU already had posts in a number of its residencies designed to intercept US and NATO military communications.

33. vol. 6, ch. 9.

34. vol. 6, ch. 9.

35. Kalugin, Spymaster, p. 92. The POCHIN files noted by Mitrokhin confirm Kalugin’s list of intercepted communications (vol. 6, ch. 9).

36. vol. 6, ch. 9.

37. See above, chapter 11.

38. See above, chapter 11.

39. vol. 6, ch. 2, part 2; vol. 6, ch. 9. There was a further operation to bug UN Secretariat offices in 1963 (k-8,138).

40. vol. 6, ch. 2, part 2.

41. After leaving GCHQ in 1977, Prime broke off contact with the KGB for the next three years. He had further meetings with his case officer in Vienna and Potsdam in 1980 and 1981. His work as a Soviet agent came to light after he was arrested for sexually molesting little girls in 1982. He was sentenced to thirtyfive years’ imprisonment for espionage and three for sexual assault (Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 526-8, 530-1). A senior GCHQ officer was later quoted as saying, “On the political side, there was a time up to the mid-1970s when we used to get useful [Soviet] political and high-level military communications. But that dried up, partly as a result of Prime.” (Urban, UK Eyes Alpha, p. 6.) Because Prime was a Third Directorate, not an FCD, agent, Mitrokhin did not have access to his file. The latest study of Prime, by the detective chief superintendent in charge of his case, is Cole, Geoffrey Prime.