Christopher Andrew - The Sword and the Shield

46. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2; vol. 6, app. 2, part 1; k-16,89.

47. The fullest published account of the Koecher case is in Kessler, Spy vs Spy (based in part on interviews with the Koechers after their return to Czechoslovakia in 1986). There are some further details in Earley, Confessions of a Spy, ch. 6, and Kessler, “Moscow’s Mole in the CIA,” Washington Post (April 17, 1988). Karl Koecher’s early career is summarized in k-8,110.

48. k-19,96.

49. Kessler, Spy vs Spy, pp. 52-63. Kessler, Undercover Washington, pp. 33-4.

50. k-19, 96. Hana Koecher was given the rather obvious KGB codename HANKA.

51. Kessler, Spy vs Spy, pp. 60, 245.

52. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 2; k-8,110.

53. t-7,306; vol. 6, app. 1 (misc.), part 2. Ogorodnik appears to have been recruited by the CIA while serving in Bogotá in 1974, and to have supplied microfilm copies of hundreds of secret Soviet documents, summaries of which were circulated by the CIA to the White House, the National Security Council and the State Department. Barron, KGB Today, pp. 428-9.

54. Kessler, Spy vs Spy, pp. 139-44, 152-8, 233-6; Kessler, “Moscow’s Mole in the CIA,” Washington Post, (April 17, 1988).

55. Hana Koecher sued the journalist, Egon Lansky, who had published the story about her and her husband. The case was dismissed and costs awarded against her. Tom Gross, “Spy’s Wife Gets a Job with Our Man in Prague,” Sunday Telegraph (March 5, 1995).

56. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 3.

57. vol. 6, app. 2, part 4.

1. vol. 6, ch. 2, part 1 n.

2. See below, chapter 15.

3. Dobrynin, In Confidence, pp. 209-10, 513. According to Dobrynin, “Andropov was cautious enough not to interfere in Gromyko’s everyday management of foreign policy, and Gromyko for his part respected Andropov’s growing influence in the Politburo.”

4. Fursenko and Naftali, “Soviet Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” p. 85, n. 7. FCD intelligence analysis, however, seems to have remained comparatively undeveloped by the standards of the British JIC, the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence and other major Western assessment agencies.

5. See below, chapters 15 and 19.

6. Volkogonov, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire, p. 322. The letter contained simply routine proposals for strengthening the role of the CPSU.

7. Kalugin, Spymaster, p. 257. During the final months of Brezhnev’s life, however, Andropov began to circulate stories about the corruption of Brezhnev’s family and entourage as part of his strategy to eliminate rivals to the succession. Service, A History of Twentieth-Century Russia, p. 426.

8. Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 130.

9. Dobbs, Down with Big Brother, pp. 6-8; Chazov, Zdorov’ye i Vlast, pp. 115-44.

10. vol. 6, app. 2, part 6.

11. vol. 6, ch. 11, part 3; vol. 6, app. 1, parts 12, 41.

12. Kalugin, Spymaster, p. 83. Kalugin does not give Lipka’s name or codename and refers to him only as “a ‘walk-in’ who came to us in the mid-1960s, explaining that he was involved in shredding and destroying NSA documents.” A later analysis by the Centre singled out 200 documents from NSA, the CIA, State Department and other federal agencies as of particular value. Mitrokhin’s notes, alas, give no details of their contents.

13. vol. 6, ch. 11, part 3; vol. 6, app. 1, parts 12, 26, 28, 41; k-8,78. Lipka’s file includes his and his father’s addresses during the 1970s, as well as details of his wife’s work at St. Joseph’s Hospital in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, together with her telephone number at the hospital.

14. Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 84-9.

15. Studies of the Walker case include Barron, Breaking the Ring; Blum, I Pledge Allegiance.

16. Kalugin, Spymaster, p. 83.

17. Kalugin, Spymaster, p. 89. The fact that Walker’s file was held by the Sixteenth Department, separately from most other FCD files, explains why Mitrokhin never saw it. There are probably other Sixteenth Department agents of whom he was also unaware.

