Christopher Andrew - The Sword and the Shield

47. Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, pp. 266-7. Fursenko and Naftali, “ One Hell of a Gamble, ” ch. 14. On October 26, Feklisov, the Washington resident, had two, now celebrated, meetings with the ABC diplomatic correspondent, John Scali, whom he knew had good access to the White House, to discuss ways to end the crisis. Kennedy was convinced that Feklisov spoke for Khrushchev personally. The KGB archives, however, show that he did not. Feklisov played no role either in Khrushchev’s proposal on October 26 to resolve the crisis by an American guarantee of Cuban territorial integrity, or in his attempt on October 27 to trade US bases in Turkey for Soviet missile sites in Cuba. It is possible that Shelepin, who—unlike Semichastny—was a member of the Presidium, had encouraged Semichastny to use a meeting between Feklisov and Scali to try to extract a US proposal to settle the crisis which would make the Soviet climbdown less humiliating. Because of the incomplete nature of KGB files on this episode, together with the conflict of oral evidence between Feklisov, Scali and Semichastny, it may never be possible to establish what led up to the meeting on the Soviet side. Fursenko and Naftali, “Using KGB Documents”; Fursenko and Naftali, “Soviet Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” pp. 80-3.

48. Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, p. 267. Fursenko and Naftali, “ One Hell of a Gamble, ” pp. 284-6.

49. The fullest account of Penkovsky’s career is Schecter and Deriabin, The Spy Who Saved the World.

50. vol. 6, ch. 1, part 1.

51. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 6.

52. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 6.

53. vol. 6, ch. 1, part 1.

54. vol. 2, app. 3.

55. On Golitsyn’s impact on Angleton and the CIA, see Wise, Molehunt, and Mangold, Cold Warrior.

56. vol. 1, app. 3; vol. 6, ch. 1, part 1. On the US embassy’s decision to return Cherepanov’s documents, see Wise, Molehunt, pp. 121-3.

57. See below, chapter 22.

58. vol. 6, ch. 1, part 1; Nosenko’s codename appears in vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.

59. vol. 2, app. 3.

60. The VPK also tasked the GRU, the State Committee for Science and Technology (GKNT), a secret unit in the Soviet Academy of Sciences and the State Committee for External Economic Relations (GKES). Most of the ST it received came from the KGB and GRU. Hanson, Soviet Industrial Espionage; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 622-3.

61. k-5,476.

62. k-5,473.

63. URBAN may be a post-war codename for the unidentified wartime agent PERS referred to in the VENONA decrypts. On KGB/SVR attempts to confuse identification of PERS, see Albright and Kunstel, Bombshell, pp. 156, 271.

64. Mitrokhin’s note, in Russian, identifies BERG’s employee as “Consolidated Vacuum.” This is probably a reference to Sperry-Rand (UNIVAC); it is known that UNIVAC computers were high on the list of ST targets (Tuck, High-Tech Espionage, ch. 11).

65. vol. 6, ch. 6.

66. Romerstein and Levchenko, The KGB against the Main Enemy, pp. 266-7; Richelson, A Century of Spies, pp. 279-82.

67. vol. 6, ch. 6.

68. Judy, “The Case of Computer Technology.”

69. vol. 6, app. 1, part 27.

70. k-5,473.

71. k-5,369.

72. vol. 6, app. 1, part 39.

73. k-5,475.

74. On the time lag between US and Soviet computer technology, see Judy, “The Case of Computer Technology”; and Ammann, Cooper and Davies (eds.), The Technological Level of Soviet Industry, ch. 8.

75. Judy, “The Case of Computer Technology,” p. 66.

76. k-5,476.

77. vol. 6, ch. 6.

78. vol. 6, ch. 3, part 1; vol. 10, ch. 2, para. 7.

1. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 4. The KGB Collegium also proposed establishing networks of illegal residencies to take over the main burden of intelligence operations in Canada, Mexico, West Germany and China.

