Christopher Andrew - The Sword and the Shield

57. The six cipher personnel under cultivation were codenamed ALMAZOV, GROMOV, GUDKOV, KRASNOV, LAPIN and VESELOV. Mitrokhin gives details of only two. The cultivation of LAPIN began in 1980 and plans were made for it to continue after he was posted abroad in 1982. With the assistance of JOUR, an investigation was undertaken of KRASNOV’s finances, home and leisure pursuits, and he was secretly photographed. At the end of 1981 an (unidentified) illegal began to cultivate him under false flag. Mitrokhin’s notes do not record which, if any, of the cultivations ended in recruitment; k-4, 177.

58. t-1, 46; k-7, 145.

59. k-3, 81; t-1, 32.

60. t-1, 34; vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 7.

61. vol. 9, ch. 6, paras. 41-53; k-6, 3-5; t-1, 57.

62. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 16; k-25, 120.

63. t-1, 27; vol. 3, pakapp. 1, 21.

64. t-1, 43; k-4, 180.

65. t-1, 44; k-14, 100.

66. t-1, 36; k-27, 292.

67. t-1, 46.

68. k-7, 145.

69. vol. 9, ch. 2, para. 17.

70. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 7.

71. k-7, 145.

72. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 7. Giscard d’Estaing’s codename is given in k-3, 81.

73. For the two years 1976-7, BROK was paid a total of 217,000 francs: 72,000 francs basic salary, 83,000 bonuses, 62,000 expenses. From January to November 1978, the last period for which details of payments to BROK are available, he received a total of 182,000 francs: 55,000 francs salary, 83,000 bonuses, 62,000 expenses. k-3, 81.

74. Mitrokhin does not identify BROK’s case officer(s) for the period 1946-51. Thereafter, his controllers were Ye. R. Radtsig (1951-7); V. K. Radchenko (1957-9); E. N. Yakovlev (1959-63); I. F. Gremyakin (1970-2); L. I. Vasenko (1972); R. F. Zhuravlev (1972-6); R. N. Lebedinsky (1974-5); Ye. L. Mokeyev (1976-8); and Ye. N. Malkov (1978-9). k-3, 81.

75. M. S. Tsimbal, A. I. Lazarev, A. V. Krasavin, V. P. Vlasov and N. N. Chetverikov; k-3, 81.

76. k-3, 81.

77. See above, chapter 12.

78. vol. 9, ch. 3, paras. 5, 6; t-7, 219.

79. vol. 9, ch. 6, paras. 15,24.

80. Raymond Aron, “Il n’y a pas de quoi rire,” Le Figaro (June 23, 1975). Aron, Mémoires, pp. 599-60. Other prominent critics of Le Monde included Pierre Nora and Jean-François Revel.

81. Le Monde (July 3, 1975).

82. Le Monde (September 12, 1975). This claim was subsequently withdrawn, but Le Monde ’s critics complained that it continued, in its reporting on Solzhenitsyn, to “ prodiguer impunément quelques insultes sous le couvert de l’objectivité. ” Legris, Le Monde tel qu’il est, p. 32.

83. A major operational plan for 1975, jointly signed by the heads of the First Chief, Second Chief and Fifth Directorates, aimed “to discredit PAUK [Solzhenitsyn]… through mass information media abroad.” k-3b, 27.

84. Legris, Le Monde tel qu’il est.

85. Jacques Thibau’s analysis of Le Monde in the 1970s concludes: “… il repose à la fois sur ce que ses adversaires ‘de gauche’ appellent l’ordre, et ses critiques ‘de droite’ la subversion. L’équilibre est difficile à tenir. Il requiert de la prudence et de la pratique de la casuistique, mais globalement il correspond à la fonction du journal. ” Thibau, Le Monde, 1944-1996, p. 433.

86. However, at least one regular Paris-based contributor to Le Monde in the 1970s, KRON, is identified as a KGB agent (k-24, 153). Mitrokhin’s notes also identify MONGO, one of Le Monde ’s African correspondents, as a KGB agent, but do not give his identity or the dates when he was posted in Africa (k-6, 116).

