Christopher Andrew - The Sword and the Shield

127. Die Welt (July 17, 1986). 128. “Ex-KGB Agent to Return to West,” Guardian (November 26, 1987).

129. k-10, 37.

130. “East Seen Escalating Drive for West’s Industrial Secrets,” Washington Post (October 24, 1986).

131. k-10, 37.

132. “Ex-KGB Agent to Return to West,” Guardian (November 26, 1987). “Red Spy Returns for His Pension,” Today (November 26, 1987).

133. Wolf, Man without a Face, ch. 1.

1. k-4, 91-9, 101. The 1953 list of “valuable agents” in Paris also includes the codename MES, but gives no indication of his or her occupation. The only codenames which can be identified on the basis of information in Mitrokhin’s notes are PIZHO (Georges Pâques) and LONG (Paddy Costello). It is quite possible, however, that the other “valuable agents” include some of those recruited under other codenames during the few years after the Liberation. Pâques’s most important period as a Soviet agent almost certainly came while he was working at the French general staff from 1958 to 1962.

2. vol. 9, ch. 1.

3. See above, chapter 9.

4. “Security Aspects of Possible Staff Talks with France.” (February 24, 1948), JIC(48)5, CAB158/3, PRO. We are indebted for this reference to Alex Craig of Christ’s College, Cambridge.

5. During the 1960s the FRG, as a result of penetration by both the HVA and KGB, became an even more important source of intelligence than France. See chapter 26.

6. “Miscellaneous Soviet Personalities Who Have Served Abroad,” (September 29, 1954), CRS A6283/XR1/144, Australian Archives, Canberra.

7. vol. 9, ch. 1. For other examples of classified French documents on Berlin and the German question obtained by the Paris residency, see Murphy, Kondrashev and Bailey, Battleground Berlin, pp. 68-9, 75-7, 82-4, 95, 145. Though the authors were given access to some reports from the Paris residency, they were not allowed to see the files on agent penetration in France noted by Mitrokhin.

8. On JOUR, chapters 9 and 27.

9. Though given to no access to KGB files on JOUR, Fursenko and Naftali confirm KGB access during the Cuban Missile Crisis to diplomatic traffic between the Quai d’Orsay and French embassies in Moscow and Washington; “Soviet Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” pp. 70-1.

10. Wolton, Le KGB en France, pp. 204-6; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 466.

11. vol. 9, ch. 6.

12. Wolton, La France sous influence, p. 70.

13. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 47.

14. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 43. Some doubt remains as to whether the FCD officer who calculated this total took fully into account the transition from “old” to “new” francs.

15. Wolton, La France sous influence, p. 70.

16. vol. 9, ch. 1.

17. k-4, 2-4. Mitrokhin’s notes give no details of the intelligence supplied by GERMAIN, but the award of the Order of the Red Star is a reliable indication of its importance.

18. k-7, 178. After her false flag recruitment, ROZA was controlled by a female agent, JEANNETTE, who doubtless posed as a member of the fictitious “progressive” group.

19. LARIONOV joined the foreign ministry from the army in 1960; k-4, 112.

20. k-4,18.

21. FRENE became a commissaire de police in Paris in 1960; k-4, 114.

22. DACHNIK was recruited during a visit to the USSR in August 1962 by the Fourteenth Department of the FCD “for material reward”; k-14, 1.

23. ADAM was a chemist at the CNRS (Centre National de Recherches Scientifiques) recruited in 1959; k-4, 25.

24. SASHA was recruited in or before 1960. In that year he went to study electronics in Washington; k-4, 113.

25. k-4, 18.

26. Barron, KGB, pp. 169-82. Interview by Christopher Andrew with Yuri Nosenko (November 15, 1987); Wolton, La France sous influence, pp. 374-9. Because these were SCD operations, they do not appear in the FCD files seen by Mitrokhin.

27. k-4, 131. The LOUISA case, unlike those of Dejean and Guibaud, figured in the FCD files seen by Mitrokhin because of the unsuccessful attempt by the Paris residency to renew contact with her.

28. NN’s name is not recorded in Mitrokhin’s notes but can be identified from the biographical detail contained in them as Saar-Demichel; vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 5. Saar-Demichel later admitted his links with the KGB; Wolton, La France sous influence, p. 247. According to Wolton, his original KGB codename was ALEKSEI.

29. Wolton, La France sous influence, pp. 247-50.

30. Wolton, La France sous influence, pp. 374, 379, 411-12, 416-17, 426 n., 437.

31. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 5.

32. vol. 9, ch. 4, para. 8.

33. vol. 9, ch. 6, paras. 43-5.

34. Mitrokhin’s notes contain no reference to the radical (later socialist) politician Charles Hernu, who was to become defense minister from 1981 to 1985. It has been alleged that Hernu was recruited by the Bulgarian DS in 1953, later had contact with the Romanian Securitate and became a KGB agent in 1963. Dupuis and Pontaut, “Charles Hernu était un agent de l’Est.”

35. k-6, 80, 128; t-1, 61. For legal reasons GILBERT’s identity, though recorded in Mitrokhin’s notes on KGB files, cannot be published. There is some indication that at one point GILBERT avoided contact with his case officer.

36. For legal reasons DROM’s identity, though recorded in Mitrokhin’s notes on KGB files, cannot be published. His file fills seven volumes. DROM’s controllers were, successively, Spartak Ivanovich Leshchev (codenamed LARIN) from 1960 to 1964; Vladimir Filippovich Yashchechkin (YASNOV) from 1964 to 1967; Yuri Konstantinovich Semyonychev (TANEYEV) from 1967 to 1972; and Anatoli Nikolayevich Tsipalkin (VESNOV) in 1972-3. vol. 9, ch. 6, paras. 30-1; t-1, 58, 68; k-4, 27, 58.

37. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 33.

38. vol. 9, chs. 2, 4

39. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 5.

40. Myagkov, Inside the KGB, p. 24.

41. In the course of 1965 Saar-Demichel seems to have lost his influence at the Élysée. De Gaulle is reported to have said to a member of his entourage, “Saar-Demichel is a Soviet spy. He doesn’t, of course, steal secrets to hand over to them, but he tells them everything he knows.” Wolton, La France sous influence, pp. 382, 424-6.

42. Wolton, La France sous influence, p. 426.

43. vol. 9, ch. 6, paras. 33, 40.

44. vol. 9, ch. 2, para. 11.

45. During the period 1963-6 three unidentified French intelligence officers were members of the GRANIT group, and one of the BULAT group. BON, a former head of department at the Sûreté Générale, worked as an agent recruiter; k-27, 242. The latest reference in Mitrokhin’s notes to penetration of SDECE is to the presence there of a KGB agent (not identified) in May 1969; k-4, 81.

46. k-4, 33, 34, 38.

47. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 30.

48. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 10. Mitrokhin’s notes give few details of the regular (non-bonus) payments to these agents.

49. Mitrokhin’s notes on his file do not specify what proportion of the large sums paid to him were in the form of a regular salary or retainer, but they do make clear that he received very substantial bonuses for particularly important items of S (k-5, 460).

50. t-1, 47; k-4, 34.

51. k-4, 35, 65; k-14, 93; vol. 6, app. 1, part 33; t-1, 264-5.

52. k-5, 281; k-11, 87; t-1, 266.

53. t-1, 42.

54. Wolton, Le KGB en France, pp. 242-3; Favier and Martin-Roland, La décennie Mitterrand, vol. 1, pp. 271-2.

55. Kahn, “Soviet Comint in the Cold War,” p. 20.

56. k-4, 176.