Christopher Andrew - The Sword and the Shield

47. The KGB officers who received commendations for their part in the operation were A. B. Maksimov, V. G. Goncharov, V. A. Andryevskaya, A. I. Baskakov, A. N. Belov, V. P. Varvanin, A. N. Kosarev, A. V. Smirnov, A. A. Shishkov, S. A. Agafonov, V. K. Gavrilov, S. Yu. Demidov, B. I. Danilin, O. I. Bukharev and V. A. Sedov. vol. 7, app. 3, n. 15.

48. See above, chapter 21.

49. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 14.

50. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 18. On Parastayev, see also vol. 7, app. 1, items 7, 42.

51. Ziegler, Wilson, p. 503.

52. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 18.

53. Ziegler, Wilson, pp. 508-9.

54. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 18.

55. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, p. 129.

56. vol. 7, ch. 16, items 54, 62.

57. vol. 7, ch. 16, item 62.

58. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 129-30.

59. See above, chapter 24.

60. Information from Oleg Gordievsky.

61. vol. 7, ch. 16, item 50.

62. Morning Star (October 31, 1975).

63. De-la-Noy, Mervyn Stockwood, pp. 214-15.

64. vol. 7, ch. 16, item 50. Tony Benn was also invited to dinner but declined because “Mervyn Stockwood is such an old gossip that he’d tell everybody that he’s had a dinner party for the Secretary of the Communist Party and myself.” Benn, Against the Tide, p. 482.

65. De-la-Noy, Mervyn Stockwood, p. 212.

66. vol. 7, ch. 16, item 51.

67. vol. 7, ch. 16, item 53.

68. Alasdair Palmer, “How the KGB Ran the Guardian ’s Features Editor,” Spectator (December 10, 1994). Interview with Richard Gott, Guardian (December 12, 1994).

69. Mitrokhin did not note either Gott’s KGB file or references to other Guardian articles by him. His notes thus do not clarify the nature of Gott’s relationship with the KGB. Gott acknowledges having met KGB officers in London, Moscow, Vienna, Athens and Nicosia, but claims that the only money he received from them was to pay travel expenses to and in the last three locations. Interview with Richard Gott, Guardian (December 12, 1994). Cf. Gordievsky, Next Stop Execution, pp. 281-2.

70. vol. 7, ch. 16, item 66. Parliamentary Debates, 5th series, House of Commons Official Report, Session 1977-78, vol. 944, col. 1200.

71. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 506-8.

72. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 101-2, 138-9.

73. Observer duly reported American claims that the document was forged but gave greater weight to evidence for its authenticity ( Observer, January 22, 1984).

74. “A Girl’s Best Friend,” New Statesman (November 5, 1982).

75. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 630.

76. vol. 6, app. 1 (misc.), part 1; k-12, 51.

77. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 130-7.

78. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, p. 118.

79. There is, for example, no reference in Mitrokhin’s notes to Geoffrey Prime, the agent in GCHQ, who was—unusually—recruited and run outside the UK by the KGB Third Directorate, to whose files Mitrokhin did not have access.

80. vol. 7, app. 1, item 77. There is another tantalizing one-sentence reference to a SIGINT official (apparently British) codenamed ZHUR (JOUR), contacted in 1963 for the first time since 1938. Mitrokhin gives no indication whether or not the contact had any result. It is also possible that the reference was garbled, since the longest-serving agent providing intelligence on cipher systems, an employee of the French foreign ministry, was codenamed JOUR. vol. 7, app. 1, item 122.

81. vol. 5, ch. 14.

82. The Times (November 29, 1969, March 31, 1994).

83. vol. 5, ch. 14, para. 1; vol. 7, ch. 7, para. 74.

84. vol. 5, ch. 14, n. 4; vol. 7, ch. 7, para. 74.

85. vol. 5, ch. 14, para. 2 and n. 4.

86. vol. 7, ch. 7, paras. 73, 74; k-2, 171; vol. 5, ch. 14, paras. 2, 3, 7.

87. vol. 5, ch. 14, paras. 5, 6; vol. 7, ch. 7, para. 75. Since there is no indication that VERA behaved improperly, it would be unfair to reveal her identity or precise job in the Moscow embassy, both of which are recorded in Symonds’s file.

88. vol. 5, ch. 14, paras. 7-9.

89. vol. 5, ch. 14, n. 6.

90. It was also considered too risky for Symonds to use his forged British passport to apply for an Australian visa; entry to New Zealand did not require a visa. From New Zealand he would need only Everett’s birth certificate to gain entry to Australia. Symonds, however, was unable to book a direct flight from Tokyo to New Zealand and was forced to use his bogus British passport as a transit passenger in Sydney. When flying from New Zealand to Australia later in the year, he used the same passport with an Australian visa obtained in Wellington, fearing that if he used Everett’s birth certificate an immigration service computer might detect that he had previously possessed a British passport containing the same name and date of birth. vol. 5, ch. 14, paras. 10-11.

91. vol. 5, ch. 14, paras. 12-44.

92. vol. 5, ch. 14, paras. 45-6.

93. vol. 7, ch. 7, para. 76.

94. vol. 5, ch. 14, paras. 51-2.

95. “The Fugitive Detective and His Secret Trips to Britain,” The Times (April 15, 1981).

96. vol. 5, ch. 14, paras. 53-4.

97. “Bribes Trial Man Says He was Told to Flee,” The Times (April 7, 1981). “Detective in ‘Morass of Corruption’ is Jailed,” The Times (April 15, 1981). “Confessions of a Bent Copper,” The Times (March 31, 1994).

98. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 526. Lukasevics was unable to claim credit for Prime and Symonds, two of the KGB’s most notable British agents of the 1970s; both had been recruited abroad.

99. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 585-7; Gordievsky, Next Stop Execution, pp. 249-52.

100. vol. 7, app. 2, item 69.

101. vol. 7, app. 2, 71. The file noted by Mitrokhin refers to Guk by his codename, YERMAKOV.

102. Zamuruyev was succeeded as head of Line N by Aleksandr Igorevich Timonov. vol. 7, ch. 7, para. 10; app. 2, para. 50.

103. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 599. Gordievsky, Next Stop Execution, pp. 269-70.

104. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 582-605. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, ch. 4.

105. vol. 7, ch. 16, item 19.

106. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 586.

107. vol. 7, app. 2, item 73.

108. vol. 7, app. 2, item 72.

109. Earley, Confessions of a Spy, pp. 139-45, 176-9.

110. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 28-35, 609; Gordievsky, Next Stop Execution, chs. 1, 14, 15.

111. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 12.

112. Report of the Security Commission (Cm 2930) (July 1995), p. 10.

113. Report of the Security Commission (Cm 2930) (July 1995), pp. 13-14, 32-3. “Phone Call Hoax that Trapped a Spy,” Independent (November 19, 1993); “Vital Clues to a Traitor,” Daily Mail (November 19, 1993).

114. Some indication of the intelligence provided by Kuzichkin and Butkov is provided in their memoirs. On Makarov, see Kahn, “Soviet Comint in the Cold War.” Butkov’s memoirs have so far appeared only in Norwegian.

115. Pasechnik, one of the scientific directors of Biopreparat, the world’s largest and most advanced biological warfare research institute, made contact with SIS during a visit to France in 1989 and was exfiltrated to Britain. Interview with Pasechnik by Christopher Andrew in the 1995 Radio 4 series New Spies for Old? (presented by Christopher Andrew; produced by Dennis Sewell).