87. t-1, 46, 58; vol. 9, ch. 6, paras. 15, 24. Most of Mitrokhin’s notes on influence operations directed against Le Monde are both brief and general. He identifies only two active measures articles by both author and exact date of publication. One is described as “entirely written on KGB themes” by a leading Le Monde journalist; the other was an article “using KGB arguments” by a leading socialist politician. Both were published in 1980. vol. 1, ch. 8; vol. 9, ch. 6, paras. 15, 24; k-8, 522; k-24, 153.

88. vol. 9, ch. 2, para. 23.

89. The same disproportion in the treatment of KGB and CIA active measures is evident, on a somewhat smaller scale, in the generally valuable history of Le Monde by Jacques Thibau. Thibau concludes, for example, that one notorious forgery published by Le Monde, the so-called “Fechteler report,” which purported to reveal outrageously belligerent US designs in the Mediterranean, was almost certainly fabricated by the CIA and French intelligence. He does not consider the far more probable hypothesis that it was a KGB forgery (Thibau, Le Monde, 1944-1996, pp. 214-18). For an assessment of the revelations in the mid-1970s of malpractice by the US intelligence community, see Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, ch. 10.

90. SIDOR was recruited in 1956 but later suspected of working for the DST (k-14, 3). JACQUES, an AFP correspondent in a number of Asian countries, was a KGB agent from 1964 to 1973; during that period he had seven different controllers (k-6, 53). MISHA was recruited during a visit to the Soviet Union in 1965; Mitrokhin’s notes do not reveal how long his work as an agent continued (vol. 2, app. 1, para. 46; vol. 2, appendix 2, para. 68). LAN was an agent from 1969 to 1979, mostly—if not exclusively—in France (k-4, 85; k-27, 291). MARAT was an agent in Paris and abroad from c. 1973 to 1982 (k-6, 42). GRININ was recruited in 1980 (k-14, 379).

91. PIERRE, a confidential contact in the 1960s (k-14, 111, 134), and JOSEPH, a confidential contact from 1974 to 1977 (k-6, 84).

92. k-27, 291.

93. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 33.

94. Shultz and Godson, Dezinformatsia, p. 134.

95. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 40.

96. Shultz and Godson, Dezinformatsia, pp. 135-49.

97. k-5, 560.

98. vol. 9, ch. 6, paras. 37, 39-40. Sakharovsky was referred to at Pathé’s trial by his alias, “Kuznetsov.” The Paris residency believed that the DST had not succeeded in identifying him as the son of the former head of the FCD; k-5, 560.

99. Like DURANT, NANT, VERONIQUE, JACQUELINE and NANCY are identified in Mitrokhin’s notes, but cannot be named for legal reasons; vol. 9, ch. 6, paras. 43-9; k-6, 3.

100. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 11.

101. vol. 9, ch. 4, para. 33.

102. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 28; vol. 9, ch. 2, paras. 25-30; vol. 9, ch. 6, paras. 13-15.

103. L’élection présidentielle, 26 avril-10 mai 1981, p. 34. Kahn, “Soviet Comint in the Cold War,” p. 18.

104. vol. 9, ch. 3, para. 20. The “affair of the diamonds” had begun with the publication by one satirical weekly Le Canard Enchaîné on October 10, 1979 of an order placed by Bokassa six years earlier for the purchase of a diamond plaquette for Giscard d’Estaing. The Élysée tried to fend off this and similar stories over the next year and a half until it finally announced on March 23, 1981, just over a month before the first round of the presidential election, that diamonds given to Giscard in 1973, 1974 and 1975 had been valued at 115,000 francs and that this sum had been donated to the Red Cross and other good causes in the Central African Republic.

105. vol. 9, ch. 2, para. 31.

106. Le Monde reported during the campaign, “ C’est incontestablement le parti socialiste qui a la meilleure image de marque dans l’électorat juif. ” L’élection présidentielle, 26 avril-10 mai 1981, p. 73.

107. vol. 9, ch. 2, para. 31.

108. Mitrokhin’s notes give no details of the inside information provided by GILES; k-6, 128.

109. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 3.