Christopher Andrew - The Sword and the Shield

62. Haynes and Klehr, “‘Moscow Gold,’ Confirmed at Last?” pp. 281-4; L. Dobbs, Down with Big Brother, p. 414. Mitrokhin’s notes provide numerous examples of “Moscow gold,” especially during the 1970s, but no figures for the total subsidies received by any Communist Party.

63. Barron, Operation Solo, ch. 4; the aliases of Morris Childs (born Chilovsky) are given in vol. 6, ch. 12. (On Child’s earlier career in the CPUSA, see Klehr, Haynes and Anderson, The Soviet World of American Communism, pp. 257-71.) Barron’s account is based on interviews and other material from Childs, his wife Eva and FBI agents concerned with his case. Operation Solo somewhat exaggerates the importance of the intelligence he supplied to the FBI after his trips to Moscow (see Draper, “Our Man in Moscow,” New York Review of Books (May 9, 1996)). Mitrokhin’s notes from KGB files, however, largely corroborate, as well as making important additions to, Barron’s account of Childs’s role in channeling Soviet funds to the CPUSA. Mitrokhin, unlike Barron, rarely gives annual totals for the Soviet subsidies. But those he provides are compatible with, though not identical to, Barron’s figures. According to the KGB files noted by Mitrokhin, the “allocations” to the CPUSA were 1.7 million dollars in both 1975 and 1976 (vol. 6, ch. 12). Barron gives figures of 1,792,676 dollars for 1975 and 1,997,651 dollars for 1976 ( Operation Solo, appendix B); one possible explanation for the discrepancies is that, as sometimes happened, additional allocations were made in the course of the year.

64. vol. 6, ch. 12.

65. vol. 6, ch. 12.

66. The instructor’s congratulations were reported by Friedman to the FBI. Barron, Operation Solo, pp. 144-5.

67. vol. 6, ch. 12.

68. Barron, Operation Solo, pp. 144-5. Mitrokhin’s notes and Barron’s book neatly complement each other. Mitrokhin summarizes the account of Friedman’s career in KGB files (vol. 6, ch. 12); Barron describes his career as known to the FBI, though he omits his real name and identifies him only by his FBI codename, CLIP.

69. vol. 6, ch. 12.

70. Barron, Operation Solo, pp. 156-7.

71. vol. 6, ch. 12.

72. Barron, Operation Solo, ch. 3.

73. vol. 6, ch. 12.

74. Barron, Operation Solo, ch. 3; Draper, “Our Man in Moscow,” New York Review of Books (May 9, 1996)

75. Barron, Operation Solo, p. 263.

76. vol. 6, ch. 12. Instead of Jackson, Dobrynin asked Hall to bring with him to meetings at the embassy Arnold Johnson, director of the CPUSA Information and Lecture Bureau, once improbably eulogized by Lee Harvey Oswald as “the Lenin of our country” (Posner, Case Closed, p. 149).

77. DeLoach, Hoover’s FBI, pp. 213-14; Barron, Operation Solo, pp. 262-3. FBI reports to the White House said that Levison had been identified as a secret CPUSA member by “an informant who has furnished reliable information in the past as a secret member of the Communist Party,” presumably Jack Childs. Friedly and Gallen, Martin Luther King, pp. 124, 136-7.

78. Garrow, FBI and Martin Luther King Jr., ch. 1; Friedly and Gallen, Martin Luther King, pp. 23-8.

79. Barron, Operation Solo, p. 263; DeLoach, Hoover’s FBI, p. 214; Friedly and Gallen, Martin Luther King, pp. 25-6, 133-5. Though he denied current membership of the CPUSA, O’Dell resigned from King’s Southern Christian Leadership Conference in 1962. Mitrokhin’s notes contain no specific reference to O’Dell but reveal that the magazine Freedomways, with which he became actively involved after leaving the SCLC, had been founded with active Soviet support, continued to receive secret Soviet subsidies and was “close” to the CPUSA. vol. 6, ch. 12.

