Günter Bischof - The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968

By indirection and public deception, Johnson was able to continue his policy of gradual escalation unabated throughout 1966 and 1967. Even though public discontent grew over these years, resulting in many street protests, the majority of Americans supported the war. Then came the Tet Offensive, which, though militarily disastrous for the Vietcong and North Vietnamese, shattered the illusion broadcasted throughout 1967 by Johnson and Westmoreland that the United States and South Vietnam were on the brink of winning the war. Despite the great American public relations disaster that was the Tet Offensive, Johnson, even after his 31 March speech limiting the bombing and inviting negotiations, kept the pressure on the Vietcong and North Vietnamese, particularly in light of their great losses during Tet. In addition, while welcoming negotiations, Johnson did not initially compromise on fundamental issues once the talks began.

The administration also used every means at their disposal to strengthen the position of South Vietnam during the summer of 1968. While reducing the bombing in the north, Johnson greatly stepped up the air war in the south. Planes attacked infiltration routes, lines of communications, and suspected enemy base camps. The number of B-52 missions tripled, and ground troops conducted the largest search and destroy operations of the war. In addition, the United States and South Vietnam initiated an accelerated pacification plan with such programs as the Chieu Hoi and Phoenix to try to control as much of the countryside as possible. The Americans also aided the South Vietnamese in increasing their force levels. However, all these were long-range undertakings that could not erase years of neglect or mismanagement. None of these measures won many hearts and minds. These efforts certainly weakened, but did not destroy the Vietcong organization or many North Vietnamese main units. Furthermore, the rampant corruption of the South Vietnamese government didn’t endear the South Vietnamese to their leaders. 4

Adding to Johnson’s difficulties was the intransigence on both sides of the peace talks in Paris. By August, the time of the tumultuous and divisive Democratic National Convention and the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, the negotiators in Paris had still not agreed on the shape of the table from which they would negotiate. Though the talks looked increasingly hopeful in the fall, South Vietnam balked at the initial agreement. The Johnson administration failed to get a peace settlement in time to deliver the White House to Democratic presidential nominee Hubert Humphrey. 5Johnson in his last months in office was a “prisoner of the White House,” increasingly isolated and beaten down by dissent from many sources. He had been politically destroyed by Vietnam. Whether or not the United States should have been involved in the war is a matter beyond the scope of this chapter. What is irrefutable is that Johnson’s Vietnam policies came under increasing attacks from both hawks and doves.

The president tried not to offend either extreme by choosing a middle course and pleased neither side. And though in America many voices expressed their discontent with Johnson and Vietnam, it was the public opposition of several southern members of the United States Congress, who collectively, in the words of historian John Fry, took “center stage” on foreign policy matters over Vietnam, that both helped influence and also reflected the opinions of a majority of Americans. In congressional hearings and through other acts and statements, southern members of Congress expressed diverse opinions on Johnson and Vietnam. This diversity of opinions among southern leaders in part helped shape the debate over the war and added to the difficulties encountered by the Texas president to prosecute the war.

According to a number of polls, a majority of ordinary Southerners supported a more aggressive military strategy in Vietnam which was more in line with military officials. Southerners supported and southern leaders protected military leaders in part because of the great financial benefit their states enjoyed from military spending. As one scholar described it, “[the South] paid homage to and reaped benefits from the defense establishment.” In addition to defense spending, one out of every three soldiers in Vietnam came from the South, a region that represented only 25 percent of the population of the United States. Furthermore, the South had a large share of military retirees as well. 6Therefore, a significant number of southern legislators became the most fervent hawks on Vietnam, advocating increasingly aggressive measures.

Examples of Southern “superhawks” included Senator J. Strom Thurmond of South Carolina, Representative L. Mendel Rivers of South Carolina, and Senator Russell Long and Representative F. Edward Hebert of Louisiana. All served on the Armed Services Committees of each house, with Rivers and Hebert both serving as chair at various times during the Vietnam War. All of them also consulted regularly with top military brass, who were increasingly frustrated with the limits both Secretary of Defense McNamara and President Johnson put on the U.S. forces in Vietnam. Though many of these leaders were in the loop regarding American military forces and operations, some made irresponsible statements as if they were, in the words of Joseph Fry, “less well informed” on Vietnam. 7For instance, in 1966 and 1967 Rivers, the chair of the House Armed Services Committee, Hebert, ranking member and later chair, and Thurmond, former member of the reserves, all advocated the use of nuclear weapons if it were necessary to produce victory in Vietnam. “We must stand ready to offer our lives on the altar of freedom,” Hebert declared when announcing his support of a possible nuclear attack in Vietnam. “If we do not,” he continued, “we are not worthy of being called Americans.” 8

Not all southern hawks made statements that extreme. Senators Russell of Georgia, chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and John Stennis of Mississippi, head of the Senate Armed Services Investigating Subcommittee on Military Preparedness, and eventual chair, had agonized privately over Johnson’s Vietnam policies before unleashing hawkish public criticisms in 1966 and 1967. In 1954, both Russell and Stennis had spoken out forcefully against U.S. military intervention to try to save the French forces at Dien Bien Phu. Moreover, both made Johnson aware of their hesitation in supporting the escalation of the war early on. Transcripts of Johnson’s White House phone conversations in 1964 and 1965 include many heartfelt conversations with Russell over Vietnam, mainly because of the president’s long-time association with Russell in the Senate (Johnson considering Russell to be a mentor) and because of Russell’s long experience on military and foreign policy matters. There are many quotes suggesting Russell’s continuing frustration with the conflict. In a phone conversation with Johnson in mid-1964, Russell declared that the Vietnam conflict was the “damn worst mess I ever saw.” 9From the beginning of U.S. involvement, Russell had little confidence in U.S. military intervention and, at one point in 1965, suggested that the Domino Theory did not apply to Vietnam. 10Nevertheless, once Johnson committed troops, Russell said U.S. honor was at stake, and he urged Johnson to “go all the way” militarily to win. 11

Stennis held similar views. Though the Mississippi senator voted enthusiastically for the Gulf of Tonkin resolution in 1964, Johnson’s gradual escalation increasingly concerned him. In a joint Senate Armed Services/Foreign Relations Committee hearing in early 1965, Stennis said that the Congress should be consulted before Johnson sent in more troops. However, once Johnson began major escalation of the war, Stennis advocated using “every weapon we have” against the North Vietnamese and Vietcong. 12Both Russell and Stennis, due to their significant seniority in the Senate and positions of considerable power within the Senate Armed Services Committee, became important spokesmen for the hawks who grew disenchanted with Johnson’s gradualism.