Christopher Andrew - The Sword and the Shield

85. Wolf, Man without a Face, pp. 188-94; Colitt, Spy Master, pp. 197-205, 235-7. In February 1992 Kuron was sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment and fined 692,000 marks—his total earnings from the HVA.

86. Wolf, Man without a Face, pp. 198-201; Colitt, Spy Master, pp. 203-4. Wolf ludicrously maintains that the prostitutes he employed to provide sexual services for Tiedge and other defectors “were not prostitutes but down-to-earth women, Party members and loyal to their country, who were prepared to do this in return for… a preferential flat or an advance up the waiting list for a car.”

87. “Wienand zu zweieinhalb Jahren Freiheitsstrafe verurteilt,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (June 27, 1996); “Politik: Wegen langjähriger Spionage für die DDR: Karl Wienand zu zweieinhalb Jahren Haft verurteilt,” Süddeutsche Zeitung (June 27, 1996); Imre Karacs, “Cold War Agent Jailed,” Independent (June 27, 1996).

88. Genscher, Erinnerungen, p. 188.

89. Wolf, Spionagechef im geheimen Krieg, pp. 186-8. After a conversation with the former Soviet ambassador in Bonn, Valentin Falin, in 1992, Brandt wrote, “Since 1975, Karl W[ienand] committed himself to working for the services over there.” Falin later denied having made a specific reference to Wienand. Roger Boyes, “Brandt Papers Revive Spy Claims,” The Times (February 11, 1995). The files seen by Mitrokhin contain no reference to a KGB attempt to recruit Wienand.

90. Observer reported from Bonn on July 3, 1994 that Wehner was “now widely suspected of having been a Stasi spy.”

91. k-3, 63.

92. Colitt, Spy Master, p. 250.

93. k-3, 63.

94. k-3, 63.

95. Wolf, Man without a Face, p. 169. Wolf’s claims are not confirmed (or denied) by Mitrokhin. Mitrokhin’s detailed notes on Wehner’s file stop in 1941.

96. Wolf, Spionagechef im geheimen Krieg, pp. 185, 210-11. Most of the section of Wolf ’s memoirs on Wehner, like much else dealing with German politics, is omitted from the English translation.

97. Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name, pp. 199, 321-2, 533-4.

98. Wolf, Spionagechef im geheimen Krieg, pp. 207, 209.

99. k-2, 53. Wolf then took his revenge on Van Nouhuys by leaking the story to Quick ’s rival Stern, which published it on October 25, 1973. A long court battle followed, eventually decided in favor of Stern. Wolf, Man without a Face, pp. 237-8.

100. In 1994 Brandt’s widow caused a political storm by referring publicly to his suspicions of Wehner.

101. Wolf, Spionagechef im geheimen Krieg, p. 218.

102. k-12, 505-6.

103. k-2, 162.

104. k-2, 165.

105. k-2, 179; k-10, 135-6.

106. k-5, 787.

107. Brezhnev’s visit, however, led to enormous expenditure of KGB time and effort. Security procedures were overseen by a committee including the heads of no less than seven KGB directorates (Kryuchkov among them). Twenty-nine KGB and GRU operational groups were assigned to supervise Brezhnev’s security during the visit. k-5, 788-9.

108. k-8, 104. Soviet-FRG negotiations on the natural gas pipeline from Siberia were successfully concluded in November 1981. According to Sir Percy Cradock, later Mrs. Thatcher’s foreign policy adviser, the Reagan administration “found in the Polish crisis [of December 1981] a convenient pretext for sabotaging an agreement they did not like. Their action was at first confined to US companies, but in June 1982 it was extended, with little thought for the consequences, to US subsidiaries and foreign companies as well.” After vigorous protests by Mrs. Thatcher as well as by Schmidt, the United States backed down in November 1982 in return for NATO acceptance of greater restrictions on trade with the Soviet Union. Cradock, In Pursuit of British Interests, p. 56.

109. k-8, 104.

110. Mitrokhin did not have access to the SCD files which reveal the agent’s name.

111. k-13, 44. Mitrokhin’s notes do not record any response by the Schmidt government.

112. k-19, 282. The active measures against Strauss give the lie to Wolf ’s suggestions since the publication of his memoirs that Strauss was an HVA informant.

