Christopher Andrew - The Sword and the Shield

14. See above, chapters 5, 6, and 10.

15. MGB report to Stalin, first published by Dmitri Volkogonov in Izvestia (June 11, 1993); reprinted in Sudoplatovs, Special Tasks, pp. 336-7, and “Stalin’s Plan to Assassinate Tito,” p. 137.

16. MGB report to Stalin, first published by Dmitri Volkogonov in Izvestia (June 11, 1993).

17. “Stalin’s Plan to Assassinate Tito,” p. 137.

18. Wolff, “Leadership Transition in a Fractured Bloc,” p. 1.

19. Sudoplatovs, Special Tasks, pp. 335-8.

20. k-13,267. Some examples of Grigulevich’s works, published under his own name, the pseudonym I. R. Lavretsky and the hybrid Grigulevich-Lavretsky, are included in the bibliography.

21. Sudoplatovs, Special Tasks, pp. 249, 252-3.

22. Khokhlov, In the Name of Conscience, part 3; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 430-1.

23. vol. 3, pakapp. 3.

24. t-7,267.

25. t-7,267.

26. Each target file ( obektovoye delo ) had to give the following information:

1. The role of the target in peacetime and wartime, and its place in the enemy’s military-industrial capabilities. Documents, photographs, films, maps and diagrams giving details on its location, work schedule, security system, personnel, neighbors, populated areas nearby and methods of approaching the target.

2. Detailed descriptions of the target’s vulnerable points, methods of attacking each of them, estimates of the likely damage, and the type of personnel to be used in sabotage operations (agents, illegals, etc.).

3. Opportunities to reconnoitre and sabotage the target. This section of the file contains individual reports ( spravki ) on every information source available on the target, and on each combat agent ( agent-boyevik ) selected for operations against it.

4. Details of the special equipment needed for operations against the target, the precise use to be made of it, dead drops, storage arrangements and the role of each of those entrusted with its use.

5. Arrangements for giving instructions to those responsible for attacking the target, together with the codewords for the “special action” to begin. (This part of the file was placed in a sealed package.)

If information on any of the subjects listed above was missing, a note was added to the file on the action being taken to obtain it. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5, n. 2.

27. k-16,255.

28. t-7,311.

29. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.

30. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.

31. Wolf, Man without a Face, pp. 211-12.

32. vol. 6, ch. 1, part 1.

33. Barron, KGB, pp. 421-6. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 467.

34. The fullest account of Stashinsky’s career is in Anders, Murder to Order.

35. Anders, Murder to Order, p. 107.

36. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 468. See below, chapter 15.

37. Richard Beeston, “KGB Refused to Kill Khrushchev” [interview with Semichastny], The Times (December 23, 1997).

38. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 481-2.

39. The text of Khrushchev’s secret speech of August 3, 1961 did not come to light until 1993. Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, p. 252.

40. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.

41. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5. Fonseca was co-founder of the FSLN. Initially it was called the National Liberation Front. “Sandinista” was added, chiefly at Fonseca’s insistence, in 1962 in honor of the “anti-imperialist” hero, General Augusto César Sandino. Volume 2 will give more detail on KGB links with the FSLN and on other operations in Latin America.

42. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.

43. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.

44. vol. 8, ch. 10.

45. t-7,173.

46. It was planned to put the Wilhemshaven-Wesseling oil pipeline out of action where it crosses the Lippe river and the Seitenkanal; t-7,277.

47. t-7,65; k-16,380.

48. k-2,186.

49. t-7,163,165,170-2. For examples of radio caches, see this chapter, appendices 2, 3.

50. k-5,483.

51. On the MOLNIYA device, see this chapter, appendix 1. Mitrokhin’s notes do not always identify clearly which caches are booby-trapped.

52. See this chapter, appendix 2.

53. Reuter report (January 18, 1999).

54. k-5,382. The Belgian caches turned out not to be booby-trapped.

55. In 1968-9, the Thirteenth Department had one illegal, PAUL, assisted by his wife VIRGINIA, and two pairs of German illegal agents, on whom Mitrokhin’s notes give no further details; vol. 3, pakapp. 3. There may have been others in files not noted by Mitrokhin.

56. The fullest account of PAUL’s career is in vol. 7, ch. 7; there are a few further details in vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5. On RAG see also k-11,17. PAUL’s file, on which Mitrokhin made detailed notes, gives little indication of the nature of the assistance provided by VIRGINIA.

57. vol. 7, ch. 7; vol. 8, ch. 9; vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5. Among other illegals seconded for shorter periods to Thirteenth Department operations was Vasili Gordievsky (GROMOV), who on a mission to Spain in the winter of 1964-5 selected seven landing sites and eight arms caches for DRG operations. Rodin, the head of the Thirteenth Department, requested the Illegals Directorate to give him an award to mark the success of his mission; t-7,279.

58. vol. 6, ch. 1, part 1.

59. See above, chapter 11.

60. Deryabin and Rastvorov defected in 1954 to the CIA in, respectively, Vienna and Tokyo. In the same year the Petrovs defected in Canberra.

61. vol. 5, sec. 7 n.; vol. 2, app. 3.

62. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 6.

63. vol. 2, app. 3; vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.

64. See above, chapter 11.

65. Wise, Molehunt, ch. 11; Mangold, Cold Warrior, ch. 12.

66. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.

67. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5. The KGB also sought, unsuccessfully, to use its agent in the Canadian RCMP, Jim Morrison (FRIEND), to track down Runge.

68. vol. 2, app. 3.

69. Nureyev, Nureyev, pp. 96-7.

70. Percival, Nureyev, pp. 55-6.

71. vol. 2, app. 3.

72. Sheymov, Tower of Secrets, pp. 92-3. Probably because of the deep lingering hostility to Nureyev among the KGB old guard, he was not rehabilitated in Russia until September 1998, five years after his death in exile. See “Russia reinstates Nureyev,” The Times (September 23, 1998).

73. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.

74. Percival, Nureyev, p. 99.

75. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.

76. vol. 2, app. 3. Both Nureyev and Makarova were also the targets of numerous KGB active measures designed to discredit them.

77. k-10,155.

78. k-10,154.

79. Ministère Public de la Confédération press release (January 18, 1999). The Swiss press release made no reference to the documents from Mitrokhin’s archives used to locate the cache.

80. k-5,382.

81. k-10,156.

82. k-10,158.

83. k-10,157.

84. k-10,158.

1. vol. 3, pakapp. 3.

2. The earliest reference to Department V (the letter “V,” not the Roman numeral) noted by Mitrokhin was contained in order no. 00197 of October 7, 1965 instructing other FCD departments with agents suitable for use in time of war or international crisis to hand them over to Department V. The Department had probably been founded not long before. vol. 2, app. 3.

3. vol. 3, pakapp. 3.

4. k-16,408.

5. k-26,317.

6. The earliest subsidies recorded by Mitrokhin were 135,000 dollars in February 1968, followed by 100,000 dollars in March. Mitrokhin’s notes on Greek Communist Party files for 1967, however, are very thin and it is likely that the first subsidies to the underground Party were handed over in Budapest during the later months of 1967. k-26,319.