Christopher Andrew - The Sword and the Shield

140. k-2, 66. Mitrokhin’s notes give no indication of whether IKAR continued to work as a KGB agent after his return to Italy.

141. k-5, 102.

142. k-9, 23; k-10, 126.

143. k-12, 516. IKAR, PLATON, ENERO and ARTUR were not the only SCD recruits in the Italian embassy in Moscow. Mitrokhin’s notes also refer to the case of POLATOV (or POLETOV), an assistant service attaché, recruited by the SCD in the late 1970s, but give no details (k-10, 124). There may have been further embassy agents not mentioned in Mitrokhin’s notes.

Other Italians recruited by the SCD in Moscow included an official in the legal department of the Italian interior ministry, recruited with the assistance of VERA, a swallow from the Polish SB (k-2, 273); and RITA, a female employee of the Fiat company recruited in 1976 (k-10, 132).

144. k-27, 240.

145. k-22, 72; k-26, 66; t-2, 158.

146. k-5, 256.

147. Cf. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 459.

148. k-14, 262, 383. BUTIL broke contact in 1979 after his firm had failed to win Soviet contracts.

149. k-5, 420, 423.

150. The Italian businessmen identified in Mitrokhin’s notes as Line X agents in the 1970s and/or early 1980s were CHIZ (k-14, 567), ERVIN (k-7, 37), KOZAK (k-14, 174), METIL (k-14, 383), PAN (k-12, 593) and TELINI (k-12, 389). It is unclear whether SAUST, a business consultant cultivated by the KGB, was actually recruited (k-14, 568).

151. Mitrokhin’s notes identify a total of seventeen Line X officers stationed at the Rome residency for all or part of the period 1974-9 (k-5, 459).

152. k-5, 353, 425. The Soviet ambassador in Rome, N. S. Rhyzov, had opposed the establishment of a Soviet consulate in Milan in order to provide cover for a KGB residency in northern Italy, but the foreign ministry in Moscow gave way to pressure from the Centre (k-5, 422).

153. k-5, 353, 357.

154. k-5, 357.

155. Mitrokhin’s notes give few details on MARIO save that he was recruited in 1972 and usually met his controller in the Soviet Union (k-6, 192).

156. k-14, 264; vol. 6, app. 1, part 40. As in other countries, Line X agents in Italy were also used to obtain ST from US sources (k-5, 236).

157. vol. 6, app. 1, part 39. Mitrokhin’s notes identify KULON and his research institute.

158. k-5, 425. Mitrokhin’s notes do not indicate what happened to UCHITEL and Kuznetsov’s other agents after his expulsion. It would have been normal practice for them to have been put on ice.

159. k-2, 415.

160. k-2, 217; k-3, 112.

161. k-2, 225, 243; k-20, 348.

162. k-2, 250, 275; k-4, 71; k-10, 52; vol. 6, app. 1, parts 39, 41.

163. k-2, 230, 242; k-13, 133; k-20, 347; k-21, 34; k-26, 68.

164. k-2, 274. Mitrokhin’s notes transcribe his codename alternately as ACHERO and AGERO. The most likely codename is ACERO, pronounced “achero”—the Italian for “steel.”

165. k-7, 126.

166. k-7, 48.

167. k-2, 212, 216, 220, 224, 229, 257-8; k-21, 32.

168. k-2, 211, 249.

169. k-2, 240, 271; k-25, 188. METSENAT’s controllers in the Rome residency were, successively, Vladimir Yevgenyevich Strelkov, Anatoli Yegorovich Abalin, Valentin Mikhaolovich Yatsura and Konstantin Kazakov.

170. k-1, 1; k-2, 214, 222, 244; k-13, 143; k-14, 687.

171. k-13, 153, 148.

172. k-13, 148. The active measures statistics were much in line with those for the previous two years. In 1975 the Rome residency reported that “3 documentary [forged document] operations were carried out; 10 conversations of influence were held; 1 press conference, 1 conference [were arranged]; 4 oral reports were disseminated; 48 articles were published; 6 questions were asked in Parliament; 1 delegation was assembled and sent out; 4 appeals were drafted; 4 mailing operations were carried out; an Italy-Spain committee was set up; 2 leaflet operations were carried out and 2 anonymous letters were sent out” (k-13, 135). The active measures statistics for 1976 were as follows:

articles placed [in the press]: 63

conversations of influence: 6

appeals made: 9

working group organized: 1

booklet distributed: 1

leaflet operation carried out: 1

anonymous letters distributed: 2

demonstration held: 1

parliamentary questions: 2

question in the Senate: 1

“Round Table” meeting held: 1

Of the total number of articles printed, 28 of the press articles were designed to discredit the Main Adversary; 21 alleged CIA interference in Italian affairs. The residency also claimed to have made “active use” of the “Italy-Spain” committee. Four active measures operations were intended “to discredit Maoism as an anti-socialist tendency.” k-13, 151.

173. Mitrokhin’s notes probably contain only an incomplete record of new agents recruited by the Rome residency during the period 1977-83. Among them, however, were ARO, who worked for the Ansaldo company in Genoa and was recruited at some point between 1978 and 1981 (k-14, 439); CLEMENT, a member of the international department of the Christian Association of Italian Workers (ACLI), recruited in 1978 but put on ice in 1981 after he had failed to supply intelligence of much significance (k-14, 395); KARS, an Italian physicist who worked as a Line X agent in both Italy and the United States in the early 1980s (k-14, 264; vol. 6, app. 1, part 40); KOK, a sinologist recruited in 1977 for operations against the PRC (k-13, 153); and KOZAK, the owner of an Italian engineering company, who was recruited not later than 1978 (k-14, 174).

174. k-14, 687.

175. k-7, 48.

176. k-10, 109; k-25, 188.

177. k-7, 126.

178. k-13, 112.

179. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, p. 10.

180. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 19-20.

181. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 629-31.

182. “Order of the Chairman of the KGB,” no. 107/OV, September 5, 1990.

1. Lenin, Works, vol. 35, pp. 89-90; Shipler, Russia, pp. 270-1. KGB persecution of Islam and Judaism will be covered in volume 2.

2. Stalin may also have been influenced by the desire not to alienate his Anglo-American allies by continued religious persecution at a time when he was pressing them to open a second front. Pospielovsky, “The ‘Best Years’ of Stalin’s Church Policy (1942-1948) in the Light of Archival Documents.”

3. The work of Michael Bourdeaux and his colleagues at Keston College has impressively documented the vitality of religious life in the post-war Russian Orthodox Church, despite continued persecution and a mostly subservient hierarchy. See, inter alia, Bourdeaux, Risen Indeed.

4. Luchterhandt, “The Council for Religious Affairs.”

5. vol. 5, sec. 9.

6. Meerson, “The Political Philosophy of the Russian Orthodox Episcopate in the Soviet Period,” p. 221.

7. Revesz, The Christian Peace Conference, pp. 1-4.

8. k-1, 232.

9. k-1, 214.

10. Harriss, “The Gospel According to Marx,” pp. 61-2.

11. Mitrokhin did not see the file on the 1961 WCC Central Committee meeting. Another file noted by him, however, identifies ADAMANT as Nikodim; vol. 7, ch. 5, para. 28.

12. “WCC Gives Eight-point Lead to Member Churches,” Church Times (August 29, 1969).

13. “Elusive Goal” (leader), Church Times (August 29, 1969).

14. Harriss, “The Gospel According to Marx,” pp. 61-2. On Buyevsky’s role in the Moscow Patriarchate’s foreign relations Department, see Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church, p. 266.

15. Letter from the Bishop of Bristol to the Church Times (September 7, 1973); Smith, Fraudulent Gospel, pp. 2-3.