113. k-5, 718, k-19, 282. Inge Goliath had been withdrawn to the GDR in 1979. Mitrokhin’s notes summarize, but give few details about, a series of other KGB active measures designed to compromise the BND and BfV: operation JUNGLE, conducted jointly with the HVA from 1978 onwards to discredit the BND and disrupt its relations with other Western intelligence services (k-13, 61, 82, 102-3); operations ZHAK-RUZH, ROZA, BURGUNDER, OSMAN and PANTER (1978), designed, again in co-operation with the HVA, “to expose and impede the activity of the FRG special services in Europe and in the Near East” (k-13, 61); operation ONTARIO (1978), “to cause disagreements between the CIA, the SDECE and the BND” (k-13, 79); operation JAMES (1980), “to exacerbate disagreements between the BND and the CIA” (k-13, 102); operation KLOP (1981), to discredit the BfV (k-13, 85); operation ORKESTR (1981), to discredit West German journalists who were alleged to be BND officers or co-optees (k-13, 86); and operation DROTIK (1981), to compromise Western businesses allegedly used by the CIA and the BND as cover and for other operational purposes (k-13, 87).

114. k-5, 718, k-19, 282.

115. k-6, 102; k-19, 32.

116. Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name, p. 320.

117. Wolf, Man without a Face, p. 222.

118. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), More Instructions from the Centre, pp. 38-9.

119. Hanson, Soviet Industrial Espionage; US Government, Soviet Acquisition of Militarily Significant Western Technology; Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Birds, p. 260.

120. RICHARD was first deployed in the FRG in 1964; k-16, 110, 129.

121. k-18, 441.

122. k-10, 39.

123. t-2, 34.

124. vol. 6, ch. 6.

125. Even when restrictions on the export of Western computers were relaxed during the Gorbachev era, fears that they were bugged or deliberately infected with viruses continued. Nikolai Brusnitsin, deputy chairman of the State Technical Commission, complained in 1990 that the software in a West German computer sold to a Soviet shoe-making factory had been deliberately pre-programmed to self-destruct. There had, he claimed, been a whole series of such incidents. Brusnitsin, Openness and Espionage, pp. 28-9.

126. Line X agents identified in the files seen by Mitrokhin include (in alphabetical order) BORIS, the manager of an electronics factory (k-18, 230); DAL, a laser technology and plasma specialist (k-10, 38); DYMOV, a computer programmer at a research center in West Berlin (k-12, 442); EBER, an employee of a major company (k-14, 570); EGON, an East German illegal working as an engineer (k-16, 112, 296); EMIL, an employee of Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (k-10, 37); ERICH, a chemical engineer (k-5, 232); FOTOGRAF, a scientist employed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (t-2, 54); FRIMAN, a rocket technology specialist (K-10, 32, 47); GUTSUL, the owner of a dye company (k-18, 318); HANS, an agent with access to two large engineering firms (k-14, 698); KARL, an expert in electro-magnetism who for part of his career worked as an agent of the Paris residency against French targets; KERNER, a polymer chemist (k-10, 48; k-12, 414; k-16, 120-1); KEST, head of a research group at a medical institute (k-5, 341); KLEIN, a nuclear physicist (k-14, 429); LEONID, a computer scientist in a multinational chemical company (k-18, 277; k-27, 323); LETON, a trade official specializing in radio electronics (k-12, 129); LOTTS, who held a senior position in an aerospace research institute (k-10, 41, 44); MORZH, a Yugoslav who supplied embargoed chemical products (k-5, 9); MOST, founder of an electronics company (k-12, 87); PAUL, owner of an electronics company (t-2, 18); RASPORYATIDEL (“Organizer”), a company director who supplied equipment for assembling integrated circuits (k-14, 570); ROBERT, a rocket engineer (k-10, 35); SHMEL, head of a computer company (k-18, 283); TAL, a designer of chemical factories and polymer plants (t-2, 1); TART, who worked for the giant chemical company Bayer (k-14, 670); TSANDER, a polymer chemist (k-10, 48; k-12, 414; k-16, 120-1); VILON, a company director who supplied embargoed goods (k-5, 10); VIN, director of an electronics company (k-5, 216); YUNG, an aircraft computer systems engineer (k-2, 70, 120); WAGNER, an employee of a major petrochemical company (k-10, 33, 46).