Christopher Andrew - The Sword and the Shield

22. Joesten, Oswald, pp. 119, 149-50.

23. Joesten, Oswald, pp. 143, 145. In the second edition, Joesten acknowledged “substantial aid” from Marzani in the “research and writing” of an appendix criticizing the Warren report (Joesten, Oswald, p. 159 n. ).

24. Even the sympathetic Mark Lane later wrote somewhat critically of Joesten’s book: “I had met with Carl Marzani, read proofs of the book at his request, and made some few suggestions. It was a very early work, written before the Warren Commission’s evidence was released; therefore, while timely, it was of necessity somewhat flawed and incomplete” (Lane, Plausible Denial, p. 44 n ).

25. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 3.

26. Joersten, Oswald, p. 3.

27. Lane, Plausible Denial, p. 23.

28. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 3. There is no evidence that Lane did realize the source of the funding.

29. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 3; t-7,102. Borovik doubtless did not identify himself to Lane as a KGB agent.

30. Lane, Plausible Denial, pp. 4, 19. Posner, Case Closed, pp. 414-15.

31. Posner, Case Closed, p. 453.

32. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 3.

33. Posner, Case Closed, pp. 454-5.

34. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 3. Mitrokhin gives the text of the forged letter in Russian translation. For the original version, see Hurt, Reasonable Doubt, pp. 235-6. On Oswald’s dyslexia, see Mailer, Oswald’s Tale, appendix.

35. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 3.

36. Hurt, Reasonable Doubt, p. 236. Hurt refers to the letter as the most “singular and teasing” document to have emerged relating to the period immediately before the assassination.

37. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 3.

38. Lane, Plausible Denial, p. 187. KGB active measures probably encouraged, rather than accounted for, the Howard Hunt conspiracy theory.

39. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 311-12.

40. Also influential was the report of the House Select Committee on the JFK and King assassinations. Its draft report in December 1978 concluded that Oswald acted alone. Flawed acoustic evidence then persuaded the committee that, in addition to the three shots fired by Oswald, a fourth had been fired from a grassy knoll, thus leading it to conclude in its final report of July 1979 that there had been a conspiracy. It pointed to mobsters as the most likely conspirators. Posner, Case Closed, pp. 475-86, appendix A.

41. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 401-7, 410-11, 421. In private Church later admitted that his study of CIA assassination plots convinced him that the real rogue elephants had been in the White House: “The CIA operated as an arm of the presidency. This led presidents to conclude that they were ‘super-godfathers’ with enforcers. It made them feel above the law and unaccountable.”

42. vol. 6, ch. 14, parts 1, 2, 3; vol. 6, app. 1, part 22.

43. On Agee’s resignation from the CIA, see Barron, KGB Today, p. 228.

44. Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 191-2. The KGB files noted by Mitrokhin describe Agee as an agent of the Cuban DGI and give details of his collaboration with the KGB, but do not formally list him as a KGB, as well as DGI, agent. vol. 6, ch. 14, parts 1, 2, 3; vol. 6, app. 1, part 22.

45. Agee, Inside the Company, p. viii. (Page references are to the Bantam edition.)

46. vol. 6, app. 1, part 22.

47. Agee, Inside the Company, p. 659.

48. The London residency eventually became dissatisfied with Cheporov, claiming that he “used his co-operation with the KGB for his own benefit” and “expressed improper criticism of the system in the USSR.” k-14,115.

49. vol. 6, app. 1, part 22.

50. Agee, On The Run, pp. 111-12, 120-1.

51. Agee, On The Run, p. 123.

52. vol. 7, ch. 16, para. 46.

53. The defense committee also took up the case of an American journalist, Mark Hosenball, who had also been served with a deportation order. Unlike Agee, however, Hosenball had no contact with the committee and took no part in its campaign. In the KGB files noted by Mitrokhin there is no mention of Hosenball, save for a passing reference to the work of the defense committee.

54. Agee, On The Run, chs. 7, 8; Kelly, “The Deportations of Philip Agee”; vol. 7, ch. 16, para. 45.

55. On the residency’s tendency to exaggerate in its influence on protest demonstrations, see Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 586.

56. At a private meeting of the Parliamentary Labour Party on February 17, 1977, however, the Home Secretary, Merlyn Rees, implied a KGB connection. Tony Benn’s diary vaguely records that the gist of Rees’s comments was that Agee and Hosenball “had been in contact or whatever with enemy agents or something.” According to Benn, Rees “got quite a reasonable hearing from the Party.” Benn, Conflicts of Interest, pp. 41-2.

57. vol. 6, ch. 14, parts 1, 2, 3; k-8,607.

58. Agee, “What Uncle Sam Wants to Know about You,” p. 113. (Page references are to the 1978 reprint in Agee and Wolf, Dirty Work. )

59. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 1; vol. 7, ch. 16, para. 46.

60. Agee, “What Uncle Sam Wants to Know about You,” p. 114.

61. Agee, On The Run, pp. 255, 280-1.

62. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2.

63. Agee, On The Run, p. 255. Codenames of some of the RUPOR group in vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2. Mitrokhin’s notes record that the group included “former CIA employees” apart from Agee, but do not identify Jim and Elsie Wilcott by name.

64. Agee, On The Run, pp. 276-82.

65. The document was also sent anonymously to the British journal Leveller, which published extracts from it in August 1979. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2.

66. Agee, On The Run, p. 304.

67. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2.

68. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2.

69. Agee, On The Run, p. 306.

70. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2.

71. Agee, On The Run, chs. 13-15.

72. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 1.

73. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 1.

74. “Miss Knight Pens Another Letter,” Washington Post (August 4, 1966).

75. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 1. On Hoover’s contacts with Knight, cf. Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover, p. 409.

76. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 1.

77. DeLoach, Hoover’s FBI, ch. 4.

78. DeLoach, Hoover’s FBI, p. 62.

79. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 1.

80. DeLoach, Hoover’s FBI, ch. 9. The expurgated text of Sullivan’s anonymous message to King, opened by his wife Coretta, is published in Theoharis, From the Secret Files of J. Edgar Hoover, pp. 102-3.

81. See below, chapter 17.

82. King, Why We Can’t Wait; Colaiaco, Martin Luther King, Jr., ch. 5.

83. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2. The other civil rights leaders selected as targets for active measures were A. Philip Randolph, Whitney Young and Roy Wilkens.

84. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2.

85. Colaiaco, Martin Luther King, Jr., p. 183. Moscow disapproved, however, of the Black Panthers (whom Carmichael joined in 1968), the Black Muslims and other black separatist groups who lacked what it believed was a proper sense of solidarity with the worldwide struggle against American imperialism.

86. DeLoach, Hoover’s FBI, p. 247.

87. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2.

88. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2. The file noted by Mitrokhin does not record the outcome of operation PANDORA. On present evidence, it is impossible to be certain which, if any, of the attacks on black organizations blamed on the Jewish Defense League were actually the work of the KGB.

89. vol. 6, ch. 10; vol. 6, ch. 14, part 1. The Soviet Union boycotted the Los Angeles Olympics in retaliation for the American boycott of the Moscow Olympics four years earlier.