Christopher Andrew - The Sword and the Shield

25. There is, however, a one-line reference to Andropov’s subsequent emergence as Soviet leader in Vance’s reflections on the period after his resignation (Vance, Hard Choices, p. 421).

26. Gorbachev, however, acknowledged that, eighteen months or two years earlier, the coup might have succeeded.

27. Remnick, Resurrection. The American edition of this generally admirable study appeared in 1997.

28. k-13, 268.

29. Kennedy-Pipe, Russia and the World, 1917-1991, is the most recent of the many studies of Soviet foreign policy which make no mention of these aspects of it.

30. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 149-52.

31. Truman, Year of Decisions, p. 346.

32. VENONA, BBC Radio 4 documentary written and presented by Christopher Andrew (producers: Mark Burman and Helen Weinstein), first broadcast March 18, 1998. Andrew, “The VENONA Secret.” The Centre received progress reports on VENONA from Weisband until 1950 and from Philby from 1949 to 1951.

33. See above, chapter 9.

34. DARIO had already served in the Italian foreign ministry before the Second World War, and was reemployed there afterwards.

35. See above, chapter 21.

36. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 29-40.

37. Fursenko and Naftali, “Soviet Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” pp. 65-6.

38. See above, chapters 6, 7, and 15.

39. See above, chapter 26.

40. Izvestia (September 24, 1991).

41. The foreign intelligence reports submitted to Stalin and Khrushchev and the more elaborate assessments supplied to their successors will one day be a major source for the study of Soviet foreign policy. Thus far, however, very few are available for research.

42. k-9, 122; vol. 2, app. 3.

43. Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, pp. 145-7.

44. See above, chapters 11, 13, and 21.

45. Pentagon estimate cited by Tuck, High-Tech Espionage, pp. 108-9.

46. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, p. 33.

47. Gorbachev’s speech was reported in Pravda on March 26, 1986.

48. Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, pp. 134-5, 139.

49. See above, chapter 25.

50. Report of the House Committee, chaired by Representative Christopher Cox, of which a declassified version was published as this volume was going to press in May 1999.

51. k-3b, 137. Though this residency circular was sent out in 1977, it merely reiterated priorities formulated in previous instructions from the Centre.

52. k-25, 186.

53. See above, chapter 20.

54. See above, chapter 18.

55. See above, chapter 22.

56. vol. 6, ch. 1, part 1; k-25, 56; k-21, 74, 96, 99.

57. vol. 6, ch. 10. Mitrokhin’s notes do not give the names of the operational officers assigned to the Karpov-Korchnoi match. Korchnoi’s official “second,” the British grandmaster Raymond Keene, believed that the head of the Soviet delegation at the championship, V. D. Baturinsky, was a KGB colonel (Keene, Karpov-Korchnoi 1978, p. 32). Korchnoi gives an account of his defection and career up to the 1978 world championship in his autobiography, Chess is My Life.

58. Keene, Karpov-Korchnoi 1978, pp. 56, 147-9, 153-4. During the rematch between Korchnoi and Karpov at Merano, Italy, in 1981, the KGB established a dedicated cipher communication circuit to report on the progress of matches and arranged a shuttle service between the Rome residency and the KGB operational group covering the World Chess Championship. No fewer than fourteen active measures were implemented in an attempt once again to ensure Korchnoi’s defeat (k-5, 921). The undercover KGB advance party at Merano claimed to be monitoring the drinking water, the climate, noise levels, even levels of radioactivity (Kasparov, Child of Change, p. 76). Korchnoi, then past his best and, at fifty, a relatively elderly challenger for the world title, lost by eleven points to seven.

59. Karpov’s eventual conqueror in the 1985 world championship, Gary Kasparov, has made much of the obstacles placed in his path by the Soviet establishment. He himself, however, owed much to the support of the head of the Azerbaijan KGB, Geidar Alyev. Lawson, The Inner Game, p. 17; Kasparov, Child of Change, p. 79.

60. See above, chapter 28.

61. See above, chapter 29.

62. The text of the appeal of the “State Committee for the State of Emergency,” dated August 18, 1991, was published in The Times (August 19, 1991).

63. Gorbachev, The August Coup, p. 31.

64. Knight, Spies Without Cloaks, pp. 130-1. Trubnikov is a former senior FCD officer who made his reputation during operations in India, which will be covered in volume 2.

65. Unattributable information from Russian sources.

66. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, p. 17.

67. Unattributable information from Russian sources.

68. Remnick, Resurrection, p. 370.

69. Unattributable information from Russian sources.

70. Knight, Spies Without Cloaks, pp. 89-91, 106-8. Remnick, Resurrection, pp. 276-7. Anna Blundy, “Return to Grace of the Baby-faced Hawk,” The Times (May 13, 1999). Stepashin is the only one of the original supporters of the war to admit his mistake.

71. Davies, Europe, pp. 328-32, 464-5.

72. The classic, though possibly overstated, analysis of the faultlines between cultures is Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.

73. Pulled westward by a Western-educated élite often out of tune with its own population, Greece remains something of an anomaly as an Orthodox member of NATO and the EU. Stefan Wagstyl, Kerin Hope and John Thornhill, “Christendom’s Ancient Split,” Financial Times (May 4, 1999).

74. Haslam, “Russia’s Seat at the Table,” p. 129.

75. Vujacic, “Gennadiy Zyuganov and the ‘Third Road.’”

76. Unusual but not unique. As a result of the divisive legacy of the Spanish Civil War, Spain also has no words to its national anthem. The Soviet Union found itself in a similar situation in 1956 after Krushchev suppressed the existing words to the Soviet national anthem as too Stalinist. New words were not devised until 1977.

77. Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, pp. 3-4.

78. Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, conclusion.

1. Mitrokhin’s Archive

Mitrokhin’s notes and transcripts are arranged in four sections:

(i) k-series: handwritten notes on individual KGB files, stored in large envelopes;

(ii) t-series: handwritten notebooks containing notes on individual KGB files;

(iii) vol.-series: typed volumes containing material drawn from numerous KGB files, mostly arranged by country, sometimes with commentary by Mitrokhin;

(iv) frag-series: miscellaneous handwritten notes.

2. Published Collections of Soviet Documents Containing KGB Material

Andrew, Christopher, and Gordievsky, Oleg (eds.), Instructions from the Centre: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975-1985 (London: Hodder Stoughton, 1990); slightly revised US edition published as Comrade Kryuchkov’s Instructions: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975-1985 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993)

Andrew, Christopher, and Gordievsky, Oleg (eds.), More Instructions from the Centre: Top Secret Files on KGB Global Operations, 1975-1985 (London: Frank Cass, 1991)

Cold War International History Project Bulletin: regularly publishes declassified Soviet official documents, including some KGB reports to the Politburo (see articles cited in section 3 of the bibliography)