Christopher Andrew - The Sword and the Shield

63. vol. 6, ch. 2, part 1; vol. 6, app. 2, parts 4, 6.

64. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 112.

65. vol. 6, app. 1, part 6.

66. Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 485.

67. vol. 5, section 10.

68. vol. 6, ch. 3, parts 2, 3.

69. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 306-7.

70. vol. 6, ch. 2, part 1, n. 3.

71. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, ch. 4.

72. Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 302-3. Kalugin considered the tone of Andropov’s cable “paranoid.”

73. Volkogonov, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire, p. 351.

74. Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 523.

75. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 582-603. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, ch. 4.

76. Shvets, Washington Station, pp. 29, 74-5. Shvets had access to Androsov’s reports as a member of the FCD First (North American) Department from 1982 to 1985, and was then posted to Washington as a Line PR officer in Androsov’s residency.

77. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 591-605.

78. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 471-7.

79. Izvestia (September 24, 1991).

80. Garthoff, “The KGB Reports to Gorbachev,” pp. 226-7.

81. vol. 6, ch. 6.

82. See, for example, Kryuchkov’s 1984 analysis of “the deepening economic and social crisis in the capitalist world.” Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 33-4.

83. vol. 6, app. 1, part 41. Mitrokhin did not record the statistics for the San Francisco residency.

84. vol. 6, ch. 6.

85. Mitrokhin’s notes give the recruitment dates of fifteen ST agents who began work for the KGB in the 1970s: ANTON (1975), ARAM (1975), CHEKHOV/YAYKAL (1976), MAG (1974), MIKE (1973), OTPRYSK (1974), SARKIS (1974), SATURN (1978), SOFT (1971), TROP (1979), TURIST (1977), UGNYUS (1974), ZENIT (1978) and two others whose codenames cannot be published (recruited in 1975-6). VIL appears to have been recruited earlier. Other ST agents active in the USA during the 1970s, whose recruitment dates do not appear in Mitrokhin’s notes, were LONG, PATRIOT and RIDEL. Mitrokhin also identifies five trusted contacts recruited during the 1970s: KLARA (1972), KURT (1973), TSORN (1977), VELLO (1973) and VEYT (1973). In the case of a further eight members of the ST network in 1970s (FOGEL, FREY, IZOLDA, OZON, ROZHEK, SPRINTER, TEP-LOTEKNIK and VAYS), it is unclear from Mitrokhin’s notes which were fully recruited agents and which were trusted contacts. The notes give no dates for the activities of another eight ST agents and trusted contacts probably active in the 1970s: ALGORITMAS, AUTOMOBILIST, CHARLES, KLIM, LIR, ODISSEY, PAVEL and RUTH. Mitrokhin’s notes on all those listed above are relatively brief, varying in length from a few lines to a paragraph. A majority of both agents and trusted contacts are identified by name. vol. 6, app. 1, parts 1, 2, 3, 5, 11, 14, 20, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 38, 39; k-14,171; k-18,380-2; t-1,138, 290,294-5,297-301; t-2,109,161-2; t-7,77.

86. FREY was an agent and PAVEL a trusted contact in IBM (vol. 6, app. 1, parts 5, 27). Agent SATURN occupied a senior scientific post in McDonnell Douglas (vol. 6, app. 1, parts 27, 32). Agent ZENIT was a scientist in TRW (vol. 6, app. 1, part 27).

87. vol. 6, app. 1, parts 2, 32.

88. vol. 6, app. 1, part 38. The case of another scientist at one of the best-known US universities cannot be referred to for legal reasons; vol. 6, app. 1, part 32.

89. vol. 6, app. 1, part 33.

90. vol. 6, app. 1, part 31. DARCOM has since become the Army Materiel Command (AMC).

91. The latest date for which Mitrokhin provides statistics on the total numbers of ST agents run by the New York and Washington residencies is 1970; he provides no statistics on the agents run by the San Francisco residency.

92. Lindsey, The Falcon and the Snowman. Boyce escaped from prison in 1980, but was recaptured a year later and sentenced to an additional three years for escaping and twenty-five years for robbing seventeen banks while on the run (Lindsey, The Flight of the Falcon ).

93. vol. 6, app. 1, part 27. Mitrokhin’s brief note on ZENIT’s recruitment gives no details of the intelligence he supplied. Other important intelligence on satellite surveillance included the operating manual for KH-11, the most advanced US SIGINT satellite. Early in 1978 William Kampiles, who had been briefly employed by the CIA Watch Center, presented a copy of it to the KGB residency in Athens. He was unaware, however, that the KGB officer who received it, Sergei Ivanovich Bokhan, had been recruited several years earlier by the CIA. Earley, Confessions of a Spy, p. 120.

94. This calculation appears to have been based on the estimated saving in imports paid for in hard currency. Brezhnev was informed that the economic benefit of ST for the Soviet defense industry had not been calculated. vol. 6, ch. 6.

95. Similar reports on ST successes were sent to Kosygin, the prime minister, and Ustinov, the Defence Minister.

96. vol. 6, ch. 6.

97. t-7,105.

98. vol. 6, ch. 6.

99. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 622.

100. In 1965 the United States had accounted for over 90 percent of the VPK’s requirements.

101. Documents supplied by the French agent in Directorate T, Vladimir Vetrov (codenamed FAREWELL); cited by Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Birds, p. 260. On Vetrov, see Andrew and Gordievsky, Le KGB dans le monde, 1917-1990, pp. 619-23. For the text of some of Vetrov’s documents, see Hanson, Soviet Industrial Espionage. Vetrov’s documents and Mitrokhin’s notes complement each other.

102. Hanson, Soviet Industrial Espionage, p. 31.

103. vol. 6, ch. 6. Mitrokhin’s notes identify 106 of the KGB’s agents within the Soviet scientific community; vol. 6, ch. 5, part 1, n. 6.

104. vol. 6, ch. 6.

105. vol. 6, app. 1, parts 2, 32.

106. vol. 6, app. 1, parts 27, 32.

107. vol. 6, ch. 6.

108. Kessler, Spy vs Spy, pp. 167-8.

109. Also targeted by western European residencies were the US Atomic Energy Commission, the Battelle Memorial Institute, Dow Chemicals, Dupont de Nemours, GTE, Arthur D. Little Inc., Litton Industries Inc., the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and RCA. Mitrokhin’s notes do not indicate which—if any—residencies had particular responsibilities for these targets; k-5,424. The National Institute of Health was targeted because of its research on the effects of chemical and biological warfare; vol. 6, ch. 6.

110. vol. 6, app. 1, part 1; t-7,8,77.

111. vol. 2, app. 3.

112. Volkogonov, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire, p. 338.

113. US government, Soviet Acquisition of Militarily Significant Western Technology

114. Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Birds, p. 260.

115. vol. 2, app. 3.

116. k-5,504.

117. Hanson, Soviet Industrial Espionage, pp. 10, 23.

118. Wolf, Man without a Face, p. 182.

119. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 641-2.

120. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 37, 49-50.

121. Recollections by Oleg Gordievsky of Gorbachev’s address; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 621.

122. Garthoff, “The KGB Reports to Gorbachev,” pp. 228-9.

123. Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Birds, p. 260.

124. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 40-9, 115-17.

125. The fullest account of the Ames case, and the only one to benefit from interviews with Ames himself, is Earley, Confessions of a Spy. On the agents betrayed by Ames, see pp. 143-5. According to the SVR, several of the Western agents named by Ames had already been identified from other leads.