Günter Bischof - The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968

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On August 20, 1968, tens of thousands of Soviet and East European ground and air forces moved into Czechoslovakia and occupied the country in an attempt to end the “Prague Spring” reforms and restore an orthodox Communist regime. The leader of the Soviet Communist Party, Leonid Brezhnev, was initially reluctant to use military force and tried to pressure his counterpart in Czechoslovakia, Alexander Dubcek, to crack down. But during the summer of 1968, after several months of careful deliberations, the Soviet Politburo finally decided that military force was the only option left. A large invading force of Soviet, Polish, Hungarian, and Bulgarian troops received final orders to move into Czechoslovakia; within 24 hours they had established complete military control of Czechoslovakia, bringing an end to hopes for “socialism with a human face.”
Dubcek and most of the other Czechoslovak reformers were temporarily restored to power, but their role from late August 1968 through April 1969 was to reverse many of the reforms that had been adopted. In April 1969, Dubchek was forced to step down for good, bringing a final end to the Prague Spring. Soviet leaders justified the invasion of Czechoslovakia by claiming that “the fate of any socialist country is the common affair of all socialist countries” and that the Soviet Union had both a “right” and a “sacred duty” to “defend socialism” in Czechoslovakia. The invasion caused some divisions within the Communist world, but overall the use of large-scale force proved remarkably successful in achieving Soviet goals. The United States and its NATO allies protested but refrained from direct military action and covert operations to counter the Soviet-led incursion into Czechoslovakia.
The essays of a dozen leading European and American Cold War historians analyze this turning point in the Cold War in light of new documentary evidence from the archives of two dozen countries and explain what happened behind the scenes. They also reassess the weak response of the United States and consider whether Washington might have given a “green light,” if only inadvertently, to the Soviet Union prior to the invasion.

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NOTES

Translated from German into English by Otmar Binder, Vienna.

1. Jitka Vondrová and Jaromír Navrátil, eds., Mezinárodní souvislosti československé krize 1967–1970: Červenec—srpen 1968 , vol. 4, no. 2 (Brno: Doplněk, 1996), 211–12; RGANI, F. 3, op. 72, d. 198, pp. 7–11, Politburo resolution of the CC CPSU P 96 (IV), 19 August 1968; Jaromír Navrátil et al., eds., The Prague Spring 1968: A National Security Archive Documents Reader (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1998), 405–8.

2. Navrátil et al., The Prague Spring 1968 , 408. Milan Klusák, Svoboda’s son-in-law, was present during the meeting. At the time of the Moscow negotiations, he was head of the First Department of the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry; until July 1968, he had been the ČSSR’s ambassador to the United Nations in New York, and from April 1969 he was deputy foreign minister.

3. Navrátil et al., The Prague Spring 1968 , 411–13; Jan Pauer, Prag 1968: Der Einmarsch des Warschauer Paktes: Hintergründe—Planung—Durchführung (Bremen: Edition Temmen, 1995), 230–31. For details, see Valerij Vartanov, “Die militärische Niederschlagung des ‘Prager Frühlings,’” in Karner et al., Beiträge , 661–71; on the successful execution of the orders see SAPMO-BA, DY 30/3621, 62–67, “Information der KPdSU an die SED über den Einmarsch in die ČSSR,” 22 August 1968, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #104.

4. Pauer, Prag 1968 , 231.

5. BStU, ZA, SdM 34, 104–9, transcript of the conversation between the minister for national defense of the GDR, H. Hoffmann, with the supreme commander of the Interventionist Alliance, I. Yakubovskii, 29 August 1968, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente, # 100.

6. For details, see Manfred Wilke, “Ulbricht, East Germany, and the Prague Spring“ in this volume.

7. RGANI, F. 3, op. 72, d. 192, pp. 18, 30, Politburo resolution of the CC CPSU. P 93/6, 30 July 1968, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente, # 52.

8. RGANI, F. 2, op. 3, d. 130, pp. 1–26, L. I. Brezhnev’s speech at the plenary session of the CC CPSU, 31 October 1968, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente, # 122.

9. Cf. Brezhnev’s statements that he repeatedly made to Dubček on 23 August in Moscow and in the telephone conversations on 9 and 13 August 1968. There are primay sources on the one-on-one talks between Brezhnev and Dubček. No interpreters were present because Dubček was fluent in Russian. Dubček claimed that no agreements had been reached in Čierná nad Tisou and that in unofficial talks with Brezhnev the upcoming conference in Bratislava had been the only topic. See Alexander Dubček, Leben für die Freiheit: Die Autobiographie (Munich: Bertelsmann, 1993), 247–49, here 248. Cf. also the telephone conversations between Brezhnev and Dubček on 9 and 13 August 1968. Vondrová and Navrátil, Mezinárodní souvislosti československé krize , 164–67; Navrátil et al., The Prague Spring 1968 , 336–38; RGANI, F. 89, op. 76, d. 75, pp. 1–18, telephone conversation between L. Brezhnev and A. Dubček, 13 August 1968, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , # 57; Vondrová and Navrátil, Mezinárodní souvislosti československé krize , 172–81; Navratil et al., The Prague Spring 1968 , 345–56; cf. also Vasil Bil’ak, Wir riefen Moskau zu Hilfe: Der “Prager Frühling” aus der Sicht eines Beteiligten (Berlin: Edition Ost, 2006), 119–33.