18. Earley, Confessions of a Spy, pp. 7-8.

19. Kalugin, Spymaster, p. 89.

20. The KGB officers who took part in running MAREK were P. V. Yatskov, B. P. Kolymakov, Ye. N. Gorlitsyn, V. F. Perchik, Ye. V. Piskarev, G. N. Pustnyatsev, V. M. Bogachev, Ye. A. Belov, V. N. Gordeyev, A. V. Bolshakov, S. V. Sychev, V. N. Melnikov, A. A. Alekseyev, S. Ye. Muzhchinin, V. S. Miroshnikov, V. A. Revin, N. V. Medved, I. K. Baranov, V. I. Kucherov, V. S. Loginov, V. I. Shpakevich, I. S. Pakhmonov, V. V. Makarov, A. M. Gvosdev and L. K. Kostanyan. Even after Agee revealed that MAREK was a plant, some in the Centre did not regard the evidence as conclusive.

21. Earley, Confessions of a Spy, pp. 91-2.

22. Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 111-12. Though Mitrokhin does not identify Sedov by name, he confirms the access to Kissinger by an “operations officer.”

23. Schultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 117.

24. t-7,321.

25. Dobrynin, In Confidence.

26. Barron, KGB, pp. 25-7. Barron, KGB Today, pp. 240-3. vol. 6, ch. 10; vol. 6, app. 1, parts 19, 40.

27. vol. 6, ch. 10; vol. 6, app. 1, part 40. There is no evidence in Mitrokhin’s notes that the cultivation of Waldheim was successful.

28. Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow, pp. 331-2.

29. vol. 6, app. 1, parts 4, 19; t-3,69, k-24,228.

30. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 4, n. 1.

31. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2, n. 2.

32. vol. 6, app. 1, parts 3, 41; t-2,258.

33. vol. 6, ch. 3, part 2; vol. 6, app. 1, part 41.

34. vol. 6, app. 1, part 16. The Turkish Cypriot newspaper Malkin Sesi reported on May 18, 1985 that, according to intelligence supplied by Washington to the Turkish government, Ozgur had worked as a Soviet spy from 1974 to 1977.

35. vol. 6, ch. 3, part 3.

36. vol. 6, ch. 4; k-8,103,447.

37. vol. 6, app. 1, part 38.

38. vol. 6, app. 1, part 4; t-3,56.

39. vol. 6, app. 1, parts 11, 39; k-22,71.

40. vol. 6, app. 1, part 33.

41. vol. 6, ch. 3, part 2. Mitrokhin does not give REM’s identity. As was frequently the case, the same codename was given to several other agents. None of the others seems to fit the Washington REM.

42. k-22,207.

43. t-1,75.

44. vol. 6, ch. 4; vol. 6, app. 1, parts 16, 19.

45. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2, n. 2.

46. vol. 6, ch. 3, part 3.

47. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2, n. 2.

48. vol. 6, ch. 3, part 3.

49. Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 72-5.

50. Kalugin, Spymaster, p. 103.

51. Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 355.

52. vol. 6, ch. 3, part 3.

53. Kramer and Roberts, “ I Never Wanted to be Vice- President of Anything!,” p. 23.

54. vol. 6, ch. 3, part 3.

55. Dobrynin, In Confidence, pp. 377-8.

56. vol. 6, ch. 3, part 3.

57. In 1977 Lomov returned to New York with his deputy director, Yuri Mikhailovich Zabrodin, for a three-month visit. His main KGB mission on this occasion was to investigate research on interrogation techniques which, the Centre hoped, would cause those it interrogated to have no subsequent memory of their replies to questions. vol. 6, ch. 2, part 1; vol. 6, app. 2, parts 4, 5.

58. vol. 6, ch. 2, part 1; vol. 6, ch. 3, part 3.

59. vol. 6, ch. 2, part 1.

60. vol. 6, ch. 2, part 1.

61. See below, chapter 17.

62. vol. 6, ch. 7. Mitrokhin identifies VLADIMIROV as deputy director of the institute, but does not give his name. Cf. Barron, KGB Today, p. 265.