Christopher Andrew - The Sword and the Shield

Part 2

1. Dubček, Hope Dies Last, pp. 225-6.

2. The Ministry of the Interior existed at both federal and national levels. There were thus Czech and Slovak ministers in addition to the Czechoslovak minister.

3. Dubček, Hope Dies Last, pp. 236-9.

4. k-20,149.

5. k-20,189,177.

6. k-20,154. On Pachman, see Hruby, Fools and Heroes, ch. 4.

7. k-19,643.

8. Renner, A History of Czechoslovakia Since 1945, p. 98.

9. Jakeš’s contact in the KGB liaison office was G. Slavin (first name and patronymic not recorded in Mitrokhin’s notes; k-19,575).

10. k-19,552.

11. k-19,643.

12. k-19,615.

13. Mitrokhin’s notes do not provide complete statistics for the purge of security and intelligence personnel. In 1970, however, 1,092 officials were dismissed from the central apparatus of the interior ministry and 3,202 individuals deprived of Party membership (k-19,551). During 1970 more than a hundred StB agents defected to the West (k-19,559).

14. k-19,566.

15. The KGB liaison office report cited as an example of the full and frank intelligence provided by Kaska the fact that he “told us all that he knew about Indra’s behavior in connection with his visit to the GDR…” Mitrokhin’s notes give no further information on this episode (k-19,645).

16. k-19,555.

17. k-19,576.

18. Sinitsyn reported that both Kaska and Husák had wanted to make further enquiries about KGB records on individuals “whose behavior in 1968-9 gave rise to doubts”; k-19,587.

19. Indra was seen by Husák as a potential rival, and his move in 1971 from his position as Party secretary to the prestigious but not very influential post of chairman of the National Assembly was probably intended to curtail his influence within the CPCz. Renner, A History of Czechoslovakia Since 1945, pp. 111-12.

20. k-19,554.

21. Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 157-8.

22. k-19,554. On the problems of calculating the final total of the purge of the CPCz, see Kusin, From Dubček to Charter 77, pp. 85-9.

23. k-19,554.

24. k-19,541. The probable date of the meeting was April 1972.

25. k-16,329. k-19,158. Mitrokhin’s notes do not give FYODOROV’s real identity.

26. k-19,609.

27. k-19,600.

28. k-19,601.

29. Renner, A History of Czechoslovakia since 1945, pp. 100-1.

30. k-19,603.

31. k-19,606.

32. k-19,62.

33. k-19,68.

34. k-19,62,92,643.

35. Kusin, From Dubček to Charter 77, p. 194.

36. Dubček describes his surveillance and harassment by the StB in Hope Dies Last, ch. 29.

37. t-7,272,297. Dubček makes no mention of this episode in his memoirs.

38. k-19,330.

39. k-19,75.

40. k-19,77.

41. k-19,76.

42. The KGB team sent to Czechoslovakia “to help with the investigation of the Grohman case at a higher professional level” consisted of A. A. Fabrichnikov and V. A. Pakhomov of the Second Chief Directorate, and “others from the KGB Investigation Department.” During the investigation, Bil’ak claimed that Grohman “was a close contact of Štrougal.” k-19,67. On Grohman’s subsequent trial, see: “Former Prague Minister on Spying Charge,” The Times (January 5, 1977); “Viele Mitarbeiter des BND haben Angst vor Verrat,” Die Welt (January 27, 1977).

43. k-19,77.

44. t-7,263,280,281. k-19,451.

45. Probably the KGB’s main source on Moczar’s active measures against Gierek and his bugging of much of the PUWP leadership was Szlachcic, later Polish Minister of the Interior. t-7,243.

46. For an analysis of the December 1970 protests, see Kurczewski, The Resurrection of Rights in Poland, ch. 5.

47. k-19,333.

48. k-19,322.

49. Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century, pp. 359-60.

50. t-7,243.

51. The other targets of cultivation assigned to BOGUN were W. Klimczak (not identified); the economist G. Nowakowski; the writer K. Busz, described as “leader of the Kraków intelligentsia”; and S. Kozinski, a photographer with “contacts in the Party and state apparatus” (k-19,415). The contact established by BOGUN with Bardecki was later continued by the illegal FILOSOV. Like others targeted by PROGRESS operations, Bardecki cannot be blamed for speaking to Western visitors whom he had no means of identifying as KGB illegals.

52. In addition to the seven illegals used for operations in East Germany, others were based there but operated elsewhere. k-19,399,415.

53. Mitrokhin’s notes do not record the specific objectives of the illegals sent to Bulgaria.

54. Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century, pp. 354-5.

55. k-19,487.

56. k-19,455.

57. k-19,415,456.

58. Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century, pp. 350-2.

59. k-16,273; k-19,429. Mitrokhin’s notes give no details on the content of the reports.

60. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 359-60.

61. k-19,287.

62. k-19,264.

63. Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century, pp. 357-8. Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name, p. 77.

64. k-19,264.

65. k-19,270.

66. t-7,264.

67. Childs and Popplewell, The Stasi, p. 82. A KGB file, apparently for the period 1976-7, gives the total size of Stasi personnel as “over 60,000” (k-19,271). This is consistent with documents in the Gauck [Stasi] Archive, which record a rise from 59,500 in 1975 to 75,000 in 1980.

68. k-19,273.

69. t-7,184.

70. k-19,430.

71. k-19,458.

72. k-27,78.

73. k-19,627.

74. k-27,243.

75. t-7,94.

76. k-19,209.

77. k-26,162. The KGB file on the drug test incident identifies the Soviet player concerned, but, since he was never tested, it is unfair to mention his name.

78. k-26,162.

79. k-19,235.

80. Kusin, From Dubˇcek to Charter 77, pp. 304-25; Renner, A History of Czechoslovakia since 1945, pp. 128-47; Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century, p. 384.

81. Cited in Renner, A History of Czechoslovakia since 1945, p. 102.

1. vol. 9, ch. 1, para. 17.

2. k-3,65,115. k-8,182. Though the earliest reference in Mitrokhin’s notes to Plissonnier’s collaboration with the KGB dates from 1952, it may well have begun earlier.

3. Robrieux, Histoire intérieure du Parti communiste, vol. 4, pp. 450-2. Bell and Criddle, The French Communist Party in the Fifth Republic, pp. 19, 21.

4. k-3,65,115. k-8,182.

5. k-3,65,115. k-8,182. Boumedienne was president of Algeria from December 1976 until his death in December 1978.

6. Ginsborg, A History of Contemporary Italy, pp. 84-7.

7. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 171-2.

8. Mitrokhin’s notes do not include any examples of the intelligence obtained by DARIO and his female recruits from the foreign ministry.

9. At various stages in his career as a Soviet agent, DARIO was codenamed BASK, SPARTAK, GAU, CHESTNY and GAUDEMUS. He appears to have switched from GRU to MGB control immediately after the Second World War. k-10,109.

10. k-10,101-3,107,109. Mitrokhin’s notes imply that in 1956 DARIO was also instrumental in the recruitment of MAGDA, a typist in the foreign ministry press department (k-10,100,103). Mitrokhin’s notes also record the recruitment in 1970 of an agent in the Foreign Ministry, codenamed STRELOK, by Georgi Pavlovich Antonov. STRELOK subsequently became “reluctant to cooperate” (k-4,80,158; k-2,221,231,268).