2. vol. 6, ch. 5, parts 2, 3. Unusually, Mitrokhin’s notes from KONOV’s file do not record the real name of either himself or his wife.

3. vol. 6, ch. 5, parts 2, 3. No details are available of KONOV’s ST.

4. vol. 8, app. 3a.

5. ALBERT’s and GERA’s KGB files record that they were issued with Belgian passports nos. 26862/37/41 and 26861/36/41 valid until April 8, 1961. vol. 8, app. 3a.

6. vol. 8, app. 3a.

7. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 3.

8. vol. 8, app. 3, item 7.

9. vol. 6, ch. 13, part 1.

10. Barron, KGB Today, pp. 294-320. vol. 6, ch. 13, part 1. During his interview with Barron, Valoushek used the cover name “Zemenek.”

11. Barron, KGB Today, pp. 320-7; Granatstein and Stafford, Spy Wars, pp. 154-5.

12. vol. 6, ch. 13, part 1.

13. vol. 8, ch. 8, para. 3.

14. Barron, KGB Today, pp. 388-90; Granatstein and Stafford, Spy Wars, pp. 170-1.

15. vol. 6, ch. 11, part 5; vol. 8, ch. 8, paras. 3, 4. In 1975 alone Hambleton had meetings with Pyatin in Washington, with V. G. Matsenov in New York, with S. S. Sadauskas in Vienna and with A. Rusakov in Prague. His other foreign missions took in Haiti, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel.

16. vol. 6, ch. 13, part 1. Mitrokhin’s notes do not give IVANOVA’s name.

17. Barron, KGB Today, pp. 330-1.

18. vol. 6, ch. 13, part 1; vol. 8, app. 8, item 87.

19. k-8,78; k-19,158; vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2. Mitrokhin’s notes do not identify LENA.

20. k-8,78.

21. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.

22. vol. 6, app. 2, parts 3, 5.

23. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2. It is not clear from Mitrokhin’s notes whether Feder was a “live” or a “dead double.”

24. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.

25. vol. 6, ch. 5, parts 2, 3. Like other Steinway customers, Governor Rockefeller can, of course, scarcely be blamed for failing to realize that his piano tuner was a KGB illegal. There is no evidence in Mitrokhin’s notes that Rudenko had contact with him.

26. Dobrynin, Anatoly, In Confidence, p. 377.

27. Isaacson, Kissinger, pp. 90-3.

28. Kramer and Roberts, “ I Never Wanted to be Vice -President of Anything!, ” pp. 8-9.

29. Schonberg, Horowitz, chs. 15-17. Mitrokhin’s notes, probably like the KGB file on which they are based, do not make clear exactly how great a part RYBAKOV played in tuning Horowitz’s pianos. The CD 186 was originally tuned by the Steinway chief technician, Franz Mohr.

30. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.

31. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2; t-7,304.

32. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2. RYBAKOV’s file gives his Moscow address as 108 Mir Prospect, apartment 120.

33. Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow, p. 375.

34. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 4. The main regional priorities for the establishment of illegal residencies in the period 1969-75, apart from North America, were the major states of western Europe, China and the Middle East. With the exception of the United States, where it was intended to establish ten residencies, no state was to have more than two.

35. vol. 6, ch. 5, parts 2, 3.

36. Barron, KGB Today, pp. 335-6.

37. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 3.

38. Barron, KGB Today, pp. 337-41, 349-51. vol. 6, ch. 13, part 1.

39. Barron, KGB Today, pp. 355-71.

40. Though not identified by Mitrokhin, LUTZEN was probably the defector Rupert Sigl, who had worked for the KGB in Karlshorst from 1957 to 1969.

41. vol. 6, ch. 13, part 1.

42. vol. 8, ch. 8, para. 3.

43. Granatstein and Stafford, Spy Wars, pp. 176, 179-83.

44. vol. 8, ch. 8, para. 4.

45. Granatstein and Stafford, Spy Wars, pp. 151-4, 184-5. In June 1986 Hambleton was moved to a Canadian jail and released under mandatory supervision in March 1989.