Günter Bischof - The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968

Brezhnev subsequently became visibly aggressive. He and Podgornyi criticized Husák for not having become active—or for having not having become active enough against anti-Soviet and antisocialist propaganda. Brezhnev then changed tack: “Don’t let’s attack one another! Our talks are difficult enough as it is!” Husák replied that he had always clearly positioned himself at rallies. Podgornyi countered by asking him how much use this had been in his eyes if the media had failed to report it. Podgornyi reiterated once more the danger inherent in the propaganda of the other side. This could “make the cauldron boil over” so that “the result was a real civil war.” Brezhnev followed suit: “If you want to speculate on a civil war, then you yourselves will have to shoulder the responsibility.” Nowhere in Czechoslovakia, according to Brezhnev, had the military invasion met with resistance apart from Prague, at the moment troops had attempted to bring the mass media under their control. Brezhnev then attacked Husák directly: “If you were really a Communist, a true Leninist, then you would be grateful to us for having gone into Czechoslovakia. We went in to save you—yet you turn this against us.” 62

Finally it was the turn of Bil’ak, one of Moscow’s most loyal Communist followers. At the session of the Presidium of the CC on 21 August, he was one of only a handful to openly oppose convening the Party Conference. “They trumpeted that we were traitors and we were unable to shout back resoundingly and unmask them as the real traitors and counterrevolutionaries”; they did not control the media. Bil’ak gave a realistic appraisal of the state of affairs from his point of view and declared that surely President Svoboda was able to report from Moscow that Černík and Dubček had been present at the negotiations. It so happened that in a few days’ time the Slovak Communists’ Party Conference was due, which according to Bil’ak presented no danger of providing a stage for potentially anti-Soviet agitation. Brezhnev insisted nevertheless on Husák calling his comrades in Bratislava to tell them to abort the Party Conference, which had been scheduled for 24 August. 63

After the end of the talks, the Soviet leadership acceded to the wishes of the Czechoslovak delegation and had Dubček and Černík, who were put up in accommodations on the Lenin Hills, brought into the Kremlin. There are several clues that seem to suggest that Brezhnev took charge of the two at first and presumably informed them about the attitudes of the delegation’s members regarding the 14th Party Conference. 64

In this briefing, the two must have been confronted with the fact that all members of the delegation had agreed to declare the Party Conference and its resolutions null and void. Immediately afterwards, Dubček and Černík joined Svoboda and the other delegation members. Dubček had expected that Svoboda, “regardless of the pitiable circumstances, would be delighted and relieved” to see him. In light of the newly accessible passages of the minutes from which it follows that Svoboda would have loved to see Dubček ousted from his post, Svoboda’s reaction to seeing Dubček does not come as a surprise: “As I stood before him I was shocked to see a look of cold disdain in his eyes…. At that moment he seemed almost to radiate enmity, as if something had changed his innermost emotions.” Dubček never questioned Svoboda later as to the reasons for his cold reaction. 65It is possible there was one more meeting between Dubček and Černík and the Soviet leadership, which apparently led to no significant rapprochement between the positions of the two sides. 66

On the next day, 24 August, Husák announced at 6:20 a.m. on Slovak radio from Moscow that Dubček and Černík were taking part in the negotiations. 67Ahead of further negotiations, Brezhnev informed the leaders of the “fraternal parties” who had arrived in Moscow in the meantime, Władysław Gomułka, Walter Ulbricht, 68János Kádár, and Todor Zhivkov, about the state of the negotiations. 69In this he had the awkward task, as he saw it, of telling the allied comrades that Dubček could not be cast aside. The plan to install a collaborationist government in Prague, which the allies had agreed on in Moscow prior to the invasion on 18 August, had proven impossible to realize. As Brezhnev explained to the leaders of the allied Communist parties, it had not been feasible to begin at once with the political work. “Unfortunately our hopes proved unfounded,” Brezhnev said, “that these rascals would get scared and beat the retreat.” 70“Confronted with this mass hysteria, part of the healthy forces took refuge in the [Soviet] embassy and gave up trying to deploy any active propaganda efforts,” he continued The forces loyal to Moscow were cowards and were considered traitors in Czechoslovakia. This was the reason, according to Brezhnev, why Dubček, Černík, Smrkovský, Kriegel, Špaček, and Šimon had been interned. He justified the invasion once more, failing which “Czechoslovakia would have become a bourgeois republic in a matter of days.” Then Brezhnev informed the allied Communist Party leaders about the “offer” that had been made to Svoboda of forming a new government, which the latter had declined saying that he would be toppled in no time. Svoboda had agreed, according to Brezhnev, to declare the 14th Party Conference illegal, yet he had urged the Soviet leadership “to conduct the negotiations in such a way that the government returning to Prague was a legal one.” This meant in plain language “that Černík, Dubček, and Smrkovský were due to return to Prague.” Brezhnev summed up the new point of departure succinctly: “We have no new demands in addition to those that we have already formulated in Čierná nad Tisou.”

Dubček’s attitude was criticized sharply by Brezhnev. Černík was the first, according to Brezhnev, to declare himself prepared to call the Party Conference illegal. Dubček then adopted “this idea,” “but not as firmly and with such determination as Černík.” There was in Brezhnev’s assessment a “certain amount of cunning” on the part of Dubček behind all this. The negotiations had, therefore, not moved beyond an initial phase, but the plan was to let Svoboda fly home ahead of the others and to issue a communiqué saying that the negotiations with the Czechoslovak delegation were being continued. Svoboda had declared he was going to persuade Dubček to resign, but in Brezhnev’s eyes, this was simply naive. There is no written evidence for this statement. 71

While it is impossible to prove that such a conversation did not take place, it appears more plausible that Brezhnev used such words to make it clear that Svoboda was by no means loyal to Dubček; he could, therefore, be regarded as having proven his loyalty to the Soviet Union. However, as one had to take into account Svoboda’s position in the ČSSR in the prevailing circumstances, there was no other way out than keeping Dubček and Černík in place for the time being.

Of all the Communist Party leaders of the “fraternal countries,” SED leader Ulbricht was the most vehement in his opposition to this. In reply to Ulbricht’s interposed question whether it followed from all this that the delegation would return under Dubček’s leadership, Brezhnev became again extremely circumstantial, “Do not think for a moment that we are yielding ground by even one step…. All we are saying is that the situation is extremely complex.” Brezhnev tried to allay the comrades’ misgivings. In his assessment, it was crucial for Indra to be the next in line after Dubček. “In this case it would be possible to find some other job for Dubček after a while.” Gomułka insisted on the troops stationed in the ČSSR being given new orders for the struggle against counterrevolutionaries, saying, “Let’s face the situation with which we’re confronted. Czechoslovakia only exists in name. There are isolated communists, but there is no longer a Communist Party. The Communist Party has been transformed into a social democratic party, a party that makes common cause with the counterrevolution, that goes down the same road.” Ulbricht subsequently agreed that one had to reach a compromise regarding Dubček, but warned against mentioning him by name in any communiqué. Dubček had cheated on everyone before so often, there was no doubt he would do it again given only half a chance. Zhivkov chimed in in support of Ulbricht. It was his considered opinion that it was possible to “make use” of Černík for a while, but this did not apply to Dubček. Zhivkov said, “We must be on the offensive, Comrade Brezhnev, otherwise things simply go from bad to worse…. We must have our sights on the suppression of the counterrevolution. The gangs that are active in Prague must be liquidated,” to which Gomułka replied: