Christopher Andrew - The Sword and the Shield

29. k-20, 103. On June 7 Aristov, Kulikov and Pavlov telegraphed the Politburo to urge “the necessity of a direct dialogue with S. Kania about his departure from the post of the First Secretary” (k-20, 57).

30. k-20, 105.

31. k-20, 53.

32. k-20, 52.

33. k-20, 55.

34. k-20, 54.

35. k-19, 385.

36. k-20, 54, 102, 112.

37. Boyes, The Naked President, pp. 97-8.

38. k-19, 110.

39. k-19, 115.

40. Boyes, The Naked President, pp. 94-5.

41. k-19, 115.

42. k-19, 115.

43. k-19, 117.

44. k-19, 113.

45. k-19, 102.

46. k-19, 106.

47. k-19, 105.

48. k-19, 103.

49. k-19, 104.

50. Kramer (ed.) “Declassified Soviet Documents on the Polish Crisis,” pp. 132-3.

51. CPSU Secretary K. V. Rusakov told Honecker after Kania’s sacking, “We noticed that lately a difference began to appear between Kania and Jaruzelski in their approaches to basic questions. Jaruzelski began to show more and more readiness to accept violent measures in dealing with counter-revolution. We began to work with Jaruzelski. When doing this, we were influenced by the fact that Jaruzelski possessed greater authority in the army and also enjoyed the support of the ministers” (k-20, 338).

52. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 315-16.

53. k-20, 303.

54. Kramer (ed.), “Declassified Soviet Documents on the Polish Crisis,” pp. 133-4.

55. k-20, 311.

56. k-20, 327.

57. k-20, 307.

58. k-20, 304.

59. k-20, 327.

60. k-20, 308.

61. Ustinov denied, not wholly convincingly, that Kulikov had actually referred to the possibility of Soviet military intervention; Kramer (ed.), “Declassified Soviet Documents on the Polish Crisis,” pp. 134-7.

62. k-20, 315, 316.

63. k-20, 340.

64. k-20, 315.

65. k-20, 325.

66. k-20, 293.

67. k-20, 324.

68. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 334, 339.

69. Boyes, The Naked President, pp. 106-7.

70. k-20, 329.

71. k-20, 297.

72. Boyes, The Naked President, p. 107.

73. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 336-7.

74. k-20, 297.

75. k-20, 316.

76. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 337-9.

77. k-20, 323.

78. k-20, 296.

79. k-20, 298.

80. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 343-4.

81. k-19, 53.

82. k-19, 321.

83. k-19, 23.

84. Boyes, The Naked President, p. 108; Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, p. 348.

85. k-20, 249.

86. k-19, 23.

87. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, p. 348.

88. Boyes, The Naked President, pp. 307-9.

89. k-20, 249.

90. k-19, 261.

91. Boyes, The Naked President, p. 117.

92. k-19, 381.

93. k-19, 380.

94. k-19, 411.

95. k-19, 312.

96. k-19, 252.

97. k-19, 253.

98. k-19, 257.

99. k-19, 258.

100. k-19, 261. Mitrokhin’s notes do not record the content of Brezhnev’s message to Jaruzelski. On prosecutions after the declaration of martial law, see Swidlicki, Political Trials in Poland 1981-1986.

101. k-19, 642.

102. k-19, 311.

103. k-19, 324.

104. k-19, 326.

105. k-19, 328.

106. k-19, 337.

107. k-19, 339.

108. k-19, 128.

109. k-19, 124.

110. k-19, 143. Kiszczak expressed his thanks for material and technical assistance already received; Mitrokhin’s notes do not record the nature of this assistance.

111. k-19, 143.

112. k-1, 15.

113. k-19, 135.

114. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 376-7.

115. Szulc, Pope John Paul II, pp. 388-9.

116. Boyes, The Naked President, p. 131.

117. k-19, 143.

118. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 381-2.

119. Boyes, The Naked President, pp. 132-3.

120. Boyes, The Naked President, pp. 117, 134-6.

121. Boyes, The Naked President, pp. 117, 136-7.

122. Boyes, The Naked President, pp. 137-8.

123. Szulc, Pope John Paul II, pp. 395-6; Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 387-8.

124. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 388-9; Szulc, Pope John Paul II, pp. 396-7.

125. k-16, 500.

126. Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, p. 249.

127. Dobbs, Down with Big Brother, pp. 265-9; Lévesque, The Enigma of 1989, ch. 6.

128. Dobbs, Down with Big Brother, p. 288.

129. Interview with Shebarshin, Daily Telegraph (December 1, 1992).

1. Jukes, “The Soviets and ‘Ultra.’” Though Jukes’s conclusions are debatable, his 1988 article remains a pathbreaking study.

2. Kennedy-Pipe, Russia and the World, 1917-1991. Dr. Kennedy-Pipe’s otherwise valuable book is only one example of the continuing underestimation of the role of Soviet foreign intelligence even in some of the most recent work by leading Western scholars.

3. The significance of SIGINT was made clear by David Kahn’s pioneering The Codebreakers, published in 1967. Though a bestseller, however, its contents appeared to stun, rather than to inspire, most historians of international relations.

4. A growing minority of international relations, history and other departments in British universities now offer courses on intelligence, though on a much smaller scale than in north America. There is a flourishing British Study Group on Intelligence, with a largely academic membership, and an increasing number of similar groups in north America and continental Europe.

5. Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four, p. 7.

6. Hosking, A History of the Soviet Union, p. 219.

7. Two of the leading historians of the Bolshevik Revolution, Orlando Figes and Richard Pipes, agree on describing the Cheka as “a state within a state.”

8. Volkogonov, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire, pp. 73-4.

9. Conquest, The Great Terror, pp. 468-70. It was a sign of the difficulty encountered by many Western historians in interpreting the Terror that Conquest’s was the only full-scale history of it published during the life of the Soviet Union.

10. Ostryakov, Voyennye Chekisty, p. 258.

11. k-25, 78. On the punitive use of psychiatry in the Soviet Union, see Bloch and Reddaway, Russia’s Political Hospitals.

12. k-25, 79. There is no suggestion in Mitrokhin’s notes that Voloshanovich was working for the KGB.

13. See above, chapter 20.

14. frag. 1,7. Mitrokhin’s notes give no details of the precise charges leveled against Korobov or of the length of his sentence.

15. k-3b, 136.

16. I am grateful to Dr. Clarissa de Waal of Newnham College, Cambridge, for these recollections of Tirana in 1992.

17. A further 3 percent were KGB co-optees.

18. t-7, 284.

19. t-7, 286. The behavior of the informers should not, in most cases, be harshly judged. Those who refused invitations to inform were likely to incur the ill will of the KGB towards themselves and their families.

20. frag. 5, 3.

21. Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 287-98.

22. See above, chapter 20.

23. Kissinger subsequently acknowledged that Senator Pat Moynihan had been an exception. “Your crystal ball,” he told him, “was better than mine.” Moynihan, Secrecy, p. 6.

24. For example, the Russian sections of Eric Hobsbawm’s brilliant history of the twentieth century, Age of Extremes, include no mention of any of the heads of the Cheka and its successors, save for a passing reference to Andropov’s career before becoming General Secretary as “chief of the security apparatus” (p. 476).