Günter Bischof - The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968

33. RGANI, F. 3, op. 72, d. 199, p. 25, and RGANI, F. 3, op. 72, d. 200, p. 52, Politburo resolution of the CC CPSU P 97 (47), 23 August 1968, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #105.

34. Bil’ak, Wir riefen Moskau zu Hilfe , 171–72.

35. Among those present at the time was also Gennadii Voronov, who only spoke once. Brezhnev told Dubček that Svoboda was on his way to Moscow and was “in the air now.” Bil’ak, Wir riefen Moskau zu Hilfe , 171–72.

36. It has proved impossible to date to ascertain what venue was used for the talks. They did not take place in the Kremlin. In setting the scene, Brezhnev said, “We will conduct the negotiations with Ludvík Ivanovič [Svoboda] in the Kremlin as usual. Secret negotiations will be conducted in this room; as he will be here on an official visit, we will have to make a report. Our meeting will therefore take place where our meetings with statesmen are normally scheduled.” RGANI, F. 89, op. 38, d. 57, pp. 62–110 (cf. note 32). The assumption that the Soviet leadership had talked to Svoboda before talking to Dubček is not borne out by the evidence. Dubček himself saw excerpts from the minutes of the talks, which partly jogged his memory, partly confused it. Dubček’s version that Brezhnev had used Svoboda to confuse him is most probably due to his reading the minutes after an interval of more than twenty years. Whether Dubček refrained from a reference to his first meeting with the Soviet leaders on purpose is a moot point. We would suggest that Dubček’s patchy memories had better be attributed to the ordeal of arrest, abduction, sleeplessness, and impaired health. Dubček, Leben für die Freiheit , 276–89.

37. RGANI, F. 89, op. 38, d. 57, pp. 62–110 (cf. note 32).

38. The May plenum of the CC CPČ lasted from 29 May to 1 June 1968. Contrary to the hopes of the “fraternal parties,” which had been banking on a decisive victory of the “healthy forces” and the end of the reformist movement, the plenum resulted in a compromise that fell short of the expectations of the “Five.” By way of reaction, the political pressure against the CPČ was stepped up. See Lutz Priess et al., Die SED und der “Prager Frühling” 1968: Politik gegen einen “Sozialismus mit menschlichem Antlitz” (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1996), 156–57. In the Kremlin, expectations during the run-up to the plenum were low. See Prozumenshchikov, “Inside the Politburo,” in this volume.

39. See Dubček, Leben für die Freiheit , 271.

40. For details, see Dubček’s memoirs, where he repeats he was convinced the conference did not take place in the ČSSR. See Dubček, Leben für die Freiheit , 282.

41. This is also mentioned by Dubček in his autobiography: “Finally Černík entered the room, and the whole scene had to be repeated for him.” See Dubček, Leben für die Freiheit , 287.

42. According to Dubček, it was not Černík who had suggested that the 14th Party Congress should be treated as irregular. See Dubček, Leben für die Freiheit , 288. The minutes are inconclusive on this point. See Document 32/2.

43. Dubček, Leben für die Freiheit , 288.

44. Pauer, Prag 1968 , 288.

45. See Arbeiter-Zeitung , 24 August 1968, 1; Bil’ak, Wir riefen Moskau zu Hilfe , 172–73; Dubček, Leben für die Freiheit , 294.

46. Brezhnev and Svoboda had met at the end of the war. Svoboda was commander in chief of the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps, which fought side by side with the Soviets. For details, see Michael Morozow, Leonid Breschnew, Biographie (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1973).

47. RGANI, F. 3, op. 72, d. 198, pp. 2, 7–11, Politburo resolution of the CC CPSU P 96 (IV), “On the Instructions to the Soviet Ambassador in Prague,” 19 August 1968, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #66.

48. See, for instance, his report to the CC CPSU, RGANI, F. 89, op. 61, d. 5, pp. 1–60, “Report of the Head of the KGB, Y. Andropov, to the CC CPSU on the Activities of the Counterrevolutionary Underground in the ČSSR,” 13 October 1968, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #121.

49. Pauer, Prag 1968 , 256–57.

50. “Svoboda and I were linked by years of a cordial relationship and had great respect for one another. We agreed on practically all matters regarding the ‘Prague Spring’; Svoboda was an upright supporter of our reforms.” Dubček, Leben für die Freiheit , 290.

51. RGANI, F. 89, op. 38, d. 57, pp. 1–19, stenographic transcripts of the talks between the Soviet leadership with the president of the ČSSR, L. Svoboda, and M. Klusák, 23 August 1968, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #107 (partially reprinted in appendix 8 of this volume); Pauer, Prag 1968 , 289. Pauer was not yet able to make use of these stenographic transcripts. In his analysis, he nevertheless came to the correct conclusion that Svoboda considered the Party Congress irregular but wanted this assessment to be validated by the party delegation. Svoboda’s role needs to be reassessed in light of the sources now accessible. Up to now it had to be assumed that he was a fervent advocate before the Soviet leadership for Dubček and Černík keeping their posts. This is not borne out by the evidence, as will be shown in greater detail below. It was not until Svoboda had learned from Brezhnev that the Kremlin did not doubt that Dubček was an essential ingredient in the “normalization” of the situation in the ČSSR or that at least normalization could only be achieved at a disproportionately high cost without him that Svoboda began to argue in favor of Dubček and joined the Soviet leaders in the search for the best “solution.” Bil’ak, too, seems to have got wind of the idea to oust Dubček during a visit he paid Svoboda and to have come out vehemently against it for the following reasons: Dubček should not be accorded martyr status and he should be “made to face the music.” Bil’ak, Wir riefen Moskau zu Hilfe , 183. Pauer inferred from the stenographic transcript of Kosygin’s talk with the “fraternal parties” that Svoboda had signaled his distrust of Dubček. Pauer, Prag 1968 , 319.

52. RGANI, F. 89, op. 38, d. 57, pp. 1–19 (cf. note 51).

53. RGANI, F. 89, op. 38, d. 57, pp. 1–19.

54. RGANI, F. 89, op. 38, d. 57, pp. 1–19.

55. RGANI, F. 89, op. 38, d. 57, pp. 1–19; cf. also Pauer, Prag 1968 , 289

56. RGANI, F. 89, op. 38, d. 57, pp. 1–19 (cf. note 51). See also Rüdiger Wenzke, “Die Nationale Volksarmee der DDR. Kein Einsatz in Prag,” in Karner et al., Beiträge . According to Gomułka, the NVA, the GDR’s National People’s Army, was kept back at the express wish of the group around Bil’ak and Indra. Cf. Pauer, Prag 1968 , 229.

57. RGANI, F. 89, op. 38, d. 57, pp. 1–19 (cf. note 51).

58. RGANI, F. 89, op. 38, d. 57, pp. 19–61, stenographic transcripts of the talks of the Soviet leadership with the president of the ČSSR, L. Svoboda, 23 August 1968, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #108. Only fragmentary excerpts of the transcripts have been available up to now. They were published in Czech in Vondrová and Navrátil, Mezinárodní souvislosti československé krize , 250–53; in English in Navrátil et al., The Prague Spring 1968 , 469–71; Pauer did not even have access to these excerpts. His analyses, therefore, had to make do with the memoirs of Bil’ak and comparable sources. Pauer, Prag 1968 , 289–91.

59. RGANI, F. 89, op. 38, d. 57, pp. 19–61 (cf. note 58).

60. RGANI, F. 89, op. 38, d. 57, pp. 19–61.

61. RGANI, F. 89, op. 38, d. 57, pp. 19–61.