10. Pauer, Prag 1968 , 175–94; Lutz Priess, “werten Sie unsere Erklärung als nachdrückliche Bitte und Forderung um Ihr Eingreifen und um allseitige Hilfe,” Darch 12 (1994): 1252–55; AdBIK, Holdings “Prague Spring,” shorthand minutes of the meeting of the Interventionist Coalition in Moscow, 18 August 1968, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #87.

11. For details, see Mikhail Prozumenshchikov, “Inside the Politburo of the CPSU: Political and Military Decision Making to Solve the Czechoslovak Crisis,” in this volume.

12. ÚSD, AÚV KSČ, F. 07/15, Zahr. Kor. No. 822. RGANI, F. 3, op. 72, d. 193, pp. 2, 6–8, Politburo resolution of the CC CPSU P 94 (I), “On the Question of the Situation in Czechoslovakia,” 16 August 1968, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #150; Navrátil et al., The Prague Spring 1968 , 366–67; Pauer, Prag 1968 , 209.

13. Navrátil et al., The Prague Spring 1968 , 384–87.

14. For details, see Csaba Békés, “Hungary between Prague and Moscow,” in this volume.

15. RGANI, F. 3, op. 72, d. 193, pp. 2, 6–8 (cf. note 12 above).

16. This can be inferred from RGANI, F. 3, op. 72, d. 197, pp. 27, 30, Politburo resolution of the CC CPSU 95 (2), “On the Telegram to the Soviet Ambassador in the ČSSR,” 18 August 1968.

17. RGANI, F. 3, op. 72, d. 197, pp. 27, 30.

18. Černík was also present when the letter was delivered. Dubček in retrospect dated the delivery wrongly (“Sunday evening”). Navrátil et al., The Prague Spring 1968 , 400; Dubček, Leben für die Freiheit , 258, 263–64.

19. Pauer, Prag 1968 , 237.

20. Bil’ak, Wir riefen Moskau zur Hilfe , 154; Dubček, Leben für die Freiheit , 261; Zdeněk Mlynař, Nachtfrost: Das Ende des Prager Frühlings (Frankfurt am Main: Athenäum, 1988), 185–86; Werner Marx and Günther Wagenlehner, eds., Das tschechische Schwarzbuch: Die Tage vom 20. bis 27. August 1968 in Dokumenten und Zeugenaussagen. Zeitpolitische Schriftenreihe 6 (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1969), 9–13.

21. Dubček, Leben für die Freiheit , 258, 263–64.

22. Dubček, Leben für die Freiheit , 264; Mlynař, Nachtfrost , 187.

23. On this point, the published memoirs of the dramatis personae either contradict one another or differ in the weight they attribute to the controversy between Dubček and Svoboda. Dubček only mentions that Svoboda appeared approximately forty minutes after he first rang him. Neither he nor Mlynař make any mention of the reputedly heated controversy. See Mlynař, Nachtfrost , 187, 192; Bil’ak, Wir riefen Moskau zu Hilfe , 154–55; Dubček, Leben für die Freiheit , 264–66; Pauer, Prag 1968 , 252–53.

24. Bil’ak, Wir riefen Moskau zu Hilfe , 159; Dubček, Leben für die Freiheit , 264–65; Mlynař, Nachtfrost , 191–93; Pauer, Prag 1968 , 237–39.

25. Dubček, Leben für die Freiheit , 268. It would appear more probable that the security police erroneously discharged him. SAPMO-BA, DY 30/3621, 62–67 (cf. note 3).

26. At 5:22 a.m., Vltava aired the TASS communiqué, and at 5:45 a message to the Czechoslovak People’s Army. Both the TASS communiqué and the message to the army are reprinted in Prager Schwarzbuch (Bonn: Edition Atlantic Forum, 1969), 22–25.

27. At 7:30 a.m. Czechoslovak radio announced that the station was surrounded by tanks. At 9 a.m., the building of the radio station was occupied by Soviet soldiers.

28. Prager Schwarzbuch , 33.

29. Later Dubček learned that in all probability he was made to stop over in Legnica in southern Poland. This is where the headquarters of the allied forces was stationed. Dubček, Leben für die Freiheit , 270–71.

30. Dubček, Leben für die Freiheit , 269ff; Prager Schwarzbuch , 38–39.

31. For details, see above all Pauer, Prag 1968 , 292.

32. RGANI, F. 89, op. 38, d. 57, pp. 62–110, stenographic transcript of the talks between the Soviet leadership and the first secretary of the KPČ, A. Dubček, and the president of the ČSSR, O. Černík, 23 August 1968, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #106.

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