80. Barron, Operation Solo, pp. 265-6.

81. DeLoach, Hoover’s FBI, p. 214-15; Friedly and Gallen, Martin Luther King, pp. 36-43.

82. vol. 6, ch. 12.

83. vol. 6, app. 1, part 34.

84. vol. 6, app. 1, part 4; t-3,76. Mitrokhin had access only to reports in FCD files based on intelligence provided by the agent, not to the agent’s file itself—probably because he had been recruited by the Second (rather than the First) Chief Directorate during a visit to the Soviet Union. Within the United States he seems to have been run from the San Francisco residency.

85. The transliteration of these names into the Cyrillic alphabet in the KGB report of the meeting makes identification difficult. vol. 6, ch. 12.

86. vol. 6, ch. 12.

87. vol. 6, ch. 12.

88. Barron, Operation Solo, pp. xiii, 312-14, 329-31.

89. Klehr and Haynes, The American Communist Movement, pp. 173-4.

90. Haynes and Klehr, “‘Moscow Gold,’ Confirmed at Last?”; Klehr, Haynes and Anderson, The Soviet World of American Communism, pp. 149-64.

91. Barron, Operation Solo, p. 300.

92. Healey and Isserman, Dorothy Healey Remembers, p. 273. Dorothy Ray Healey left the Party in 1973.

1. Urban, Moscow and the Italian Communist Party, pp. 254-6.

2. k-26,187, 252, 288, 295, 296.

3. k-26, 258.

4. k-26, 229.

5. k-26, 59.

6. k-26, 60.

7. The Centre concluded that the forgeries had probably been included in the money handed to the PCI in either April or July 1972. k-26, 299.

8. k-26, 306. From 1969 to 1976 the PCI emissary most frequently used to collect Soviet subsidies from the embassy was Barontini (codenamed CLAUDIO); other emissaries referred to in KGB files were Marmuggi (codenamed CARO) and Guido Cappelloni (codenamed ALBERTO). k-26, 256, 267, 270, 291, 300, 302, 303, 305, 306.

Smaller subsidies also went to the Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (PSIUP) and the San Marino Communist Party. In 1974 the San Marino general secretary sent Brezhnev a Capo di Monte marble clock, via the Rome residency, in gratitude for Soviet financial assistance. k-26, 260, 283, 306.

9. k-26, 246.

10. k-26, 252, 311. The supply of the SELENYA radio system to the PCI by the KGB had been approved in principle by Politburo decision no. P 91/3 of May 17, 1973, but it was agreed that, “The two-way radios must be handed over to our Italian friends [the PCI] only when there is a real need to organize radio communications, bearing in mind that if kept in store for a long period the radio stations require periodic checks, maintenance and repairs.”

11. Berlinguer’s articles, first published in the autumn of 1973, are reprinted in Valenza (ed.), Il compromesso storico, pp. 14-31.

12. k-26, 229. Agostino Novella, a veteran member of the PCI Direzione, strengthened the case against Amendola, Pajetta and Ingrao by telling Ambassador Rhyzov that all three had tried to prevent Longo seeking medical treatment in the Soviet Union. k-26, 230.

13. Urban, Moscow and the Italian Communist Party, ch. 8. Ginsborg, A History of Contemporary Italy, 1943-1988, ch. 10.

14. k-26, 237.

15. Urban, Moscow and the Italian Communist Party, ch. 8.

16. Urban, Moscow and the Italian Communist Party, pp. 283-4, 290.

17. k-26, 257. The KGB files noted by Mitrokhin do not record what use was made of its intelligence on Berlinguer’s allegedly dubious building contracts.

18. k-26, 264.

19. k-26, 256. Mitrokhin gives no details of payments after 1976.

20. k-26, 259, 261. In 1998 a receipt by Cappelloni, dated June 27, 1976, for one million dollars from the CPSU for the 1976 election campaign was published in the Italian press. “Pci, ecco le ricevute dei miliardi di Mosca,” Il Giorno (April 30, 1998).