Christopher Andrew - The Sword and the Shield

7. k-16,69.

8. See above, chapter 18.

9. k-27,61.

10. k-16,69.

11. k-27,61.

12. k-3,28.

13. k-3,23,24,29.

14. k-3,28; k-26,315,318,323,325,326,384,387,390,394.

15. k-26,322. The Iraqi Communist Party also deposited its archives in the Soviet Union for safekeeping; see volume 2.

16. k-14,531. The location for operation ZVENO was studied by the illegal YAKOV and the agent ROBBI of the Vienna residency. YAKOV was Gennadi Mikhailovich Alekseyev, based in Switzerland, who had assumed the identity of a Swiss man, Igor Mürner, who had died in the Soviet Union. In 1973 YAKOV was arrested by the Swiss authorities, who were unable to prove charges of espionage against him. He served two years in prison for using false identity documents (k-5,193; k-24,236). Mitrokhin is unable to identify ROBBI. Other KGB officers (at least three, and possibly all, from Department V) involved in preparations for operation ZVENO were Yu. V. Derzhavin, A. D. Grigoryev, B. N. Malinin, Ye. S. Shcherbanov, B. S. Olikheyko, A. S. Savin, Kovalik, and Ye. A. Sharov (k-14,531).

17. k-16,408.

18. vol. 7, ch. 15

19. vol. 3, pakapp. 3. Vol. 7, ch. 5, para. 35 gives the location of PEPEL as Istanbul, but neither reference identifies the type of special action employed in PEPEL. Mitrokhin did not see the PEPEL file. The 1969 report also noted that the 1955 requirement for the Thirteenth Department to steal Western military technology was out of date; this had become the primary responsibility of FCD Directorate T (Scientific and Technological Espionage).

20. O’Riordan’s history of the Irish members of the International Brigades, Connolly Column, was printed in East Germany (though published in Dublin), and gratefully acknowledged the assistance of the Soviet agent and British defector to East Germany, John Peet.

21. The text of O’Riordan’s appeal for weapons for the IRA is published in the appendix to Yeltsin, The View from the Kremlin, pp. 311-16. In December 1969, shortly before the split which led to the emergence of the Provisionals, a secret meeting of the IRA leadership approved a proposal by Goulding to establish a National Liberation Front including Sinn Fein, the Irish Communist Party and other left-wing groups. Coogan, The Troubles, p. 95.

22. Bishop and Mallie, The Provisional IRA, p. 88.

23. Eight memoranda on the subject by Andropov on the IRA appeal for arms are published, in whole or part, in the appendix to Yeltsin, The View from the Kremlin, pp. 311-16.

24. vol. 7, ch. 7; vol. 8, ch. 9; vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.

25. On the FLQ, see Granatstein and Stafford, Spy Wars, pp. 206-10.

26. vol. 8, ch. 14.

27. Even Granatstein and Stafford, two of Canada’s leading historians of intelligence, conclude that the CIA document, “if authentic… does suggest strongly that the CIA was operating in Quebec”; Spy Wars, p. 209.

28. vol. 8, ch. 14.

29. k-24,365.

30. “Soviets Protest to Argentina After Envoy Foils Kidnaping,” Washington Post (March 31, 1970).

31. vol. 4, indapp. 3.

32. Rob Bull, “Defector Bares ‘Secret’ Past,” Vancouver Sun (April 5, 1976).

33. vol. 4, indapp. 3.

34. Interview with Robert Gates by Christopher Andrew (March 14, 1994).

35. See above, chapter 22.

36. k-24,365.

37. k-24,365.

38. k-24,365.

39. See below, chapter 24.

40. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 524-5; Barron, KGB, pp. 110, 431ff; Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Birds, pp. 197-9.

41. Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 131-2.

42. Bennett and Hamilton (eds.), Documents on British Policy Overseas, series 3, vol. 1, pp. 388-9.

43. Gordievsky, Next Stop Execution, p. 184.

44. Bennett and Hamilton (eds.), Documents on British Policy Overseas, series 3, vol. 1, pp. 337-43, 359.

45. Bennett and Hamilton (eds.), Documents on British Policy Overseas, series 3, vol. 1, p. 389 n.

46. Barron, KGB, pp. 413-15. Kuzichkin, Inside the KGB, p. 81.

47. Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 131-2.

48. Gordievsky, Next Stop Execution, p. 184.

49. vol. 6, ch. 1, part 1; vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5. It is, of course, impossible to exclude the possibility that plans to cripple Baryshnikov were contained in a file not seen by Mitrokhin.

50. Studies of the split between Officials and Provisionals include Bell, The Secret Army, ch. 18; Bishop and Mallie, The Provisional IRA, chs. 7-8; Coogan, The IRA, chs. 15-17; Coogan, The Troubles, ch. 3; Taylor, The Provos, ch. 5-6.

51. Smith, Fighting for Ireland?, pp. 88-90.

52. O’Riordan’s letter to the Central Committee and Andropov’s memorandum on operation SPLASH are printed in the appendix to Yeltsin, The View from the Kremlin, pp. 314-16. According to Yeltsin, the file on SPLASH in the archives of the General Secretary does not indicate whether it was implemented. The files noted by Mitrokhin, apparently withheld from Yeltsin, show that it was and identify the boat used in the operation. vol. 7, ch. 15, para. 2.

53. vol. 7, ch. 15, para. 2.

54. O’Riordan informed the Central Committee, “I will take no part in the transport operation, and my role will only involve transferring the technical information about this to Seamus Costello.” Yeltsin, The View from the Kremlin, p. 314.

55. Bishop and Mallie, The Provisional IRA, pp. 221-2; Smith, Fighting for Ireland?, p. 90; Coogan, The Troubles, pp. 276-80. The Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), founded as the military wing of IRSP, became arguably the most violent of the republican paramilitary groups. Its victims included Airey Neave, MP, Conservative spokesman on Northern Ireland, killed in 1979 by a bomb, activated by a mercury tilt switch, which was planted in his car in the Palace of Westminster car park.

56. k-27,393; vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.

57. Hodges, Intellectual Foundations of the Nicaraguan Revolution, p. 228.

58. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5. On Piñeiro, who in 1974 became head of a new Departamento Americano of the Cuban Communist Party’s Central Committee, which took over responsibility for assistance to Latin American revolutionary movements, see Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 514.

59. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.

60. Pezzullos, At the Fall of Somoza, p. 58. Shelton’s reports were widely regarded in diplomatic circles as reflecting only Somoza’s views. On at least one occasion, his political officer, James R. Cheek, used the State Department’s “dissent channel” to contradict his chief. Jeremiah O’Leary, “Shelton being Replaced as Ambassador to Nicaragua,” Washington Star (April 19, 1975).

61. Pastor, Condemned to Repetition, p. 39.

62. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.

63. Booth, The End and the Beginning, p. 142, Pezzullos, At the Fall of Somoza, pp. 116-17. Shelton was replaced as ambassador in April 1975.

64. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.

65. On the three main factions within the FSLN which emerged in 1975, see Booth, The End and the Beginning, pp. 143-4; Hodges, Intellectual Foundations of the Nicaraguan Revolution, pp. 233-55.

66. On Fonseca’s link with the USSR, see volume 2.

67. k-27,393.

68. The file seen by Mitrokhin records only Fonseca’s request to visit Moscow. Though he saw no file on the trip itself, it is unlikely that the request was rejected.

69. Pezzullos, At the Fall of Somoza, pp. 117-19. On KGB relations with the Sandinistas, see volume 2.

70. t-7,135; vol. 2, appendix 3.